

# LIFE OF THE PARTY

## The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule

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### INTRODUCTION

THE collapse of democracy in many Latin American countries in the 1960s and 1970s gave birth to the “new authoritarianism,” characterized by a focus on developing typologies of nondemocratic rule and on theorizing the origins of such regimes. Authoritarianism garnered much less interest during the heyday of transitology, as scholars focused on those governments that underwent transitions to democratic rule. And, more recently, the increasing use of cross-national data sets and game theory to test the effects of democratic subtypes relies on a formal institutional approach that has crossed over into the study of authoritarianism. To take one particularly good example, Barbara Geddes’ path-breaking data collection and work on this topic opened the door to more systematic analyses of authoritarianism by specifying the incentives inherent in different patterns of government and how they affect regime durability.<sup>1</sup> These recent studies, however, generally lack an explanation for how powerful authoritarian regimes come into being in the first place since institutions are taken as given. Missing from the study of authoritarianism is a causal account linking origins to institutions and institutions to outcomes, that is, a theory of how the origins of regimes shape their long-term prospects for survival.

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<sup>1</sup> Barbara Geddes, “Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 2–5, 1999).

This article develops a theory of the origins and long-term durability of single-party rule. It argues that the types of fiscal and political constraints parties face at their inception generate long-lasting trajectories. Elites that face organized opposition in the form of highly institutionalized social groups such as mass-mobilizing parties or dedicated foreign or colonial armies and that have little or no access to rent sources are likely to respond to these constraints by building party institutions to mobilize their own constituencies. By contrast, rulers who face only scattered opposition and enjoy access to plentiful rents confront no such forced moves. As a result, they tend not to build much in the way of a party organization. As I outline below, the kinds of organizations that party leaders build will directly influence their ability to withstand political crises later on. Whereas transition studies begin at a moment of crisis that may undermine an authoritarian government, this study ends at that moment and seeks to explain which antecedent conditions forecast when such crises will topple a government and which ones will not. Subsequently, this synthesis of macro-origins and political trajectories enables a more precise set of explanations for the wide variation in the ability of autocratic regimes to survive the third wave of democracy. I conduct an initial test of the theory against four single-party regimes in Africa and Asia.

The article proceeds as follows. First, I discuss trends among single-party regimes and conduct some cross-national tests of the determinants of their breakdown. Second, I develop a theory of authoritarian origins in which the initial conditions surrounding regime consolidation set in motion coherent institutional trajectories. Third, I assess the theory's causal plausibility against a structured comparison of four cases. Finally, I summarize the implications of the theory and of the first-stage empirical test for future research and for the prospects for constructing data sets capable of capturing the dynamics of regime origins and trajectories.

### THE CASES AND SOME INITIAL OBSERVATIONS

While the theoretical argument presented in the next section ought plausibly to do a good job of accounting for variations in regime durability across and within regime types, the sample that I analyze here includes only those that settled into some variant of the single-party state.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>To gauge relative longevity rates within the single-party "family," I estimated the same basic logit models discussed below but included only variants of single-party rule. None of the variants proved

I also added one regime in which a ruling party is held to have been important to political outcomes by specialists—the Philippines under Marcos; it had been coded differently in Geddes' data set.<sup>3</sup> The sample consists of forty-one regimes in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East (see Table 1) that lasted between six years (Ghana 1960–66 and Guinea-Bissau 1974–80) and seventy-two (Mexico 1929–2000).

A striking feature of the single-party subset is the wide variation in regime tenure. Single-party regimes in Ghana and Guinea-Bissau lasted only six years, while Mexico's PRI lasted seventy-two years; eleven others survive today after between twenty-nine and fifty-six years in power. On average, these regimes lasted 30 years, with a large standard deviation of 13.6 years and with only two regimes (in Indonesia and Myanmar) that fall within 5 years on either side of the average life span. There is a wide range of development levels, both among those regimes that persist to the present and among those that have collapsed. In terms of per capita GDP in 2000 among survivors, Singapore at \$26,640 and Mozambique at \$198 represent the extremes of wealth. Among regimes that ended, Taiwan at \$17,000 and Guinea-Bissau at \$168 are the extremes in the year before regime breakdown. GDP growth ranges from –20 percent to 14 percent in the year before regime failure in regimes that ended during the sample period, and many of the regimes still standing in 2000 experienced negative growth periods that equaled or surpassed their failed counterparts.

Given the number of potentially relevant causal factors, it is plausible that one or more of them might explain the variation. That is, a simple look at the life spans of these regimes might not reveal possible, non-regime-type explanations such as level of development, economic performance in any given year, regional effects, or something as simple as a regime's age. As a result, especially when questioning a finding like this, it is appropriate to try to control for as many possible confounding factors as possible to be sure that they are not behind variation in regime life span as substantial as this.

With these concerns in mind, I attempted to replicate Geddes' analysis (see Table 2, model 1) and obtained results similar to hers in a

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significantly more or less durable than others, so it is appropriate to include all of the variants in a sample. The regimes data used here are the original work and property of Barbara Geddes.

<sup>3</sup>Indeed, Marcos's Philippines between 1978 and 1986—more than half, and the last eight, of the regime's fourteen years—ranks as a single-party regime on seven of thirteen measures to my mind, using Geddes' coding criteria. In her language, it settled into single-party hybrid status during these years. Coding for the Marcos regime is available from the author.

TABLE 1  
SINGLE-PARTY REGIMES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

<i>1930–2000</i>				
<i>Region</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Tenure</i>	<i>Regime Type</i>	<i>Life Span</i>
Africa	Ghana	1960–66	1-Party Hybrid <sup>a</sup>	6
Africa	Guinea-Bissau	1974–80	Single Party	6
Latin America	Bolivia	1952–64	Single Party	12
Latin America	Nicaragua	1979–90	Single Party	12
Latin America	Panama	1968–81	1-Party Hybrid	13
Africa	Niger	1960–74	Single Party	14
Asia	Philippines <sup>b</sup>	1972–86	1-Party Hybrid	14
Africa	Chad	1960–75	Single Party	15
Africa	Madagascar	1975–93	Single Party	18
Africa	Rwanda	1973–94	1-Party Hybrid	21
Latin America	Brazil	1964–85	1-Party Hybrid	21
Africa	Cameroon	1961–83	Single Party	22
Africa	Mali	1968–91	Single Party	23
Latin America	Honduras	1933–56	1-Party Hybrid	23
Middle East	S. Yemen	1967–90	Single Party	23
Africa	Congo (Br.)	1968–92	Single Party	24
Africa	Sierra Leone	1968–92	Single Party	24
Africa	Guinea	1958–84	Single Party	26
Asia	Myanmar	1962–88	Triple Threat <sup>c</sup>	26
Asia	Indonesia	1967–98	Triple Threat <sup>c</sup>	32
Middle East	Iraq	1968–2003	1-Party Hybrid	35
Middle East	Algeria	1963–99	1-Party Hybrid	36
Africa	Zambia	1964–91	Single Party	37
Africa	Cote D'Ivoire	1960–99	Single Party	39
Africa	Tanzania	1964–	Single Party	39
Latin America	Paraguay	1954–93	Triple Threat <sup>c</sup>	39
Africa	Senegal	1960–2000	Single Party	40
Middle East	Tunisia	1957–	Single Party	46
Asia	Taiwan	1949–2000	Single Party	51
Latin America	Mexico	1929–2000	Single Party	71

