Appendix A. Fixed Effects

We mainly use random effects models instead of fixed effects models. There are two reasons why we choose random effects models rather than fixed effects models. First, unlike random effects models, fixed effects models cannot take account of between-country effects at the country level. We aim to capture both between and within effects. Second, we have some time invariant control variables such as Muslim population, major power, and regional dummy variables. Fixed effects models cannot make an estimation of the time invariant control variables. Random effects models provide far more than fixed effects model can provide.[1] Therefore, we conclude that random effects models are preferred over fixed effects models in our analysis.

For robustness checks, however, we report the results of fixed effects models. Overall, there is no substantial difference in the results between random effects and fixed effects models except one model. Unlike Model 6, the interaction variable in Model A2.3 between revolutionary government and logged oil and gas income per capita fails to achieve statistical significance at 90 percent confidence. This result supports our hypothesis more than our main model. When we use a continuous measure of petro-state status, we can observe oil's peace-inducing effect in both revolutionary and non-revolutionary government (Figure A1).

[1] Bell, Fairbrother, and Jones 2018, 1052.

Table A1. Poisson Regression Analysis with Fixed Effects: Alternative Measurement of Petrostate

Dependent Variable: *Aggressor-MIDs*	Model A1.1	Model A1.2	Model A1.3
Revolutionary Government	0.321***	0.289***	0.298***
	(0.104)	(0.096)	(0.093)
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	-0.369**		
	(0.164)		
Revolutionary Government ×	0.485**		
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	(0.192)		
Petrostate (10% of GDP)		-0.124	
		(0.121)	
Petro Revolution (10% of GDP)		0.545***	
		(0.191)	
Petrostate (20% of GDP)			0.014
			(0.150)
Petro Revolution (20% of GDP)			0.695***
			(0.211)
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.094	-0.148**	-0.153**
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Population, *log*	-0.065	-0.05	-0.091
	(0.118)	(0.107)	(0.106)
Polity IV	-0.008	-0.012*	-0.013*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Contiguous Borders	0.145***	0.107***	0.104***
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Cold War	0.069	0.025	-0.024
	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Observations	6350	6291	6291
Countries	132	136	136
AIC	5490.203	5558.258	5548.695
BIC	5564.521	5632.474	5622.911

All models use fixed effects Poisson regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data.

Standard errors are in parentheses.

A spline of peace years is included in all models but not shown in this table.

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A1 presents the results of Poisson regression analysis with fixed effects. Table A1 has three models in which we use different indicators to measure oil wealth. Model A1.1 uses a binary variable whether each country's net oil export revenues divided by GDP would be equal or larger than 10 percent. Both Model A1.2 and A1.3 utilize oil and gas income measure divided by GDP rather than using net oil export revenues. They use different thresholds for petrostate. In Model A1.2, the threshold of the binary variable, petrostate, is 10 percent. In Model A1.3, the threshold for petrostate is 20 percent.

Table A2. Poisson Regression Analysis with Fixed Effects: Continuous Measurement of Petrostate with Different Timelines

Dependent Variable: *Aggressor-MIDs*	Model A2.1 Full	Model A2.2 1945-1990	Model A2.3 1945-2001
Revolutionary Government	0.346***	0.355***	0.308***
	(0.090)	(0.119)	(0.094)
Oil & Gas Income/CAP, *log*	-0.027**	-0.053***	-0.028**
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.014)
Revolutionary Government × Oil & Gas Income/CAP, *log*	0.029**	0.049***	0.026
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.016)
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.139**	-0.135	-0.071
	(0.067)	(0.106)	(0.077)
Population, *log*	0.071	0.165	0.1
	(0.111)	(0.180)	(0.127)
Polity IV	-0.012*	-0.006	-0.005
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Contiguous Borders	0.110***	0.151***	0.127***
	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.026)
Cold War	0.049		0.072
	(0.086)		(0.090)
Observations	6291	3335	5037
Countries	136	102	131
AIC	5559.995	3239.523	4707.463
BIC	5634.211	3300.645	4779.233

All models use fixed effects Poisson regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
A spline of peace years is included in all models but not shown in this table.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A2 presents the results of Poisson regression analysis with fixed effects. Table A2 has three models in which we use a continuous measure of petrostate status: logged oil and gas income per capita with different timelines. Model A2.1 is a full model with the full time span from 1945 to 2010. Model A2.2 captures the impact of the Cold War from 1945 to 1990. Model A2.3 follows Colgan's timelines from 1945 to 2001.

Table A3. Poisson Regression Analysis with Fixed Effects:
Impact of Influential Cases: The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)

Dependent Variable: *Aggressor-MIDs*	Model A3.1	Model A3.2	Model A3.3 Without Iran-Iraq 1980-1988 Cases
Revolutionary Government	0.332***	0.264***	0.264***
	(0.105)	(0.096)	(0.096)
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	-0.283*		
	(0.164)		
Revolutionary Government ×	0.143		
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	(0.206)		
Petrostate (10% of GDP)		-0.105	-0.093
		(0.123)	(0.123)
Petro Revolution (10% of GDP)		0.129	0.095
		(0.214)	(0.219)
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988	1.430***	1.450***	
	(0.196)	(0.201)	
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.110*	-0.177***	-0.155**
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Population, *log*	-0.204*	-0.134	-0.169
	(0.120)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Polity IV	-0.01	-0.016**	-0.017**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Contiguous Borders	0.152***	0.108***	0.109***
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Cold War	-0.085	-0.107	-0.115
	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Observations	6350	6291	6277
Countries	132	136	136
AIC	5441.472	5509.652	5429.317
BIC	5522.546	5590.614	5503.508

All models use fixed effects Poisson regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
A spline of peace years is included in all models but not shown in this table.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A3 presents the results of Poisson regression analysis with fixed effects. Table A3 has three models in which we include a dummy variable for nine years (1980-1988) of the Iran-

Iraq War (Model A3.1 and A3.2) and then exclude those years from the analysis in Model A3.3. All three models use full time span from 1945 to 2010. To measure oil wealth, Model A3.1 and A3.3 use a binary variable whether each country's net oil export revenues divided by GDP would be equal or larger than 10 percent. Model A3.2 utilizes a different indicator: whether oil and gas income measure divided by GDP would be equal or larger than 10 percent.

Table A4. Poisson Regression Analysis with Fixed Effects: Impact of Influential Cases: The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) with Restricted Time Span (1945-1990)

Dependent Variable: *Aggressor-MIDs*	Model A4.1	Model A4.2	Model A4.3 Without Iran-Iraq 1980-1988 Cases
	1945-1990	1945-1990	1945-1990
Revolutionary Government	0.16	0.241*	0.241*
	(0.122)	(0.126)	(0.126)
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	-0.484**		
	(0.226)		
Revolutionary Government ×	0.926***		
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	(0.297)		
Petrostate (10% of GDP)		-0.12	-0.09
		(0.157)	(0.156)
Petro Revolution (10% of GDP)		0.393	0.305
		(0.287)	(0.302)
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988	1.235***	1.404***	
	(0.237)	(0.250)	
GDP/CAP, *log*	0.042	-0.071	-0.006
	(0.099)	(0.106)	(0.107)
Population, *log*	-0.287*	-0.302*	-0.405**
	(0.162)	(0.175)	(0.178)
Polity IV	-0.013	-0.008	-0.01
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Contiguous Borders	0.161***	0.137***	0.140***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Observations	3684	3335	3321
Countries	100	102	102
AIC	3316.116	3204.399	3122.37
BIC	3384.445	3271.634	3183.45

All models use fixed effects Poisson regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
A spline of peace years is included in all models but not shown in this table.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A4 presents the results of Poisson regression analysis with fixed effects. Table A4 has three models in which we include a dummy variable for nine years (1980-1988) of the Iran-

Iraq War (Model A4.1 and A4.2) and then exclude those years from the analysis in Model A4.3. All three models use limited time span from 1945 to 1990. To measure oil wealth, Model A4.1 and A4.3 use a binary variable whether each country's net oil export revenues divided by GDP would be equal or larger than 10 percent. Model A4.2 utilizes a different indicator: whether oil and gas income measure divided by GDP would be equal or larger than 10 percent.

Figure A1. Effect of Oil and Gas Income per capita on MIDs by Revolutionary and Non-revolutionary Leaders



Note Control variables are all set to their mean values.