*Regimes Still in Power as of 2000*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Tenure</i>	<i>Regime Type</i>	<i>Age in 2000</i>
Africa	Zimbabwe	1979–	Single Party	24
Africa	Angola	1976–	1-Party Hybrid	27
Africa	Mozambique	1975–	Single Party	28
Asia	Laos	1975–	Single Party	28
Asia	Singapore	1965–	Single Party	38
Africa	Kenya	1963–	Single Party	40
Middle East	Syria	1963–	Triple Threat <sup>c</sup>	40
Africa	Gabon	1960–	1-Party Hybrid	42
Latin America	Cuba	1959–	1-Party Hybrid	44
Asia	Malaysia	1957–	Single Party	46
Middle East	Egypt	1952–	Triple Threat <sup>c</sup>	51

<sup>a</sup>1-Party Hybrid: regime combining a ruling party and either personalist or military rule.

<sup>b</sup>Geddes codes the Philippines as personalist; based on her coding schema, I code it a single-party hybrid.

<sup>c</sup>Triple threat: regime combining single-party, military, and personalist characteristics.

TABLE 2  
AUTHORITARIAN REGIME TYPES AND SURVIVAL (1950–92)

<i>Dependent Variable</i> = <i>End of Regime</i>	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i> ( <i>Includes Monarchies</i> )	<i>Model 3 (Excludes</i> <i>USSR &amp; Mexico)</i>
Military	1.173** (.380)	1.076** (.380)	1.135** (.384)
Military-personalist	.3294 (.496)	.257 (.496)	.245 (.496)
Single-party hybrid	.1786 (.369)	.050 (.376)	.083 (.379)
Single party	-.750* (.347)	-.865* (.354)	-.687 (.356)
Triple threat	-2.277* (1.044)	-2.503* (1.053)	-2.459** (1.056)
Monarchy	—	-.850 (.610)	-.808 (.617)
Per capita GDP <sub>ln</sub>	-.1687 (.136)	-.1686 (.136)	-.225 (.139)
Lagged GDP growth	-4.244** (1.173)	-4.085** (1.170)	-4.128** (1.175)
Asia	-.1511 (.532)	.1264 (.602)	.109 (.627)
Central America	-.0276 (.553)	.164 (.595)	.397 (.622)
Central/Eastern Europe	-.507 (.749)	-.248 (.787)	-.766 (.840)
Middle East–N. Africa	-.575 (.587)	.017 (.720)	.191 (.744)
South America	.699 (.582)	.947 (.638)	1.098 (.664)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-.302 (.510)	-.080 (.567)	.025 (.600)
Age of regime	-.067 (.075)	-.067 (.076)	.237* (.118)
Age 2	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	-.014* (.006)
Age 3	-.00005 (.00004)	-.00005 (.00004)	.0002** (.00009)
Constant	-1.374 (1.053)	-1.554 (1.078)	-2.635* (1.166)
N=	1983	1983	1914
Log Likelihood=	-344.89734	-344.89734	-335.55252
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.086	.088	.105

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; cell entries are logistic regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses

baseline logistic regression model.<sup>4</sup> The strengthening effect for single-party rule remained significant after incorporating monarchies into the sample (model 2).<sup>5</sup> However, given the wide variation in life span, it seems plausible that one or more of the regimes at the long-lived end of the list—Mexico and the Soviet Union, at seventy-two and seventy-five—might be dragging the single-party effect upward relative to other regime types. They are the only two regimes with life spans more than two standard deviations from the mean of thirty years. I estimated the same logit models but left out Mexico's PRI and the USSR, each of which lasted for more than seventy years (model 3). By controlling for their remarkable longevity, the single-party effect fails to be significant at the conventional standard of 5 percent.<sup>6</sup> The change in the results is dramatic: the level of significance falls from  $<.001$  with the two regimes included to  $>.05$  with them excluded. The results suggest that these two regimes account disproportionately for the longevity of single-party rule during the 1950–92 period. Moreover, they suggest that the existence of a ruling party may not exert any systematic effect on regime resilience.

The classic studies of authoritarian regimes focused heavily on their origins. Guillermo O'Donnell's analysis of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, for example, pinpointed military coups in South America as the result of tensions in capitalist development in which popular mobilization threatened the "normal functioning" of the economy.<sup>7</sup> Huntington located the strength of single-party institutions in the fierceness of the struggles that brought them to power, noting that communist parties had endogenously created such struggles by instigating class warfare.<sup>8</sup> Moore noted that both types of twentieth-century European single-party rule originated in constellations of class conflict surrounding the

<sup>4</sup> Although these are cross-sectional time-series data, Geddes conducted the analysis for her 1999 article using standard logit models. I tested for temporal sensitivity using Stata 7.0's `xtlogit` command and found no significant change in the results. Thus, I have retained her use of standard logistic regression and otherwise have used the same models and methods. One minor difference is that I coded the Middle East and North Africa as a single region.

<sup>5</sup> The monarchy data are the original work and property of Jason Brownlee.

<sup>6</sup> Because of the lack of a regime failure in Mexico between 1950 and 1992, including a dummy for the regime produced a perfect prediction of lack of failure and Stata 7.0's logit and `xtlogit` commands dropped all of Mexico's observations. And, because PWT data are missing for the USSR in 1991, the regime's collapse in that year does not appear in the models, so the USSR's observations are dropped as well.

<sup>7</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966–1973*, in *Comparative Perspective* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 11.

<sup>8</sup> Samuel Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore, *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 14.

onset of commercialized agricultural production.<sup>9</sup> These accounts of regime origins provide a starting point for analysis: that the circumstances under which single-party regimes come to power have important effects on their makeup. What these classic studies do not provide is an explanation for why some of these regimes survive so much longer than others.

More recent work on authoritarianism has steered clear of reference to these works, drawing inspiration instead from institutional theories of political change. Geddes suggests that cadre dynamics within a ruling party approximate the incentive structure of a Stag Hunt game, in which all players are better off if they fill in their share of the circle around the stag: “No one ever has an incentive to do anything but cooperate.”<sup>10</sup> However, elites and cadres in ruling parties sometimes seem to do anything *but* cooperate. Within this game-theoretic framework, it is hard to understand how this might happen other than as a function of nature, that is, the emergence of popular mobilization that cannot be ignored. Treating party institutions as prior variables makes it nearly impossible to figure out how incentives within such regimes might come, or not come, to look very much like the Stag Hunt game.

There are a number of plausible explanations for why there is so much variation in both life span and skill in crisis management among single-party regimes. One is economic: we might expect that regimes facing more frequent and/or deeper economic crises would be more vulnerable over time. Geddes’ analysis of all authoritarian regimes shows this to be the case. However, my analysis of only single-party variants found no relationship at all between economic performance and the likelihood of regime survival or collapse, suggesting that as a group they may be more capable than other dictatorships of riding out economic shocks. Moreover, within the four-case sample I investigate below, all of the regimes experienced serious economic crises, yet only two of the four broke down (in Guinea-Bissau and the Philippines).

Another set of explanations rests on external influence: we might expect regimes with strong international support (from one superpower or the other during the cold war) to be more likely to survive than ones without such support. The four cases covered below all reflect strong superpower support, enabling us to discount that explanation at least within this group of regimes. Both the Philippines under martial law

<sup>9</sup>Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press: 1966).

<sup>10</sup>Geddes (fn. 1), 11.

and Indonesia under the New Order were favorite anticommunist allies of the United States, and the socialist leaderships of both Guinea-Bissau and Tanzania garnered strong Soviet support. Succession, too, within party-regimes might prove central. Regimes might well be most likely to break down during the process of succession, and this factor, if unaccounted for, could be a "hidden" cause. The PAIGC regime in Guinea-Bissau broke down well before it confronted a succession, while TANU in Tanzania managed the transition from power of its founding president, Julius Nyerere, with little difficulty in 1985. The crisis that confronted Suharto in 1977 had little to do with succession and much more to do with economic performance, as did the crisis that ultimately brought down Marcos in the Philippines. In short, a succession crisis does not seem to account for why regimes broke down or survived across the cases considered here.

Finally, variations in the repressiveness of these regimes might explain their ability to survive crises. For example, Bellin suggests that, in the case of the Middle East, the ability and will to repress explains the "exceptionalism" of robust authoritarianism in the region.<sup>11</sup> However, a first systematic cut at comparing these cases reveals that all four regimes rank nearly identically on Polity III scores for both democracy and autocracy, suggesting similar levels of coerciveness during crises.<sup>12</sup> It is also the case that the magnitude of political violence at a regime's inception does not appear to have any systematic connection to regime viability.<sup>13</sup> The ascent to power of Indonesia's New Order regime was by far the bloodiest, with roughly half a million killed, but the Philippines ranks second, with approximately ninety thousand dead across the two conflicts that largely took place during the period of martial law. Nearly fifteen thousand people died during the independence movement in Guinea-Bissau between 1962 and 1974, and there was less significant civil violence in Tanzania in 1964. This hierarchy of repression and violence at the inception of these regimes fails to track with their long-term durability.

<sup>11</sup> Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 36 (January 2005).

<sup>12</sup> Indonesia and the Philippines rank identically on both autocracy and democracy scores, with Indonesia ranking 6/1 (autocracy/democracy) in 1974 and 1977 and the Philippines ranking 6/1 during the last three years of martial law rule. Guinea-Bissau and Tanzania rank, during their respective crisis years of 1979–80 and 1980–83, 7/0 and 7/1. Polity's "autocracy" score is a composite measure of several different kinds of repressive or coercive government action.

<sup>13</sup> The figures that follow in this paragraph are drawn from Monty G. Marshall, *Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946–2004*, <http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/warlist.htm> (accessed February 22, 2005).

## EXPLAINING REGIME DURABILITY UNDER SINGLE-PARTY RULE

OPPOSITION, RENT ACCESS, AND THE ORIGINS OF  
PARTY ORGANIZATION

As mentioned above, Huntington locates the origins of strong parties in the struggles that brought them to power.<sup>14</sup> Communist parties, which tended to take power through full-blown class warfare that often coincided with civil war (as in the cases of Russia, China, and Vietnam), built what Selznick refers to as “organizational weapons” to survive their early years.<sup>15</sup> Huntington, however, differentiates between the emergence of strong and weak parties only by reference to varying levels of modernization: more modern societies are more likely to give rise to strong parties, while less modernized ones (he refers specifically to African party-states) tend to generate weak parties. While this schema offers a fruitful discussion of party origins in political conflict, there is little to guide explanations within similar developmental strata: why might two-party regimes ruling countries at virtually the same level of development evince widely different strengths? Moreover, why did the Soviet Communist Party become so strong *before* Russia modernized? Indeed, it was the party, in the hands of Joseph Stalin, that coercively engineered Russia’s great leap into modernity.

In a wide-ranging analysis of American political party formation, Shefter traces the origins of party organizations in democratic settings to two main factors: “[party] leaders will organize an extensive popular following only if they must overcome substantial opposition to gain or retain power and they lack other means of accomplishing their ends.”<sup>16</sup> In democracies, he argues, whether parties hold power or are challenging for it determines their access to bureaucratic patronage. The challenges they face from other parties shape the political difficulty they face. And, Shefter finds, these initial conditions have long-lasting effects on party organizations: “The party organization leaders construct to meet early challenges to their rule will be on hand to meet the problems they subsequently confront in governing the regime they now control. Moreover, to the extent that rulers were able to maintain themselves in power by relying upon a party organization, they will have an

<sup>14</sup> Huntington (fn. 8).

<sup>15</sup> Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952).