Appendix B. Negative Binomial Regression Analysis

The Poisson regression analysis assumes equality of the mean and variance (*equidispersion*). However, the variance of count data often exceeds the mean, which is called *overdispersion*.[2] To explore for overdispersion, we check the Pearson dispersion statistic of the generalized Poisson regression analysis in our main models. The Pearson dispersion statistics are 1.158071 (Model 1), 1.124553 (Model 2), 1.113802 (Model 3), 1.142219 (Model 4), 1.091893 (Model 5), 1.156298 (Model 6), 1.131865 (Model 7), 1.101663 (Model 8), 1.099223 (Model 9), 1.096718 (Model 10), 1.052933 (Model 11), and 1.04871 (Model 12). All the values are slightly greater than 1. It means that our count data may be a little overdispersed. Therefore, we use fixed and random effects negative binomial models to test possible overdispersion and check the robustness of our main models.

When we use negative binomial models with either random effects or fixed effects, the Pearson dispersion statistic values get closer to 1 than the Poisson models. However, there is no substantive difference in the results between Poisson and negative binomial models with random effects. When we take account of negative binomial models with fixed effects, in Model B6.1 and B6.3, the interaction variable between revolutionary government and logged oil and gas income per capita fails to achieve statistical significance at 90 percent confidence. In our main models (Model 4 and 6), the interaction variable is statistically significant at 95 percent confidence. When we use a continuous measure of petro-state status with fixed effects negative binomial models, we can observe that there is no statistically significant difference in bellicosity between revolutionary and non-revolutionary government.

[2] Cameron and Trivedi 2013, 4

Table B1. Negative Binomial Regression Analysis with Random Effects: Alternative Measurement of Petrostate

Dependent Variable: *Aggressor-MIDs*	Model B1.1	Model B1.2	Model B1.3
Revolutionary Government	0.344***	0.336***	0.346***
	(0.100)	(0.093)	(0.090)
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	-0.455***		
	(0.148)		
Revolutionary Government ×	0.460**		
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	(0.193)		
Petrostate (10% of GDP)		-0.213*	
		(0.117)	
Petro Revolution (10% of GDP)		0.519***	
		(0.190)	
Petrostate (20% of GDP)			-0.123
			(0.145)
Petro Revolution (20% of GDP)			0.733***
			(0.211)
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.111**	-0.133**	-0.145***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.056)
Population, *log*	0.200***	0.228***	0.222***
	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Polity IV	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Contiguous Borders	0.090***	0.072***	0.070***
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Cold War	0.132*	0.135*	0.111
	(0.076)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Muslim, % Population	0.121	0.058	0.038
	(0.267)	(0.252)	(0.250)
Major Power	0.739**	0.677**	0.695**
	(0.356)	(0.341)	(0.341)
Constant	-1.247	-1.428	-1.134
	(1.146)	(1.128)	(1.141)
Observations	7317	7217	7217
Countries	159	159	159
AIC	6327.38	6304.542	6298.625
BIC	6486.033	6462.878	6456.961

All models use random effects negative binomial regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data.
Standard errors are in parentheses.

Regional dummy variables and a spline of peace years are included in all models but not shown in this table.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B1 presents the results of negative binomial regression analysis with random effects. Table B1 has three models in which we use different indicators to measure oil wealth. Model B1.1 uses a binary variable whether each country's net oil export revenues divided by GDP would be equal or larger than 10 percent. Both Model B1.2 and B1.3 utilize oil and gas income measure divided by GDP rather than using net oil export revenues. They use a different threshold for petrostate. In Model B1.2, the threshold of the binary variable, petrostate, is 10 percent. In Model B1.3, the threshold for petrostate is 20 percent.

Table B2. Negative Binomial Regression Analysis with Random Effects: Continuous Measurement of Petrostate with Different Timelines

Dependent Variable:	Model B2.1	Model B2.2	Model B2.3
Aggressor-MIDs	Full	1945-1990	1945-2001
Revolutionary Government	0.392***	0.389***	0.341***
	-0.087	-0.11	-0.091
Oil & Gas Income/CAP, *log*	-0.033***	-0.062***	-0.038***
	-0.011	-0.015	-0.012
Revolutionary Government ×	0.032**	0.052***	0.035**
Oil & Gas Income/CAP, *log*	-0.014	-0.018	-0.015
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.099*	-0.093	-0.06
	-0.058	-0.084	-0.065
Population, *log*	0.284***	0.418***	0.323***
	-0.057	-0.082	-0.064
Polity IV	-0.011	-0.008	-0.007
	-0.007	-0.009	-0.007
Contiguous Borders	0.074***	0.082***	0.083***
	-0.019	-0.027	-0.021
Cold War	0.133*		0.097
	-0.072		-0.078
Muslim, % Population	0.112	0.146	0.2
	-0.252	-0.33	-0.273
Major Power	0.615*	0.05	0.259
	-0.34	-0.485	-0.376
Constant	-2.764**	-4.802***	-3.889***
	-1.205	-1.652	-1.314
Observations	7217	4241	5857
Countries	159	137	158
AIC	6301.913	3813.953	5419.241
BIC	6460.25	3953.709	5572.775

All models use random effects negative binomial regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Regional dummy variables and a spline of peace years are included in all models but not shown in this table. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B2 presents the results of negative binomial regression analysis with random effects. Table B2 has three models in which we use a continuous measure of petrostate status: logged oil and gas income per capita with different timelines. Model B2.1 is a full model with the full time span from 1945 to 2010. Model B2.2 captures the impact of the Cold War from 1945 to 1990. Model B2.3 follows Colgan's timelines from 1945 to 2001.

Table B3. Negative Binomial Regression Analysis with Random Effects: Impact of Influential Cases: The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)

Dependent Variable: *Aggressor-MIDs*	Model B3.1	Model B3.2	Model B3.3 Without Iran-Iraq 1980-1988 Cases
Revolutionary Government	0.342***	0.325***	0.326***
	(0.100)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	-0.393***		
	(0.146)		
Revolutionary Government ×	0.178		
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	(0.203)		
Petrostate (10% of GDP)		-0.201*	-0.199*
		(0.117)	(0.117)
Petro Revolution (10% of GDP)		0.164	0.148
		(0.207)	(0.211)
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988	1.321***	1.338***	
	(0.197)	(0.202)	
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.136**	-0.156***	-0.144***
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Population, *log*	0.176***	0.212***	0.205***
	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Polity IV	-0.01	-0.011*	-0.012*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Contiguous Borders	0.095***	0.075***	0.076***
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Cold War	0.053	0.062	0.065
	(0.076)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Muslim, % Population	0.129	0.071	0.081
	(0.266)	(0.253)	(0.253)
Major Power	0.767**	0.705**	0.712**
	(0.356)	(0.344)	(0.344)
Constant	-0.188	-0.488	-0.36
	(1.225)	(1.223)	(1.258)
Observations	7317	7217	7203
Countries	159	159	159
AIC	6288.625	6265.681	6185.738
BIC	6454.176	6430.901	6344.029

All models use random effects negative binomial regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data.
Standard errors are in parentheses.

Regional dummy variables and a spline of peace years are included in all models but not shown in this table.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B3 presents the results of negative binomial regression analysis with random effects. Table B3 has three models in which we include a dummy variable for nine years (1980-1988) of the Iran-Iraq War (Model B3.1 and B3.2) and then exclude those years from the analysis in Model B3.3. All three models use full time span from 1945 to 2010. To measure oil wealth, Model B3.1 and B3.3 use a binary variable whether each country's net oil export revenues divided by GDP would be equal or larger than 10 percent. Model B3.2 utilizes a different indicator: whether oil and gas income measure divided by GDP would be equal or larger than 10 percent.

Table B4. Negative Binomial Regression Analysis with Random Effects: Impact of Influential Cases: The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) with Restricted Time Span (1945-1990)

Dependent Variable: *Aggressor-MIDs*	Model B4.1	Model B4.2	Model B4.3 Without Iran-Iraq 1980-1988 Cases
	1945-1990	1945-1990	1945-1990
Revolutionary Government	0.221*	0.255**	0.251**
	(0.116)	(0.118)	(0.118)
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	-0.672***		
	(0.201)		
Revolutionary Government ×	0.806***		
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	(0.285)		
Petrostate (10% of GDP)		-0.342**	-0.332**
		(0.148)	(0.148)
Petro Revolution (10% of GDP)		0.407	0.335
		(0.276)	(0.286)
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988	1.118***	1.259***	
	(0.232)	(0.243)	
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.093	-0.144*	-0.118
	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Population, *log*	0.263***	0.303***	0.290***
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Polity IV	-0.01	-0.008	-0.009
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Contiguous Borders	0.077***	0.061**	0.060**
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Muslim, % Population	0.178	0.106	0.124
	(0.330)	(0.325)	(0.324)
Major Power	0.338	0.304	0.344
	(0.539)	(0.491)	(0.493)
Constant	-1.631	-1.549	-1.225
	(1.554)	(1.814)	(2.098)
Observations	4615	4241	4227
Countries	131	137	137
AIC	3973.74	3792.597	3711.009
BIC	4121.793	3938.706	3850.693

All models use random effects negative binomial regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data.

Standard errors are in parentheses.
Regional dummy variables and a spline of peace years are included in all models but not shown in this table.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B4 presents the results of negative binomial regression analysis with random effects. Table B4 has three models in which we include a dummy variable for nine years (1980-1988) of the Iran-Iraq War (Model B4.1 and B4.2) and then exclude those years from the analysis in Model B4.3. All three models use limited time span from 1945 to 1990. To measure oil wealth, Model B4.1 and B4.3 use a binary variable whether each country's net oil export revenues divided by GDP would be equal or larger than 10 percent. Model B4.2 utilizes a different indicator: whether oil and gas income measure divided by GDP would be equal or larger than 10 percent.

Table B5. Negative Binomial Regression Analysis with Fixed Effects: Alternative Measurement of Petrostate

Dependent Variable: *Aggressor-MIDs*	Model B5.1	Model B5.2	Model B5.3
Revolutionary Government	0.327***	0.303***	0.309***
	(0.107)	(0.098)	(0.095)
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	-0.482***		
	(0.174)		
Revolutionary Government ×	0.384*		
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	(0.207)		
Petrostate (10% of GDP)		-0.166	
		(0.126)	
Petro Revolution (10% of GDP)		0.464**	
		(0.203)	
Petrostate (20% of GDP)			-0.009
			(0.154)
Petro Revolution (20% of GDP)			0.661***
			(0.218)
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.099	-0.143**	-0.149**
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Population, *log*	0.023	0.009	-0.044
	(0.112)	(0.104)	(0.108)
Polity IV	-0.008	-0.011	-0.012*
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Contiguous Borders	0.124***	0.091***	0.092***
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Cold War	0.07	0.024	-0.019
	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.087)
Constant	1.618	2.497	3.766*
	(1.953)	(1.935)	(2.103)
Observations	6350	6291	6291
Countries	132	136	136
AIC	5486.39	5554.947	5547.596
BIC	5567.465	5635.91	5628.559

All models use fixed effects negative binomial regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
A spline of peace years is included in all models but not shown in this table.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B5 presents the results of negative binomial regression analysis with fixed effects. Table B5 has three models in which we use different indicators to measure oil wealth. Model B5.1 uses a binary variable whether each country's net oil export revenues divided by GDP would be equal or larger than 10 percent. Both Model B5.2 and B5.3 utilize oil and gas income measure divided by GDP rather than using net oil export revenues. They use different threshold for petrostate. In Model B5.2, the threshold of the binary variable, petrostate, is 10 percent. In Model B5.3, the threshold for petrostate is 20 percent.

Table B6. Negative Binomial Regression Analysis with Fixed Effects: Continuous Measurement of Petrostate with Different Timelines

Dependent Variable:	Model B6.1	Model B6.2	Model B6.3
Aggressor-MIDs	Full	1945-1990	1945-2001
Revolutionary Government	0.341***	0.324***	0.297***
	(0.093)	(0.121)	(0.097)
Oil & Gas Income/CAP, *log*	-0.031**	-0.059***	-0.034**
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.014)
Revolutionary Government ×	0.025	0.043**	0.02
Oil & Gas Income/CAP, *log*	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.016)
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.123*	-0.122	-0.052
	(0.068)	(0.108)	(0.078)
Population, *log*	0.114	0.219	0.138
	(0.104)	(0.160)	(0.119)
Polity IV	-0.011	-0.006	-0.004
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Contiguous Borders	0.090***	0.126***	0.104***
	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.027)
Cold War	0.032		0.033
	(0.086)		(0.092)
Constant	0.411	-1.414	-0.791
	(1.892)	(2.592)	(2.067)
Observations	6291	3335	5037
Countries	136	102	131
AIC	5553.936	3237.134	4700.929
BIC	5634.898	3304.369	4779.223

All models use fixed effects negative binomial regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
A spline of peace years is included in all models but not shown in this table.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B6 presents the result of negative binomial regression analysis with fixed effects. Table B6 has three models in which we use a continuous measure of petrostate status: logged oil and gas income per capita with different timelines. Model B6.1 is a full model with the full time span from 1945 to 2010. Model B6.2 captures the impact of the Cold War from 1945 to 1990. Model B6.3 follows Colgan's timelines from 1945 to 2001.

Table B7. Negative Binomial Regression Analysis with Fixed Effects: Impact of Influential Cases: The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)

Dependent Variable: *Aggressor-MIDs*	Model B7.3 Without Iran-Iraq 1980-1988 Cases
Revolutionary Government	0.267***
	(0.097)
Petrostate (10% of GDP)	-0.097
	(0.124)
Petro Revolution (10% of GDP)	0.097
	(0.220)
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.155**
	(0.066)
Population, *log*	-0.16
	(0.111)
Polity IV	-0.017**
	(0.007)
Contiguous Borders	0.106***
	(0.025)
Cold War	-0.116
	(0.089)
Constant	7.147**
	(2.917)
Observations	6277
Countries	136
AIC	5431.008
BIC	5511.943

All models use fixed effects negative binomial regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data. Standard errors are in parentheses.
A spline of peace years is included in all models but not shown in this table.
Model B7.1 and B7.2 (from Model 7 and 8) fail to achieve convergence.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B7 presents the results of negative binomial regression analysis with fixed effects. Table B7 has one model in which we exclude nine years (1980-1988) of the Iran-Iraq War (Model B7.3). This model uses full time span from 1945 to 2010. To measure oil wealth, Model B7.3 has a binary variable whether oil and gas income measure divided by GDP would be equal or larger than 10 percent. We also attempt to run different models (Model B7.1 and B7.2) with a dummy variable for nine years (1980-1988) of the Iran-Iraq War. However, these models fail to achieve convergence.

Table B8. Negative Binomial Regression Analysis with Fixed Effects: Impact of Influential Cases: The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) with Time Span (1945-1990)

Dependent Variable: *Aggressor-MIDs*	Model B8.2	Model B8.3 Without Iran-Iraq 1980-1988 Cases
Revolutionary Government	0.241*	0.241*
	(0.126)	(0.126)
Petrostate (10% of GDP)	-0.121	-0.09
	(0.157)	(0.156)
Petro Revolution (10% of GDP)	0.393	0.305
	(0.288)	(0.302)
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988	1.403***	
	(0.250)	
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.072	-0.006
	(0.107)	(0.107)
Population, *log*	-0.301*	-0.405**
	(0.177)	(0.178)
Polity IV	-0.008	-0.01
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Contiguous Borders	0.137***	0.140***
	(0.037)	(0.037)
Constant	11.208	20.182
	(27.865)	(557.971)
Observations	3335	3321
Countries	102	102
AIC	3206.398	3124.37
BIC	3279.745	3191.558

All models use fixed effects negative binomial regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data. Standard errors are in parentheses.
A spline of peace years is included in all models but not shown in this table.
Model B8.1 (from Model 10) fails to achieve convergence * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B8 presents the results of negative binomial regression analysis with fixed effects. Table B8 has two models in which we include a dummy variable for nine years (1980-1988) of the Iran-Iraq War (Model B8.2) and then exclude those years from the analysis in Model B8.3. These models use limited time span from 1945 to 1990. To measure oil wealth, both models use a binary variable whether oil and gas income measure divided by GDP would be equal or larger than 10 percent. We attempt to run different mode (Model B8.1) with a dummy variable for the Iran-Iraq War and net oil export revenues (10 percent threshold). However, this model fails to achieve convergence.