<sup>16</sup> Martin Shefter, *Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 32–33.

incentive to use their authority to further strengthen the party.”<sup>17</sup> It is important to note here that Shefter finds that party organizational strength depends much less on the conditions present when a government comes to power and much more on those present when party leaders must decide how broad and deep to build both the party’s organizational structure and the coalition to support it.<sup>18</sup>

Drawing on these lessons both from modernization-inspired accounts of single-party genesis and from democratic party building, I turn below to the development of a theory of single-party formation and subsequent durability or fragility. The theory suggests that prospects for long-term survival of single-party regimes are best conceptualized as a function of the challenges political actors face as they make decisions about building parties. In particular, the fiscal and political challenges facing elites as they decide how broad and deep to build parties create incentives that influence the strength and shape of the institutions they create to maintain themselves. Elites who face and survive the most strenuous fiscal and political crises early on are likely to do so because they have invested heavily in institution and coalition building. The party institutions they build tend to be robust and allow not just for administrative power but for the maintenance of ruling coalitions through later crises as well. In Selznick’s words, party inceptions such as these tend to catalyze the construction of “organizational weapon” parties. By contrast, those elites who have the widest array of options early on tend to establish institutions with little real “bite,” even though on the surface they may look very much like powerful institutions in other settings. In these cases, parties turn into little more than rent-seeking arenas whose survival depends on continued access to patronage rents. Variation on the values of these two factors during party consolidation yields two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1. Rulers who confront a strong and well-organized opposition are likely to use official parties to maintain alliances with powerful social groups. Coalitions embedded in parties give regimes a long-term capability to monitor these groups, even if later they oppose the regime. Where regimes begin with little or no organized opposition, however, rulers face few incentives to give up much to latent allies and are unlikely to build strong parties to hold coalitions together.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 27.

Hypothesis 2. Where rulers come to power without a significant source of rents, they cannot simply buy off potential supporters. As a result, if they face a strong opposition, the only option is to make significant concessions to them in return for their support. By contrast, where regimes have ready access to rents as they consolidate, they can buy a coalition through the distribution of those rents and confront no necessity to disperse access to policy-making via the ruling party.

#### REGIME ORIGINS AND TRAJECTORIES UNDER SINGLE-PARTY RULE: ORGANIZATIONAL WEAPONS AND RENT HAVENS

The importance of building stalwart party organizations manifests itself over time in the political trajectories that emerge from the consolidation years (see Figure 1). During “routine” periods, strong parties provide a means for incorporated groups to present their political and policy preferences to the regime, channeling interests in much the same way that Huntington foresaw in the single-party rule of the 1960s. During periods of crisis, the crucial task of party institutions is to provide a credible guarantee to in-groups that their long-term interests will be best served by remaining loyal to the regime.<sup>19</sup> Another central mechanism through which parties can cement regime survival is by providing an attractive alternative to continued opposition for dissident group leaders, who might thereby be induced to defect from the opposition and enter the party apparatus.

These mechanisms emerge not as automatic responses to crisis but as the product of a party’s early years: “The way in which a party first acquires a popular base is *a character-forming or ‘critical’ experience*.”<sup>20</sup> That critical experience of first formation creates patterns of rule and of regime and coalition maintenance to which leaders turn in times of crisis. Thus, whatever the patterns of rule that emerge during the early years, changing those first patterns becomes progressively more difficult, because initial political dynamics create a “track record” that follows a regime and thereby become progressively harder to alter over time.

Moreover, it is ultimately during crisis periods that the most compelling tests of regime and party strength are possible. The depth of ruling coalitions under single-party rule is often obscured during routine political and economic periods; only during crises are the dynam-

<sup>19</sup>Jason Brownlee, “Durable Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2004).

<sup>20</sup>Shefter (fn. 16), 30, emphasis added.




FIGURE 1  
A CAUSAL MODEL OF SINGLE-PARTY TRAJECTORIES AND OUTCOMES

ics of those coalitions exposed to full light. As Gourevitch notes, “Hard times expose strengths and weaknesses to scrutiny, allowing observers to see relationships that are often blurred in prosperous periods, when good times slake the propensity to contest and challenge.”<sup>21</sup> In the next section, I conduct an initial test of this argument through a structured comparison of four cases.

## TRAJECTORIES OF SINGLE-PARTY RULE

### FOUR CASES IN AFRICA AND ASIA

This section utilizes a structured comparison of four single-party regimes to explore the causal mechanisms that connect initial conditions surrounding party consolidation to regime longevity. Accordingly, I trace the processes by which strong parties were built, or not built, in Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Tanzania, to provide paired comparisons of both intraregional most-similar cases and cross-regional most-different cases. The case studies are summarized here as a plausibility test of my origins-focused argument for explaining broad trends in single-party resilience across national and regional settings.

In addition to covering two strata of relative development—Guinea-Bissau and Tanzania on the low end and Indonesia and the Philippines in the middle range—the regionally paired cases also provide variation in regime durability within regional pairs. In addition, these four cases make it possible to provide examples of contrast between strong and weak party rule in (1) countries in which parties came to power after wars of independence (Guinea-Bissau and Tanzania) and in (2) those in which single-party regimes that came to power displaced established postindependence governments (Indonesia and the Philippines). Moreover, within regional pairs, it is possible to hold party ideology constant. Parties in Guinea-Bissau and Tanzania were both avowedly socialist, while their counterparts in Indonesia and the Philippines were ideologically center-right, highly statist, and, as they claimed, the vanguards for “new” national development.<sup>22</sup> Finally, as for opposition strength and rent access during party consolidation, the four cases display significant variation on these measures as well (see Table 3). Elites in Indonesia and Tanzania faced powerfully organized oppo-

<sup>21</sup> Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press), 9.

<sup>22</sup> Indonesia’s Golongan Karya (Functional Groups), or GOLKAR, became the public face of the “New Order,” and the Philippines’ “Kilusang Bagong Lipunan” (KBL) the political vehicle of Marcos’s “New Society Movement.”

TABLE 3

## OPPOSITION STRENGTH AND RENT ACCESS DURING REGIME CONSOLIDATION

<i>Access to Rent Revenues during Party Consolidation</i>	<i>Organizational Strength of Opposition during Party Consolidation</i>	
	High	Low
	<u>Parties as Organizational Weapons</u>	
Low	Indonesia (1967–71) Tanzania (1954–62)	
		<u>Parties as Rent Havens</u>
High		Guinea-Bissau (1970–74) Philippines (1978–82)

sitions and fiscal scarcity, while their counterparts in Guinea-Bissau and the Philippines faced much lesser challenges. The following discussion traces the long-term effects of those factors on party formation.