Appendix C. the Iran-Iraq War

Figures C2.1 and C2.2 present visually oil's peace-inducing effect on both revolutionary and non-revolutionary governments. Once we include a dummy variable for nine years (1980-1988) of the Iran-Iraq War in Model 7, regardless of nonrevolutionary or revolutionary governments, non-petrostates are more likely to initiate MIDs than petrostates. In Model 8, Figure E2 also demonstrates that there is no significant difference between revolutionary petrostates and non-petro states' war-prone tendencies. Model 7 and 8 use different oil wealth measurements. Model 7 utilizes net oil export of GDP and Model 8 uses oil and gas income of GDP. When we include the dummy variable of the Iran-Iraq War, regardless which oil wealth measurement we use, petrostates do not show any statistically significant bellicosity than non-petrostates.

Figure C2.1. Effect of Oil and Revolutionary Governments on MIDs with 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War Dummy with 10% Threshold of Net Oil Export of GDP Binary Variable



Note Control variables are all set to their mean values.

Figure C2.2. Effect of Oil and Revolutionary Governments on MIDs with 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War Dummy with 10% Threshold of Oil and Gas Income of GDP Binary Variable



Note Control variables are all set to their mean values.

To check the goodness of fit in Poisson regression models, we plot the studentized Pearson and deviance residuals. In the plots, we differentiate the Iran-Iraq War observations from non-Iran-Iraq War observations. Both plots of the Pearson and deviance residuals show similar patterns (see Figure 1.3 in the article and C3.1 below). In both plots, we can observe that the Iran-Iraq War points are far from zero and the other points. It indicates that the Iran-Iraq War observations are not only outliers but also influential points in the models. These residual plots also explain why the interaction variable, petro-revolution, lost statistical significance with 90 percent confidence when we include the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable in our main models. The small set of observations drives the models to overestimate the bellicosity of revolutionary petrostates.

Figure C3.1. Studentized Deviance Residuals



Table C1. List of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) with 3rd Parties during the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988

No.	Dispute No.	Year	Revisionist Countries	Other Countries
1	2544	1985	Iran	Belgium
2	2545	1985	Iraq	Turkey
3	2547	1985	Iran	Germany
4	2548	1985	Iran	Malta
5	2549	1985	Iraq	Italy
6	2551	1985	Iran	United Kingdom
7	2552	1985	Iraq	Panama
8	2553	1985	Iran	Saudi Arabia
9	2554	1985	Iran	Kuwait
10	2555	1985	Iran	South Korea
11	2557	1985	Iran	Denmark
12	2560	1985	Iran	France
13	2565	1986	Iraq	Bahrain
14	2566	1986	Iran, Turkey	
15	2568	1986	Iraq	Greece
16	2574	1986	Iran	Saudi Arabia
17	2575	1986	Iran	Turkey
18	2578	1986	Iran	United States
19	2584	1986	Iraq	Cyprus
20	2585	1986	Iran	Netherlands
21	2587	1986	Iran	Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates
22	2588	1986	Iran	Soviet Union
23	2590	1983	Soviet Union	Iran
24	2593	1986	Iran	Liberia
25	2594	1986	Iran	Kuwait
26	2595	1986	Iraq	Cyprus
27	2596	1986	Iran	United Kingdom
28	2734	1987	Iran	Panama
29	2739	1987	Iraq	United States
30	2740	1987	United States	Iran
31	2751	1988	Iran	Japan
32	2752	1988	Iran	United Arab Emirates
33	2758	1988	Iraq	Liberia
34	2759	1988	Iran	Romania
35	2762	1988	Iran	Malaysia

36	2763	1988	Iran	Germany
37	2764	1988	Iraq	Spain
38	2765	1988	Iran	Spain
39	2767	1988	Iraq	United Kingdom
40	2769	1988	Iraq	Panama
41	2772	1988	Iran	Bahrain
42	2774	1988	Iraq	United States
43	2784	1987	Iraq	Australia
44	2785	1987	Iraq	Singapore
45	2786	1987	Syria	Iraq
46	2788	1987	Iraq	Turkey
47	2789	1987	Iran	Singapore
48	2790	1987	Iran	Maldives
49	2791	1987	Iran	Pakistan
50	2792	1987	Iran	India
51	2793	1987	Iran	Japan
52	2794	1987	Iran	South Korea
53	2796	1987	Iran	Qatar
54	2797	1987	Iran	Kuwait
55	2798	1987	Iran	Saudi Arabia
56	2799	1987	Iran	Turkey
57	2808	1987	Iran	Liberia
58	2811	1987	Iraq	Panama
59	2814	1987	Belgium, Netherlands	Iran
60	2815	1987	Iraq	Malta
61	2817	1987	Iran	Greece
62	2818	1987	Iran	Cyprus
63	2819	1987	Iraq	Greece
64	2820	1987	Iran	Yugoslavia
65	2821	1987	Iran	Italy
66	2822	1987	Iran	Spain
67	2823	1987	Iran	France
68	2824	1987	Iraq	Cyprus
69	2825	1987	Iran	Sweden
70	2826	1987	Soviet Union, Iran	
71	2828	1987	Iran	Romania
72	2832	1987	Iran	Norway
73	2833	1987	Iran	Norway
74	2834	1987	Iran	Denmark
75	3017	1980	Soviet Union	Afghanistan, Iran

76	3029	1985	Iraq	Kuwait
77	3033	1985	Iraq	South Korea
78	3034	1984	Iran	Spain
79	3035	1984	Iran	India
80	3036	1984	Iraq	Norway
81	3038	1984	Iraq	Bahamas
82	3040	1984	Iran	Germany
83	3042	1984	Iran	United Kingdom
84	3043	1984	Iraq	Cyprus
85	3045	1984	Iraq	Turkey
86	3046	1984	Iraq	Liberia
87	3048	1984	Iran	Saudi Arabia
88	3049	1984	Iraq	Panama
89	3052	1984	Iraq	United Kingdom
90	3053	1984	Iraq	India
91	3057	1983	Iraq	Greece
92	3059	1983	Iran	Afghanistan
93	3071	1983	United States, Iran	
94	3078	1982	Iraq	South Korea
95	3079	1982	Iraq	Greece
96	3086	1982	Syria	Iraq
97	3095	1981	Iran	Kuwait
98	3097	1981	Turkey	Iran
99	3100	1981	Iran	Denmark
100	3101	1981	Israel	Iraq
101	3108	1980	Iran	Kuwait
102	3180	1981	Israel	Iraq
103	3541	1984	Iran	United States
104	3617	1984	Iran	Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates
105	3625	1985	Iran	Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, United States

Appendix D. Oil Geography Analysis

Our alternative set of analyses explores the role of oil geography on interstate conflict. It takes up a question addressed by Caselli et al (2015) and incorporates our strategy for controlling for the Iran-Iraq conflict—which to reiterate took place between two oil-exporting countries, led by radical regimes, and which both oil fields the majority of which are proximate to their mutual border. The units of analysis for these data are country pair (dyad) years between 1946 and 2008 that satisfy the condition of direct contiguity: "the two countries must share a land (or river) border or be separated by no more than 400 miles of water. As with Caselli et al, our data come from 606 country pairs.[3] As we note below, this sampling strategy has the effect of comparing geography-related or resource-geography wars not to all other interstate wars, but only geographically contiguous wars to one another. It does not merely create a possible bias for conflicts driven by contiguity-related factors—it excludes all wars that are not fought between contiguous states. In this sample, therefore, the 1991 Gulf War and 2003 war between the United States and Iraq are both excluded.

The dependent variable is the same as in our other main models—a count of militarized interstate disputes. This measure, however, comes from Maoz (2005) and uses an ordered scale ranging from zero (0) to five (5). The main independent variables are lagged measures of the "distance of oil fields in each country in the pair from the bilateral border or from the other country's coastline" (21). We use the five variables constructed by Caselli et al on the basis of these data:

> The variable One is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when only one country in the pair has oil. Similarly, Both takes a value of 1 if both countries of the pair have oil. The omitted baseline category hence is the case where none of the countries in the pair has oil. OneXDist is the product of the One dummy with the distance of the oil from the border. Similarly, BothXMinDist is the product of the Both dummy and the minimum of

[3] See Appendix I in Caselli et al.

> the distances of the oil from the border in the two countries. Analogously, BothXMaxDist captures the distance from the border in the country whose oil is further from the border (22).

We also include a battery of control variables in line with those used in the original analysis: absolute and average differences in land areas, GDP per capita, population, fighting capabilities, democracy scores, peace years, bilateral trade, cultural distance, alliance and historical ties, civil war legacies, and OPEC membership. We further include country and year dummies and account for country and year fixed effects.

Oil Geography Analysis

Table D1 presents our extension of results from Caselli et al (2015). These models explore the impact of oil geography on interstate war in a more limited sample—only contiguous states. As a result, as we outlined above, these analyses do not ask 'what causes war?' but rather 'what factors shape territorial wars?' Again, as we have discussed, a key problem in these specifications is that oil geography is the only territorial factor included, alongside an array of determinants of what Colaresi (2005) and others have termed positional wars. By excluding all non-territorial wars, and by only including the single territorial war determinant, we suspect that these models are highly inclined to produce a significant role for oil geography. Nonetheless, we extend these analyses to see whether the disproportionate influence of the Iran-Iraq war manifests in this more limited sample as well.

We supplement Caselli et al's baseline models with a dummy variable for the years (1980-1988) of the Iran-Iraq War. Unlike Colgan and Hendrix, Caselli et al use a binary dependent variable called hostility. If there is any use of force (4) or war (5), measured in the MID intensity scale, between a country-dyad, it is coded as 1. Their original analyses use linear

probability models, and here we do the same. While Models D1.1 and D1.2 take account of all oil fields, Models D1.3 and D1.4 regard only offshore oil fields and Models D1.5 and D1.6 consider only onshore oil fields. Model D1.1, D1.3, and D1.5 do not use country-fixed effects. Models D1.2, D1.4, and D1.6 use country-fixed effects.[4]

As we expected, the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable maintains statistical significance with 99 percent confidence and has the strongest impact throughout the models. In Model D1.1, all else equal, the Iran-Iraq War situation increases the probability of hostility in a country-dyad by a rate of 0.727. Regardless of country-fixed effect or types of oil fields, the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable show the largest impact on an onset of hostility.

On the other hand, the results of other independent variables in Models D1.1, D1.2, D1.4, D1.5, and D1.6 are very similar to Caselli et al's original models. For example, in Caselli et al's main model (Model D1.2), both oil's presence and its geographic location are statistically significant at 95 percent confidence. In a country-dyad, holding other variables constant, if one country or both countries have oil, the likelihood of bilateral conflict increases compared to a dyad without any oil presence. Moreover, when only one country has oil, as the location is further away from the border, it is less likely to have bilateral military conflict. When both countries have oil, as oil's distance from the border increases, the likelihood of bilateral conflict also decreases. Only one independent variable – the interaction variable between both countries' oil presence and its maximum distance from the border – fails to achieve significance with 90 percent confidence throughout the models.

Moreover, it needs more explanation to understand the difference between the models with and without country-fixed effects. In Models D1.1, D1.3, and D1.5, when country-fixed

[4] Caselli et al 2014, 292.

effects are not applied, the key independent variables, particularly interaction variables, lose statistical significance with 95 percent confidence interval. However, the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable is consistently significant with 95 percent confidence. The main results, in short, are highly dependent on this one specification choice.

Model D1.3 focuses on offshore oil fields and does not apply country-fixed effects. When the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable is included, the interaction variable between one country's oil presence and its distance from border is not statistically significant with 95 percent confidence. Instead, the binary variable of both countries' presence of oil becomes significant with 95 percent confidence. Nonetheless, we should note that the binary variable (Both) barely passes the threshold of 95 percent confidence and the interaction variable (One X Distance)'s *p*-value is 0.052. It is still difficult to conclude that the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable makes a significant change in this model.

In Table D2, the design of all six models is exactly same as Table D1 but the dependent variable varies to check robustness.[5] Models D2.1 and D2.2 use a more restrictive definition of conflict and therefore only take account of war (5 in the MID intensity scale). Models D2.3 and D2.4 use a looser definition of conflict. They include the intensity 3 in the MID dataset. Unlike other models, Models D2.5 and D2.6 use the full scale (0-5) of the MID intensity and implement Poisson regression analysis.[6]

Again, throughout the models (except Model D2.6), the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable is significant with 95 percent confidence and the strongest predictor of the likelihood of bilateral conflict. In Model D2.2, even though we restrict the definition of conflict (war is only 0.51

[5] Caselli et al 2014, 296.

[6] It is unclear why Poisson regression analysis is used in these models. To take account of the ordinal dependent variable (MID intensity scale), we also test the models with ordinal logistic regression analysis. The overall result is similar to Poisson models' but these models cannot satisfy the proportional odds assumption.

percent of the entire observations), ceteris paribus, the Iran-Iraq War year increases the likelihood of interstate war by a rate of 0.845 compared with other dyad years. On the other hand, in (but only in) Model D2.6, the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable is not significant with even a 90 percent confidence interval. We suspect that the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable may lose its statistical power due to the change of dependent variable from binary variable to ordinal variable (dispute intensity) and country-fixed effects on a country-dyad.

In terms of other independent variables, Models D2.3, D2.4, D2.5, and D2.6 show very similar result to Models D1.1 and D1.2. We can still observe the pattern that the key independent variables is no longer insignificant with 95 percent confidence without country-fixed effects. Meanwhile, unlike Caselli et al's original model, in Model D2.1, the binary variable of both countries' presence of oil fails to achieve statistical significance with 95 percent confidence. In such setting (Models D1.1 and D2.1), none of the independent variables are statistically significant. In Model D2.2, the interaction variable between only one country's presence of oil and its distance from border is not significant with 95 percent confidence. The interaction variable between both countries' presence of oil and its minimum distance from border becomes significant with 0.049 p-value. Since the dependent variable is restricted in Model D2.1 and D2.2, when the Iran-Iraq War variable is included, the results are more fluctuating than others.

Overall, it is possible to re-confirm that the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable is the strongest and most significant predictor in predicting interstate conflict, although it causes less dramatic change in Caselli et al's dyadic models.

Table D1. Baseline Results for Hostility

Dependent Variable: *Hostility*	Model D1.1	Model D1.2	Model D1.3	Model D1.4	Model D1.5	Model D1.6
One	0.030	0.076**	0.077**	0.118***	0.063*	0.130***
	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.043)
One × Distance	-0.044	-0.084***	-0.083*	-0.112***	-0.072*	-0.135***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.041)
Both	0.026	0.043	0.051**	0.074**	0.022	0.044
	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.031)
Both × Min Distance	-0.046	-0.092***	-0.028	-0.067**	-0.098**	-0.127***
	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.035)
Both × Max Distance	-0.010	0.01	-0.05	-0.01	0.047	0.049
	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.037)
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988	0.727***	0.631***	0.717***	0.619***	0.732***	0.621***
	(0.047)	(0.072)	(0.051)	(0.071)	(0.049)	(0.071)
Land Areas (Mean)	0.000	0.076	0.000	0.077	0.000	0.075
	(0.000)	(0.112)	(0.000)	(0.113)	(0.000)	(0.112)
Land Areas (Diff)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Population (Mean)	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Population (Diff)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP per capita (Mean)	-0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP per capita (Diff)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Polity IV (Mean)	0.001	0.000	0.001*	0.000	0.001	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Polity IV (Diff)	0.001*	0.000	0.002*	0.000	0.001*	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Civil War 1	0.041***	0.022**	0.042***	0.023***	0.041***	0.022**
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Civil War 2	0.080***	0.050**	0.084***	0.052***	0.077***	0.049**
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Fighting Capabilities (Mean)	0.958	1.244	0.551	1.377	0.843	1.038
	(1.905)	(1.970)	(2.097)	(2.098)	(1.923)	(1.993)
Fighting Capabilities (Diff)	-0.627	-0.939	-0.45	-0.974	-0.517	-0.823
	(0.979)	(0.926)	(1.059)	(1.008)	(0.990)	(0.940)
Bilateral Trade/GDP	-0.454	-0.611	-0.508	-0.468	-0.559	-0.87
	(0.407)	(0.603)	(0.408)	(0.619)	(0.480)	(0.653)
Defensive Pact	-0.002	-0.016*	0.002	-0.016*	-0.001	-0.016*
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)