## THE ORIGINS OF DURABLE SINGLE-PARTY RULE

## INDONESIA, 1966–98

Suharto's New Order came to power in 1965–66, following then Lieutenant General Suharto's seizure of military authority in Jakarta in the immediate aftermath of an attempted coup by a group of army officers. By nearly all accounts, the first years of the New Order were times of serious economic desperation. The economy was in a state of meltdown. Oil exports in 1965 amounted to less than half their value in 1960. Inflation ran at 600 percent during 1965 as a result of the growing crisis and Sukarno's willingness to print money without regard for its economic effects.<sup>23</sup>

The economic crisis during which the New Order regime came to power was not the only test confronting its leadership. Economic catastrophe coincided with the persistence of a powerfully organized opposition movement in the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and sizable pockets of support for Sukarno in the bureaucracy, military, and Indonesian society. For the regime, the PKI's success at mobilizing within Indonesian society—and especially at creating divisions within the ranks of the military—was cause for alarm. It took several years to unify the military and purge it of PKI and Sukarno supporters. Moreover, the

<sup>23</sup> Mochtar Mas'ood, "The Indonesian Economy and Political Structure during the Early New Order, 1966–1971" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, Columbus, 1983), 66–67.

PKI persisted for nearly two years after the 1965–66 rampages against it. Former party militias continued their guerrilla attacks against landowners and military installations in central and eastern Java into early 1968.<sup>24</sup>

Finally, Sukarno refused to bow out quietly. In August 1966 he called for the formation of a “Sukarno Front.” On September 1 he gave a speech lambasting the new government’s economic policy, claiming that it did nothing but promote Indonesia’s foreign dependency. Pro-Sukarno army units fought with units loyal to Suharto throughout late 1966.<sup>25</sup> All of these uprisings and challenges from Sukarno point to a lengthy and difficult period of dealing with political opposition, one that extended far into the period in which the regime was trying to paint a picture of political stability.

In addition to its dealings with the opposition, the Suharto regime in its first months had to contend with an equally powerful collection of social forces intent on pressuring any new government to pursue policies favorable to its own interests. Muslim and Christian organizations that until 1965 had faced ideological and sometimes physical attack by PKI cadres or affiliated groups demanded the banning and destruction of the party and, in the case of Muslim organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama, demanded a greater say in government policy.<sup>26</sup> Student organizations, many of which strongly supported anticommunist trends among the Indonesian intellectual community, demanded a rapid government effort to revive the economy. Even though the strongest of the student organizations, KAMI, was actually created with the assistance of an army general,<sup>27</sup> it quickly took on a position of real political power, such that its leaders were able to extract significant concessions from the military in return for their support in the purge of the PKI.

While by 1968 the New Order had purged the remaining supporters of Sukarno and the PKI from the military and from the bureaucracy, Suharto and his closest advisers remained concerned with legitimizing the regime. More importantly, he and the other generals in the govern-

<sup>24</sup> The regional location of these attacks was especially alarming for the new regime: central and eastern Java is the cultural heartland of Indonesia’s dominant Javanese majority, and Suharto and many of his closest advisers were born and raised there.

<sup>25</sup> Mas’oed (fn. 23), 101–5.

<sup>26</sup> Harsja Bachtiar, “Indonesia,” in D. K. Emmerson, ed., *Students and Politics in Developing Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 190–91; and John Bresnan, *Managing Indonesia: The Modern Political Economy* (New York: Columbia University Press, ), 36–37.

<sup>27</sup> KAMI stands for Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian Student Action Union); *kami* is also the inclusive word for “we” in Indonesian. KAMI was created in late October 1965 at the home of General (and Minister of Higher Education) Sjarif Thajeb during a meeting of students and anticommunist military leaders.

ment wanted to construct a political organization that could reflect, represent, and provide support for government policy. Suharto and the New Order moderates turned for the answer to the army's Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya (or Sekber Golkar, the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups).<sup>28</sup>

In 1967 GOLKAR was an underdeveloped central organization with more than two hundred affiliate organizations. The still-recent memory of PKI institutionalization and the organizational clout of the remaining parties left the government with little choice but to mobilize its own base of support while also imposing discipline on an unruly conglomeration of social organizations. The GOLKAR leadership dramatically cut the number of organizations and replaced many of their leaders with men it knew it could count on to provide loyal leadership. Second, it created a much smaller group of four coordinating bodies, called *Kelompok Induk Organisasi* or *Kinos* (Basic Organizational Units), to simplify the process of directing the affiliate organizations: one each for functional groups related to material development, spiritual development, religion, and the armed forces. The new hierarchical arrangements made it possible to coordinate the incorporation of the groups into something resembling a single political movement. Despite beginning with a somewhat chaotic structure, GOLKAR was, according to most accounts, operating with impressive coordination by 1970.<sup>29</sup>

The regime also took concrete steps to tie the party to the civil service, requiring party membership of new appointees and offering individuals material inducements for being loyal party members. In addition, local political figures in many regions were appointed to leadership positions as GOLKAR officials, transforming their existing local credibility into a regime asset.<sup>30</sup> Rather than simply establishing a party and calling it the official one, therefore, the New Order took a positive-sum approach to local authority and party building, strengthening the reach of party and state into local settings while assuring that (1) the party could draw on the strength of the bureaucracy and that (2) local authority bolstered rather than hindered central power.

<sup>28</sup> Leo Suryadinata, *Military Ascendancy and Political Culture: A Study of Indonesia's GOLKAR* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1989), 10–13.

<sup>29</sup> Julian M. Boileau, *GOLKAR: Functional Group Politics in Indonesia* (Jakarta: CSIS, 1983); David Reeve, *GOLKAR of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System* (Singapore and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); and Suryadinata (fn. 28).

<sup>30</sup> Ichlasul Amal, *Regional and Central Government in Indonesian Politics* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1992).

The 1971 elections were the first official and perhaps the most important test of the extent to which GOLKAR had succeeded in building itself into a viable official party, and the results exceeded even the government's own expectations. Forecasting a victory that would give GOLKAR perhaps one-third of the elected seats and therefore a ruling majority coalition (with the appointed members), the party actually won 63 percent of the votes cast nationwide. As New Order Indonesia moved toward the 1973–74 oil boom, the regime had succeeded in building up GOLKAR as the most powerful political organization in the country. And despite its heavy-handed approach to politics, it had become one that attracted significant support and that could both mobilize and provide patronage to millions of supporters. All of this took place, it is important to note, three years before the first oil boom added a substantial monetary windfall to GOLKAR's already substantial repertoire of political resources.