OPEC 1	-0.006	0.028**	-0.007	0.034***	-0.006	0.028**
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.013)
OPEC 2	0.056*	0.105**	0.060*	0.116***	0.064*	0.115**
	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.047)
Genetic Distance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Colonial Relations	0.014	-0.001	0.018	0.005	0.015	0.002
	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.014)
Ever Same Country	0.014	0.016	0.020*	0.028**	0.012	0.013
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Years Since Last Hostility	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.050*	-3.798	0.041	-3.779	0.043*	-3.763
	(0.026)	(5.270)	(0.026)	(5.289)	(0.026)	(5.261)
No. Observations	11303	11303	11303	11303	11303	11303
No. Country-Dyads	405	405	405	405	405	405
Type of Oil	All	All	Offshore	Offshore	Onshore	Onshore
Country Fixed Effect	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.097	0.163	0.098	0.161	0.1	0.166
AIC	-4554.86	-5324.614	-4569.997	-5330.366	-4587.912	-5426.969
BIC	-3997.565	-4430.01	-4012.703	-4589.751	-4030.617	-4803.679

The unit of observation is a country-dyad in a given year.
The sample covers all contiguous country-dyads and the years 1946-2008.
OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the country-dyad level in parentheses.
All explanatory variables are taken as first lag.
All specifications control for the average and the absolute difference of land areas in the pair, intercept, and annual time dummies.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table D2. Baseline Results for Alternative Dependent Variables

	Model D2.1	Model D2.2	Model D2.3	Model D2.4	Model D2.5	Model D2.6
Dependent Variable:	War	War	Hostility+	Hostility+	Dispute Intensity	Dispute Intensity
One	0.004	0.015**	0.026	0.081**	0.457	1.764**
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.331)	(0.788)
One × Distance	-0.003	-0.009*	-0.046*	-0.093***	-0.794**	-2.130***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.321)	(0.624)
Both	0.008*	0.017**	0.033	0.052	0.256	0.499
	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.273)	(0.506)
Both × Min Distance	-0.011	-0.012**	-0.053	-0.114***	-1.046***	-1.578***
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.339)	(0.438)
Both × Max Distance	0.002	0.001	-0.013	0.011	0.178	0.249
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.347)	(0.441)
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988	0.845***	0.823***	0.692***	0.605***	0.582**	0.189
	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.051)	(0.070)	(0.237)	(0.267)
Land Areas (Mean)	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.105	0.000	0.455
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.115)	(0.000)	(0.506)
Land Areas (Diff)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Population (Mean)	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.005	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Population (Diff)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.004)
GDP per capita (Mean)	0.000	0.000*	-0.001	0.001	-0.136***	-0.087**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.037)	(0.041)
GDP per capita (Diff)	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.069***	0.024
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.024)	(0.029)
Polity IV (Mean)	0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.012	-0.01
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.021)
Polity IV (Diff)	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.020*	-0.014
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Civil War 1	0.006*	0.002	0.045***	0.022**	0.622***	0.444***
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.159)	(0.133)
Civil War 2	-0.001	-0.007	0.086***	0.045*	0.743***	0.481**
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.185)	(0.189)
Fighting Capabilities (Mean)	-0.273	-0.151	1.667	0.947	13.79	-5.973
	(0.545)	(0.518)	(2.047)	(2.316)	(13.863)	(18.596)
Fighting Capabilities (Diff)	0.071	0.175	-1.042	-1.256	-5.644	-5.206
	(0.235)	(0.283)	(1.077)	(1.024)	(6.287)	(7.015)
Bilateral Trade/GDP	-0.069	-0.112	-0.491	-0.729	-12.114	22.119
	(0.071)	(0.095)	(0.441)	(0.646)	(17.949)	(18.451)

Defensive Pact	0.001	-0.001	0.005	-0.015	0.2	0.073
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.145)	(0.165)
OPEC 1	-0.003	0.001	-0.007	0.032**	0.11	0.988*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.162)	(0.510)
OPEC 2	0.003	0.002	0.05	0.109**	0.664**	2.702**
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.050)	(0.260)	(1.061)
Genetic Distance	-0.000*	-0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Colonial Relations	0.000	-0.002	0.032	0.002	0.37	0.288
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.240)	(0.238)
Ever Same Country	0.004	0.007***	0.013	0.015	0.129	0.501**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.177)	(0.249)
Constant	-0.002	-0.179*	0.051*	-5.2	-0.435	-12
	(0.002)	(0.098)	(0.027)	(5.411)	(0.313)	(14.776)
No. Observations	11303	11303	11303	11303	11303	11303
No. Country-Dyads	405	405	405	405	405	405
Method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	Poisson	Poisson
Country Fixed Effect	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R-Squared	0.162	0.218	0.111	0.182		
AIC	-34480.041	-35232.719	-2045.695	-3001.942	12262.934	10753.441
BIC	-33922.746	-34543.434	-1488.401	-2466.646	12820.229	11926.692

The unit of observation is a country-dyad in a given year.
The sample covers all contiguous country-dyads and the years 1946-2008.
OLS is used in Model D2.1-D2.4 and Poisson regression analysis is used in Model D2.5-D2.6.
Robust standard errors clustered at the country-dyad level in parentheses.
The oil variables are constructed using all oil fields (onshore and offshore).
All explanatory variables are taken as first lag.
All specifications control for the average and the absolute difference of land areas in the pair, intercept, and annual time dummies.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

E. Additional Robustness Tests

Petro-State Analysis

In Table E1, we present the results of two models in which we introduce different thresholds for petro-state status at 10 percent of GDP and 20 percent of GDP. Our dataset's time span is from 1945 to 2010. In Model E1.1, we use the new binary variable that measures oil and gas income revenue for 10 percent or higher of GDP. The revolutionary government and its interaction variable with petro-state are statistically significant at 95 percent confidence. However, the petro-state variable fails to achieve statistical significance at 95 percent confidence. Non-petro-states with revolutionary governments aggressively engage in MIDs more than nonrevolutionary governments at a rate of 0.04 per year, or 38.69 percent more per year. Petro-states with revolutionary governments aggressively engage in MIDs more than non-revolutionary governments at a rate of 0.10 per year, or 97.10 percent more per year. Again, the magnitude of the relationship between revolutionary-petro-states and aggressive military conflict decreases in our extended dataset.

Model E1.2 uses the 20 percent of GDP threshold to measure petro-state status. The result is not so different from Model E1.1. The revolutionary government and its interaction variable with petro-state are statistically significant at 95 percent confidence. However, the petro-state variable fails to be statistically significant at 90 percent confidence.

Table E1. Alternative Measurements of Petrostates

Dependent Variable: *Aggressor-MIDs*	Model E1.1	Model E1.2
Revolutionary Government	0.327***	0.339***
	(0.092)	(0.089)
Petrostate (10% of GDP)	-0.213*	
	(0.114)	
Petro Revolution (10% of GDP)	0.564***	
	(0.183)	
Petrostate (20% of GDP)		-0.124
		(0.142)
Petro Revolution (20% of GDP)		0.761***
		(0.204)
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.136**	-0.149***
	(0.055)	(0.055)
Population, *log*	0.234***	0.226***
	(0.055)	(0.054)
Polity IV	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Contiguous Borders	0.074***	0.072***
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Cold War	0.157**	0.129*
	(0.069)	(0.070)
Muslim, % Population	0.119	0.093
	(0.251)	(0.249)
Major Power	0.715**	0.736**
	(0.347)	(0.346)
Constant	-4.738***	-4.472***
	(1.048)	(1.045)
No. Observations	7217	7217
No. Countries	159	159
AIC	6309.838	6302.903
BIC	6461.29	6454.355

Note All models use random effects Poisson regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data. Standard errors are in parentheses. Regional dummy variables and a spline of peace years are included in all models but not shown in this table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Oil and Gas Income Analysis

Table E2 demonstrates the results of two models which use a continuous measure of oil wealth directly compared to the binary indicator for petrostates: logged oil and gas income per capita (2011 constant US$) with different timelines. This has increasingly become the measure of choice for capturing the effects of oil wealth, or abundance. Models E2.1-2.2 employ the full-time span from 1945 to 2010. The revolutionary government logged oil and gas income per capita, and its interaction variable between the two variables are statistically significant at 95 percent confidence.

Model E2.1 restricts the time series to the Cold War period, from 1945 to 1990. Holding other variables constant, under revolutionary governments, a 10 percent increase in oil and gas income per capita is negatively associated with the number of aggressive MIDs at 0.08 percent less per year. Under non-revolutionary governments, a 10 percent increase in oil and gas income per capita is also negative associated with aggressive MIDs at 0.59 percent less per year.