Despite this robust pattern of coalition building through GOLKAR, the regime could not guarantee itself smooth sailing. In January 1974, on the eve of a visit to Jakarta by the Japanese prime minister, protesters filled the streets of Jakarta to decry Indonesia's increasing reliance on foreign capital, official corruption, a sudden increase in officially set rice prices, and the evidently nondemocratic trajectory that the regime had in mind for the New Order. When Prime Minister Tanaka arrived on the evening of January 14, eight hundred students were waiting for his plane; they fought police and army troops and some of them managed to enter the airfield before the plane landed. The next morning students from three Jakarta universities held a protest march in central Jakarta. While they marched, bands of young people around the city began stopping drivers of Japanese-made vehicles, deflating the tires, and setting the cars ablaze; they also attacked dealers of Japanese-made automobiles and others at Japanese-owned businesses.<sup>31</sup>

The protests drew in other groups as well: one group of nearly five hundred arrested for demonstrating included almost three hundred "laborers and peddlers." Although the regime succeeded in putting an end to the protests by January 17, there is no doubt that "the government had been shocked to its very roots."<sup>32</sup> Without question, heavy-handed tactics from military force to newspaper closure and questionable arrests were a central component of the regime's response. Equally im-

<sup>31</sup> *Suara Muhammadiyah*, February 1974. See also Bresnan (fn. 26), 136.

<sup>32</sup> Bresnan (fn. 26), 137.

portant, though, was Suharto's other course of action. In line with student demands, by the end of January 1974 he had

abolished the posts held by four senior army officers in his personal staff; announced a series of measures to protect indigenous enterprise; and issued orders designed to moderate the extravagant life-styles of senior military officers and civil servants. He also removed General Soemitro from his post and dismissed General Sutopo Juwono as head of central intelligence.<sup>33</sup>

At least some of the student protesters apparently thought that they had the active support of certain members of the government; there seems to be some support for their beliefs in the inaction of army troops during the first day's protests, when soldiers literally stood by and watched as property was destroyed. Some of the students also believed that this was their opportunity to bring down the government.<sup>34</sup> In the end, however, they did not bring it down. In addition to cracking down on the protesters, Suharto's regime made a series of tactical concessions in the weeks following the protests. While some of the concessions were ultimately watered down, the immediate steps taken to allay the students' primary concerns went further to consolidate the regime's hold on power than the use of force alone would have done. The regime's standing contacts with student leaders "had been a valuable source of information that helped the government to track the outcomes of its policies and to know when and where correctives were needed."<sup>35</sup> Moreover, numerous leaders from among the student organizations that mobilized against the regime were incorporated into GOLKAR in the following three years and emerged as important figures in the 1977 elections.<sup>36</sup> It is important to note that all of these outcomes—due in significant part to the regime's effort to build GOLKAR—took place before the party could ever become an arena for rent distribution. Sizable timber and oil rents began to accrue directly to the government only in the early to mid-1970s, well after the party itself had assumed its powerful form.<sup>37</sup> Once rents became consider-

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 142.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 163.

<sup>36</sup> Suryadinata (fn. 28), 76.

<sup>37</sup> The Indonesian government had engineered a domestic timber boom in the late 1960s so that timber sales grew dramatically. However, only in 1970, with the enactment of a series of laws aimed at centralizing the industry and tying it closely to the regime, did the government accomplish what it had hoped to politically: turning the timber industry into a well-controlled source of political rents. See Michael Ross, *Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 167–76; and David Brown, "Why Governments Fail to Capture Economic Rent: The Unofficial Appropriation of Rain Forest Rent by Rulers in Insular Southeast Asia between 1970–1999" (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 2001), 124–29.

able, Suharto's government added them to the arsenal of organizational strategies available to the party, so that they supplemented, rather than substituted for, the exercise of coalition maintenance.

In early 1977, as a result of international political pressure—from the incoming Carter administration in the United States—and of the economic effects of the 1974 oil boom, protests again erupted in Indonesia. Students and Islamic groups were the primary protagonists during 1977 and 1978.<sup>38</sup> Again, however, the regime (1) managed to prevent the coalition from splintering and (2) used GOLKAR to incorporate both student and religious leaders into the regime. What mattered crucially were, first, the standing ties that the regime maintained with these groups and, second, the capacities of GOLKAR and other institutions to limit the scope of social dissent by coalition maintenance through means other than oil rent patronage. Thus, social opposition never coalesced into a mass-based movement. By 1979 Suharto was back in firm control and would remain so for nearly twenty more years. In both of these crises, central to the regime's longevity was its ability to hold its coalition together and prevent bandwagoning with the opposition and to incorporate opposition leaders into GOLKAR after the crisis.

#### TANZANIA, 1961–

Tanganyika became independent in 1961 and merged with Zanzibar in 1964 to become Tanzania. The political party that has ruled the country from independence, however, had its origins in the decade before it took power and it is there that the origins of the Tanganyika African National Union's (TANU) potency are to be found. TANU's resilience was in large part a result of its struggle to survive between its establishment in 1954 and the formal granting of independence. Whereas colonial governments in many other African states had prepared political organizations to take over once autonomous rule was granted, British colonial rulers in Tanzania did all they could to interfere with the emergence of a movement-based party. This interference took the form of attempts to mobilize social groups against TANU in an organizational alternative to the party (the United Tanganyika Party, or UTP), efforts to mobilize local chiefs against TANU mobilization by portraying the latter as a threat to the authority of the former, denial of local registra-

<sup>38</sup> Hero Cahyono, *Peranan Ulama Dalam GOLKAR 1971–1980: Dari Pemilu Sampai Malari* (The role of the Islamic scholars in GOLKAR 1971–1980: From the general election to the January 15 disaster) (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992); Hariyadhie, *Perspektif Gerakan Mahasiswa 1978 Dalam Percaturan Politik Nasional* (Perspectives on the student movement of 1978 in the political arena) (Jakarta: PT Golden Terayon Press, 1997).

tion permits TO TANU branches, and the harassment and imprisonment of newly appointed party officials.<sup>39</sup> In addition, TANU had to fight to the very end to force the British government to set a date for formal independence.