In Model E2.2, we analyze the time span from 1945 to 2001. The magnitude of war-proneness of oil-exporting countries with revolutionary governments is substantially smaller than Model E2.1's. Ceteris paribus, under revolutionary governments, a 10 percent increase in oil and gas income per capita is associated with aggressive MIDs at 0.01 percent more per year.

Table E2. Continuous Measurement of Petrostate with Different Timelines

Dependent Variable: *Aggressor-MIDs*	Model E2.1 1945-1990	Model E2.2 1945-2001
Revolutionary Government	0.387***	0.343***
	(0.109)	(0.089)
Oil & Gas Income/CAP, *log*	-0.062***	-0.038***
	(0.015)	(0.012)
Revolutionary Government × Oil & Gas Income/CAP, *log*	0.054***	0.039***
	(0.017)	(0.015)
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.1	-0.063
	(0.084)	(0.064)
Population, *log*	0.430***	0.336***
	(0.081)	(0.063)
Polity IV	-0.007	-0.005
	(0.009)	(0.007)
Contiguous Borders	0.084***	0.086***
	(0.027)	(0.021)
Cold War		0.124*
		(0.075)
Muslim, % Population	0.203	0.252
	(0.323)	(0.271)
Major Power	0.034	0.265
	(0.491)	(0.387)
Constant	-8.492***	-7.177***
	(1.516)	(1.253)
No. Observations	4241	5857
No. Countries	137	158
AIC	3814.093	5425.143
BIC	3947.497	5572.002

Note All models use random effects Poisson regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data. Standard errors are in parentheses. Regional dummy variables and a spline of peace years are included in all models but not shown in this table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table E3 presents the results of two models in which we included a dummy variable for nine years (1980-1988) of the Iran-Iraq War in the first model and then excluded those years from the analysis in the second model. Both models use the extended period dataset spanning the 1945-2010 period. Model E3.1 includes the binary petro-state variable that measures oil and gas income revenue for 10 percent or higher of GDP and the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War dummy variable. While the revolutionary government variable achieves statistical significance at 95 percent confidence, both the petro-state and revolutionary petro-state interaction variables fail to be significant at 95 percent confidence. The Iran-Iraq War dummy variable is statistically significant at 99 percent and shows the largest impact on the model specified this way. All else equal, during the Iran-Iraq war situation, the expected increase in the number of aggressive MIDs is a rate of 2.83. Once this dummy variable is included, the war-proneness of oil-exporting countries with revolutionary governments disappears. Ceteris paribus, revolutionary petro-states are less likely to initiate MIDs at a rate of 0.006, or 4.06 percent less per year than revolutionary non-petro-states.

In Model E3.2, where we omit those Iran-Iraq War years, the substantive results are the same. Radical leadership continues to be significant, but the petro-state variable and the interaction effect fail to be statistically significant at 95 percent confidence. Indeed, the effect of radical oil-rich leadership on conflict initiation is entirely dependent on this small set of years from a single interstate conflict. In short, for the whole world between 1945 and 2010 that effect hinges on a nine-year period during the Iran-Iraq war. Once those years are separately accounted for, the effect vanishes, and radical petro-state leaders are no more bellicose than others. Indeed, more than anything we see strong support for a *Pax Petrolica*, in line with our expectations.

Table E3. Impact of Influential Cases: The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)

Dependent Variable: *Aggressor-MIDs*	Model E3.1	Model E3.2 Without Iran-Iraq 1980-1988 Cases
Revolutionary Government	0.317***	0.319***
	(0.092)	(0.092)
Petrostate (10% of GDP)	-0.200*	-0.198*
	(0.114)	(0.115)
Revolutionary Government ×	0.159	0.139
Petrostate (10% of GDP)	(0.205)	(0.209)
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988	1.343***	
	(0.198)	
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.159***	-0.146***
	(0.055)	(0.055)
Population, *log*	0.212***	0.205***
	(0.055)	(0.055)
Polity IV	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.007)	(0.007)
Contiguous Borders	0.077***	0.078***
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Cold War	0.072	0.074
	(0.071)	(0.071)
Muslim, % Population	0.102	0.107
	(0.251)	(0.251)
Major Power	0.738**	0.741**
	(0.347)	(0.347)
Constant	-4.135***	-4.123***
	(1.059)	(1.061)
No. Observations	7217	7203
No. Countries	159	159
Chi-Squared	457.862	352.885
AIC	6267.141	6186.519
BIC	6425.478	6337.928

Note All models use random effects Poisson regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data. Standard errors are in parentheses. Regional dummy variables and a spline of peace years are included in all models but not shown in this table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

In Table E4, the design of all three models are exactly same as Table E3 but these models' time span is restricted from 1945 to 1990. In Model E4.1, the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable is statistically significant at 99 percent and shows the largest impact on the model of all the right-hand side variables. All else equal, during the Iran-Iraq War situation, the expected increase in the number of aggressive MIDs is a rate of 3.10. On the other hand, while the revolutionary leadership variable fails to achieve statistical significance with 95 percent confidence, both petro-states and revolutionary petro-state interaction variables are significant at 95 percent confidence. Moreover, the revolutionary petro-states are more bellicose than revolutionary non-petro-state. Holding other factors constant, revolutionary petro-states are more likely to initiate MIDs at a rate of 0.021, or 15.1 percent more per year than revolutionary non-petro-states. While this is a substantially smaller difference than prior research has indicated, the results are very sensitive to time spans. The results of this model suggest that only during the Cold War were radical petrostates more inclined to initiate wars—implying that once the bipolar Cold War dynamic ended this interactive relationship ended with it. Another possibility is that the Cold War period is different because there were substantially fewer significant oil producing countries—fewer than twenty-five as compared with nearly fifty by 2012 (Ross 2012). With the production market more concentrated during the earlier period, individual states arguably had more leverage vis-à-vis oil importing countries than they would have by the 2010s.

The Iran-Iraq War dummy variable maintains statistically significance with 99 percent confidence and has the strongest impact on Model E4.2. Model E4.2 measures oil and gas income revenue for 10 percent or higher of GDP. Both revolutionary government and petro-state variables gain statistical significance with 95 percent confidence. However, their interaction variable fails to achieve significance with 90 percent confidence interval. All else equal,

revolutionary petro-states are more likely to initiate MIDs at a rate of 0.009 or 6.29 percent more per year than revolutionary non-petro-states. In other words, there is very small difference between revolutionary petro-states and non-petro-states' belligerence.

Model E4.3 shows similar result to Model 4.2's. While both revolutionary government and petro-state variables are statistically significant at 95 percent confidence, their interaction variable fails to achieve significance with 90 percent confidence interval. Holding other variables constant, revolutionary petro-states are less likely to initiate MIDs at a rate of 0.0004 or 0.31 percent less per year than revolutionary non-petro-states. When we omit those Iran-Iraq War years, oil's war-proneness disappears.

Table E4. Impact of Influential Cases: The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) with Restricted Time Span (1945-1990)

Dependent Variable:	Model E4.1	Model E4.2	Model E4.3
			Without Iran-Iraq 1980-1988
Aggressor-MIDs			Cases
	1945-1990	1945-1990	1945-1990
Revolutionary Government	0.212*	0.251**	0.248**
	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.118)
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	-0.669***		
	(0.197)		
Revolutionary Government ×	0.809***		
Net Oil Export (10% of GDP)	(0.282)		
Petrostate (10% of GDP)		-0.338**	-0.329**
Clarify here endogeneity of export dominance to poverty		(0.146)	(0.146)
Revolutionary Government ×		0.399	0.326
Petrostate (10% of GDP)		(0.274)	(0.284)
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988	1.125***	1.266***	
	(0.229)	(0.241)	
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.095	-0.144*	-0.118
	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Population, *log*	0.262***	0.304***	0.290***
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Polity IV	-0.009	-0.007	-0.008
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Contiguous Borders	0.079***	0.062**	0.061**
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Muslim, % Population	0.196	0.133	0.144
	(0.325)	(0.319)	(0.320)
Major Power	0.327	0.306	0.346
	(0.545)	(0.494)	(0.495)
Constant	-5.424***	-5.698***	-5.676***
	(1.309)	(1.370)	(1.373)
No. Observations	4615	4241	4227
No. Countries	131	137	137
AIC	3973.551	3791.362	3698.665
BIC	4115.166	3931.118	3838.348

Note All models use random effects Poisson regression analysis for cross-sectional time-series data. Standard errors are in parentheses. Regional dummy variables and a spline of peace years are included in all models but not shown in this table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Oil Price Analysis

Table E5 presents Hendrix's monadic models with a dummy variable for nine years (1980-1988) of the Iran-Iraq War. While Models E5.1 and E5.2 use negative binomial regression analysis, Models E5.3 and E5.4 use Poisson regression analysis like Colgan's. The dependent variable in Models E5.1 and E5.3 include all types of MIDs. In Models E5.2 and E5.4, the dependent variable only takes account of aggressor MIDs like Colgan's.