Because TANU took shape during the preindependence period, it did not have access to the sorts of patronage resources that incumbent one-party regimes often have. As a result, the party's leadership did not have access to funds to use as payoffs to win over supporters, and subsequently the leadership had to build a broad coalition based on ethnic power distribution. In addition to the fact that Tanzania was a country poor in the kinds of natural resources that provide a regime in power with access to rent revenues, TANU was shut out of even the limited resources that were available. In the late 1960s the Tanzanian government began to receive significant and largely discretionary foreign aid, enabling patronage to complement a strong party apparatus. As in Indonesia, rent patronage joined, rather than substituted for, patterns of coalition maintenance forged earlier. That this took place in two single-party regimes in Africa and Asia suggests that Shefter's observation that powerfully organized American parties tended not to degenerate into rent-seeking arenas, even after taking power, has wide applicability across ruling parties in many other settings.<sup>40</sup>

Julius Nyerere and his supporters in TANU responded to the organizational and fiscal challenges posed by colonial opposition and a lack of revenues by broadening the basis of authority within the party. Whereas the New Order regime in Indonesia had reached out to student and Islamic organizations, the TANU "shadow regime" forged ties with numerous ethnic groups. The adoption of Kiswahili as the working language of the movement, for instance, cut across ethnic lines and suggested a "common language" for political authority. The TANU leadership also worked hard to build organizational power, incorporating the established Tanganyika Federation of Labor (TFL) and appointing its head to TANU's executive committee, as well as creating its own youth and women's movements.<sup>41</sup>

These steps came despite the fact that TANU took the reins of state in 1961 as a "loose-knit national movement . . . with a weak ideological

<sup>39</sup>G. Ruhumbika, *Towards Ujamaa: Twenty Years of TANU Leadership* (Kampala, Nairobi, and Dar Es Salaam: East African Literature Bureau, 1974), 5–10.

<sup>40</sup>Shefter (fn. 16).

<sup>41</sup>Ruhumbika (fn. 39), 13–18.

base.”<sup>42</sup> Its primary task shifted from movement building to state and regime building. And, given the difficulties involved in surviving the preindependence period, TANU unsurprisingly pursued regime consolidation using much the same techniques it had used earlier on to become a viable movement. One of those strategies involved tying the party to the bureaucracy, which had been staffed by the outgoing colonial government and whose employees were therefore suspect as non-nationalists. In 1962 the Regions and Regional Commissioners Act replaced provincial commissioners with regional commissioners, all of whom were party members in good standing. In this way, as the New Order regime had done in Indonesia, a ruling party was explicitly and carefully fused to existing government institutions, bolstering its power and its ties to the state. The local civil service was simultaneously tied more closely to the central government:

The all-purpose, civil-service, provincial and district commissioners have given way to political regional and area commissioners; the Chiefs lost all their official powers; [and] the formal native authority councils have everywhere been replaced by TANU-dominated, predominantly elected councils. Taken together, *these changes constitute a revolution* in provincial administration in Tanzania.<sup>43</sup>

The party also became a clearinghouse of sorts for government funding and subsidies: “Rural party leaders are able to remain in power for at least three reasons. First, they offer the peasant . . . the possibility of representing him at higher levels of authority. Second, the party leader is privy to information outside the village by virtue of his contacts with the party. Third, the party leader often controls the allocation of local jobs and other scarce resources.”<sup>44</sup> When discretionary foreign aid became a significant source of patronage revenue in the late 1960s and 1970s, it did not become a substitute for party building. Rather, as in Indonesia, it became its complement and was used to cement further an already broad coalition and to bind individuals more closely to the regime through the party.<sup>45</sup>

Despite all this effort, the TANU regime, like Indonesia’s New Order, experienced an economic crisis in the late 1970s that threatened the regime. Negative economic growth rates in both 1980 and 1983 were

<sup>42</sup> William Tordoff, “Regional Administration in Tanzania,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 3 (May 1965), 66.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 64, emphasis added.

<sup>44</sup> Norman N. Miller, “The Rural African Party: Political Participation in Tanzania,” *American Political Science Review* 64 (June 1970), 550.

<sup>45</sup> Thanks to Goran Hyden for his suggestions on this topic.

responsible for the state's inability to maintain its many socialist-inspired subsidies and social programs.<sup>46</sup> In response, the regime undertook a major effort to revitalize the party, eclipsing TANU with the Revolutionary Party (CCM) and setting new conditions for the TANU rank and file to transfer their memberships to the new organization.<sup>47</sup> The CCM has remained in power since the late 1970s, even after announcing a transition to multiparty politics in 1992 and holding elections in 1995, which the CCM won handily despite a stream of defections.

Ruling parties in Indonesia and Tanzania shared in common several features that ensured a long tenure, even through economic and political crises that in other settings brought down single-party regimes. First, rent scarcity and political challenges defined their respective ascents to power and forced equally tough decisions on rulers who would likely have preferred not to spread access to power so broadly. Second, they undertook genuine party- and coalition-building programs, tying the ruling party in both countries to important organized social groups and to the state itself, ensuring both streamlined authority and a robust configuration of regime supporters in their societies. Third, even though both regimes gained substantial rent access a decade after their inception, the hard times that marked those inceptions led rulers to plow the rents back into the regime project, in effect adding patronage funds to an already strong ruling coalition and facilitating its expansion and consolidation. In the next section, I show how, given easier initial conditions, rulers failed to build strong party organizations and could elect to rely on rent patronage to hold together a loose coalition. The long-term consequences of those choices weighed as heavily on regime resilience as they did in Indonesia and Tanzania, though with widely different results.

## THE ORIGINS OF WEAK SINGLE-PARTY RULE

### GUINEA-BISSAU, 1974–80

Like all of Portugal's colonies in West Africa, Guinea-Bissau achieved independence following the Portuguese army coup in 1974. The African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) took power despite having taken control over only parts of the country and few of the cities, leaving much of the population outside

<sup>46</sup> Frank Holmquist, "Class Structure, Peasant Participation, and Rural Self-Help," in J. D. Barkan, ed., *Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 191–92; and Aili Marie Tripp, "Local Organizations, Participation, and the State in Urban Tanzania," in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds., *Governance and Politics in Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 234–36.