Unlike Colgan's, Hendrix applies panel-fixed effects to his models. Even with the country-fixed effect, the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable maintains statistical significance with 99 percent confidence and has the strongest impact throughout the models. In Model E5.1, holding other variables constant, during the Iran-Iraq War situation, the expected increase in the number of MIDs is a rate of 3.86. The Iran-Iraq War dummy variable is the strongest factor in predicting the number of MIDs in Hendrix's models.

Oil price, revolutionary governments, petro-states, the interaction variable between oil price and revolutionary governments are not statistically significant at 95 percent confidence throughout the models. The interaction variable among three variables – oil price, revolutionary governments, and petro-states – also fails to achieve statistical significance with 95 percent confidence. This is the same as Hendrix's result.

In Hendrix's model, the panel-fixed effects include dummy variables for each country to take account of the within effect in each country. The Iran-Iraq War dummy variable codes all Iran and Iraq years "1" from 1980 to 1988. Both panel-fixed effects country dummy variables and the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable capture the effect of an independent variable changing

over time in the same level (country-level). [7] Therefore, the panel-fixed effects cancel out the effect of the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable.

Once the effect of the Iraq-Iraq War disappears due to the panel-fixed effects, the interaction variable between revolutionary leadership and petro-states maintains statistical significance at 95 percent confidence throughout the models. Moreover, these models all show a bellicosity effect for revolutionary petrostates compared to revolutionary non-petrostates. For example, in Model E5.1, all else equal, revolutionary petro-states are more likely to engage in MIDs at a rate of 0.46 or 33.41 percent more per year than revolutionary non-petro-states. This is the one set of analyses in which we do not observe oil's peace-inducing effect.

On the other hand, the interaction variable between oil price and petro-states fails to achieve significance 95 percent confidence. This is a major difference from Hendrix's result. In his models, the interaction variable obtains significance with 95 percent confidence interval and it supports his hypothesis: Higher oil prices are associated with an increased frequency of MID onsets in petro-states.[8] Once the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable is included, however, it is not possible to confirm the positive relationship between high oil prices and petro-states' greater war-proneness.

[7] Bell, Fairbrother, and Jones 2018, 1053.

[8] Hendrix 2015, 10.

Table E5. Monadic Fixed Effects Negative Binomial & Poisson Estimates of Oil Price Effects on Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1947–2001

	Model E5.1	Model E5.2	Model E5.3	Model E5.4
Dependent Variable:	MIDs Negative Binomial	Instigated Negative Binomial	MIDs Poisson	Instigated Poisson
Oil Price	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Revolutionary Government	0.086	0.292*	0.105	0.305*
	(0.145)	(0.175)	(0.143)	(0.172)
Oil Price ×	0.003	-0.003	0.002	-0.004
Revolutionary Government	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	-0.094	-0.138	-0.097	-0.151
	(0.225)	(0.573)	(0.222)	(0.576)
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP) ×	1.014***	1.051**	1.081***	1.135**
Revolutionary Government	(0.304)	(0.463)	(0.299)	(0.442)
Oil Price ×	0.005*	-0.002	0.005*	-0.002
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.008)
Oil Price × Revolutionary Government ×	-0.014	-0.008	-0.016*	-0.01
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988	1.349***	1.823***	1.423***	1.892***
	(0.302)	(0.357)	(0.295)	(0.338)
Major Power	0.290**	2.638***	0.296***	2.640***
	(0.118)	(0.182)	(0.114)	(0.179)
Cold War	-0.07	-0.375**	-0.07	-0.367**
	(0.087)	(0.147)	(0.085)	(0.145)
Population, *log*	0.084	-0.216	0.071	-0.229
	(0.150)	(0.224)	(0.150)	(0.220)
GDP/CAP, *log*	-0.138*	-0.016	-0.138*	-0.006
	(0.078)	(0.126)	(0.078)	(0.126)
Polity IV	0.007	-0.020*	0.007	-0.019*
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Constant	-1.298	-16.474***	-1.201	-24.522***
	(1.336)	(2.034)	(1.342)	(2.028)
No. Observations	6014	6014	6014	6014
No. Countries	153	153	153	153
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AIC	9243.84	5116.864	9328.889	5133.234
BIC	9364.473	5445.255	9684.087	5468.326

Note Robust errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

In Table E6, the design of all four models are exactly same as Table E5 but the models do not include the panel-fixed effect. Regardless of the country-fixed effect, the Iran-Iraq War dummy variable is statistically significant with 99 percent confidence and demonstrates the strong impact on the MIDs throughout the models.

Like the results of Models E5.1-E5.4, the interaction between oil price and revolutionary government, oil price and petrostate, and triple interaction among oil price, revolutionary government, and petrostate, all fail to achieve statistical significance with 95 percent confidence. Moreover, once the country-fixed effect is removed from the models, the interaction between revolutionary leadership and petrostate loses statistical significance with 95 percent confidence in Models E6.1, E6.2, and E6.4. The interaction variable is significant with 95 percent confidence only in Model E6.3. This result demonstrates that the effects of the revolutionary petro-state interaction variable in Hendrix's models are highly influenced by the application of panel fixed effects. Moreover, it is not clear methodologically or theoretically why we would decide to apply the country-fixed effect to these models. On one hand, doing so reduces the risk of omitted variable bias by accounting for unobservable and time-invariant differences across countries. On the other, without solid reason to believe that the important omitted variables specific to countries are indeed time-invariant, we run the risk of violating that assumption. Moreover, we have no way of being even minimally confident that those country-specific and time-invariant factors are uncorrelated with our explanatory variables. For these reasons, we present both sets of results, and the results suggest that the three-way interaction effect is highly dependent on the fixed effects specification. And, to reiterate, it is only in Model E6.3 that the original explanatory variable of interest is significantly related to the outcome.

Table E6. Monadic Negative Binomial & Poisson Estimates of Oil Price Effects on Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1947–2001, without Country-Fixed Effect

	Model E6.1	Model E6.2	Model E6.3	Model E6.4
Dependent Variable:	MIDs Negative Binomial	Instigated Negative Binomial	MIDs Poisson	Instigated Poisson
Oil Price	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Revolutionary Government	0.377**	0.440*	0.384***	0.448*
	(0.154)	(0.241)	(0.147)	(0.234)
Oil Price ×	-0.002	-0.005	-0.002	-0.005
Revolutionary Government	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	0.068	0.102	0.08	0.133
	(0.150)	(0.342)	(0.144)	(0.351)
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP) ×	0.573*	0.663	0.714***	0.745*
Revolutionary Government	(0.327)	(0.487)	(0.276)	(0.395)
Oil Price ×	0.002	-0.004	0.002	-0.005
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.008)
Oil Price × Revolutionary Government ×	-0.002	0.004	-0.006	0.000
Net Oil Export State (10% of GDP)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988	1.226***	1.584***	1.367***	1.752***
	(0.246)	(0.323)	(0.294)	(0.344)
Major Power	0.724***	0.3	0.712***	0.302
	(0.176)	(0.239)	(0.164)	(0.223)
Cold War	0.082	-0.014	0.095	-0.008
	(0.086)	(0.116)	(0.084)	(0.114)
Population, *log*	0.173***	0.275***	0.177***	0.276***
	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.046)
GDP/CAP, *log*	0.037	0.033	0.041	0.038
	(0.034)	(0.063)	(0.037)	(0.061)
Polity IV	0.01	-0.018*	0.011	-0.019*
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Constant	-2.374***	-4.041***	-2.450***	-4.090***
	(0.542)	(0.782)	(0.561)	(0.767)
No. Observations	6014	6014	6014	6014
No. Countries	153	153	153	153
Country Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No
AIC	9969.467	5685.567	10070.517	5735.59
BIC	10090.101	5806.201	10184.448	5849.521

Note Robust errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.