<sup>47</sup> Goran Hyden, *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry* (London: Heinemann, 1980), 36–37.

the party's control at independence and, more importantly, dependent on an alternative economy and Portuguese patronage efforts.<sup>48</sup> In addition, the PAIGC fought its war of independence against a Portuguese army that was both overstretched by its simultaneous commitments in Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique and preoccupied with growing political instability at home (the latter led to domestic political intervention in 1974). On balance, the PAIGC faced a less strenuous challenge than did many other independence movement parties; 80 percent of the Portuguese army was already committed to fighting guerrillas in Angola and Mozambique and could not be transferred to Guinea.<sup>49</sup>

This relatively weaker colonial opposition manifested itself in several ways that shaped the party's later trajectory. First, the PAIGC could opt not to engage the problem of persistent tension with local chiefs in much of the countryside or with the Fula, an ethnic group that had supported the Portuguese;<sup>50</sup> as long as the movement could secure sufficient land to hide its cadres and fighters, it could avoid making concessions to, or co-opting, these chiefs.<sup>51</sup> Second, the party could sidestep the challenge of seizing the cities because of limited rural resistance. As a result, it never had to engage the bulk of the population and subsequently came to power with a relatively narrow social base—Cape Verdian elites who were looked on with suspicion by mainland ethnic groups, limited parts of the countryside, and the peasantry in only parts of the country.

The PAIGC had also been able to rely on Soviet aid since the mid-1960s, so that even before state-to-state aid began in large volume after 1974, highly fungible aid revenues made it unnecessary to extract much from the countryside. While the party's militias had often relied on logistical and material support from the peasants for whose land they fought, its leadership spent much of its time abroad raising funds. As a result, the ties that might have been built between the newly independent party and social forces and taken shape in party organization were neglected in favor of substantial aid from outside. For instance, the goodwill that the party had built during the war of independence with the peasantry deteriorated in the immediate postindependence years. The replacement of guerrilla leaders with party cadres with little experience outside the cities meant that party officials mostly stuck to the

<sup>48</sup> Patrick Chabal, "Party, State, and Socialism in Guinea-Bissau," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 17, no. 2 (1983), 194.

<sup>49</sup> Joshua Forrest, *Guinea-Bissau: Power, Conflict, and Renewal in a West African Nation* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), 30–31.

<sup>50</sup> Chabal (fn. 48), 191.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 197.

cities: "The consequence was a growing lack of contact between cadres and the general populace, a rapid decline of grass-roots mobilisation activities, and a physical and institutional distancing of the Party from the peasantry."<sup>52</sup>

In addition, the PAIGC after independence failed to live up to its wartime rhetoric. Given the political flexibility to do so, President Luiz Cabral elected to keep as much power as possible for himself, neglecting what could have become a strong coalition-maintaining party apparatus to build a close circle of personal associates, all Cape Verdians, and high-level party officials. Many of the most powerful social groups in Guinea-Bissau—the army, led by Commander João Bernardo Vieira; the peasantry, suddenly inundated with heavy taxes and who through hometown ties maintained a strong influence with the army rank and file; holdover civil servants from the colonial government, whose loyalty the party leadership never pursued through patronage or the offer of party status and employment; and ethnic Balantas, whom the regime marginalized to the benefit of Cabral's Cape Verdian inner circle.<sup>53</sup>

Between 1974 and 1980, the regime filled the top rungs of the army officer corps with Cape Verdians close to Cabral, rather than looking to battle-proven but politically suspect Balanta soldiers. Other than those select few commanders with close ties to the regime, the army generally suffered from low pay and received little from the regime in the way of patronage. The impact of the levy of heavy taxes on peasant farmers in 1977, coming on the heels of many declarations of the party's solidarity with the countryside, was exacerbated by government rice policy during the Sahelian drought of 1977–79, in which rice supplied and purchased abroad largely went to favored urban consumers rather than to the farmers who before the drought had been paying the government with surplus.<sup>54</sup> In the civil service, PAIGC officials took over most of the ministries and pushed aside bureaucrats who were better trained but ideologically suspect. The result was that the PAIGC had very weak ties to the bureaucracy, whereas a fusion of the two could have provided the party with a much more solid social and political foundation, as well as cementing the loyalty of a growing social class that could have helped the regime through crises had it been vested in the regime's continuity.

As a result of the early years of rule by the PAIGC, in which consolidation took the form of wholesale exclusion of important social forces,

<sup>52</sup>Joshua Forrest, "Guinea-Bissau since Independence: A Decade of Domestic Power Struggles," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 25 (March 1987), 99–100.

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*, 97.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, 102.

neither the party nor the ruling coalition remained very strong by the late 1970s. And growing tension between President Cabral and Commander Vieira of the Army culminated in a political confrontation between the two, who were supported respectively by the government and upper echelons of the party and by the military and middle-level party officials who had split with the leadership. By 1979 the discord had become a full-fledged regime crisis, to which Cabral and the PAIGC leadership could respond either by reaching out to the opposition or by confronting it. The regime chose the latter, and Cabral began by purging the ministries and party of their questionable members and filling the vacancies with close friends. He also confronted the Army directly by relieving Vieira of his commander's position and amending the Constitution to make himself Supreme Head of the Armed Forces.<sup>55</sup> When Vieira, who retained the overwhelming support of the army, moved against the regime in November 1980, no social groups stood with Cabral or the party. The lack of early coalition-building efforts and the decay of the party's organizational and mobilizing capacities left the regime with little protective capacity for use in a serious crisis and no ties to the social groups that could have shored up a ruling coalition. Unable to count on such a coalition to stand by it, the PAIGC regime collapsed the first time that it faced a real crisis.

#### THE PHILIPPINES, 1972–86

Seven years after first being democratically elected, Philippines president Ferdinand Marcos “declared” martial law on September 22, 1972, claiming a threat to national security. Despite the rhetorical flare with which he announced this emergency, however, his government faced no opposition capable of genuinely threatening it by any means other than elections, which came to an end with martial law.<sup>56</sup> The two militant groups in the country—the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and National People's Army (NPA)—posed a local threat only in limited areas and had no real ability to jeopardize the central government.<sup>57</sup> In-

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 104.

<sup>56</sup> However, both Marcos and his opponents among the traditional Filipino political elite inflated the strength of the opposition. Marcos did so to rationalize the declaration of martial law; his opposition did so through exaggerated reporting of regional rebellions in newspapers they owned, and did so to try and paint a picture in Manila of a president on the ropes. As Thompson details, neither side's account during this period was very accurate, and both were heavily colored by political motives. See Mark R. Thompson, *The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Transition in the Philippines* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), esp. 37–41, 54–61.

<sup>57</sup> The MNLF grew in strength, however, during the first few years of martial law, and by 1975 had forced the regime to the negotiating table, the result of which was a cease-fire granting autonomy to Muslim areas in the southern Philippines and large-scale co-optation of MNLF leaders into the regime's patronage circles. See Thompson (fn. 56), 61–63.

deed, the threat was one that Marcos had largely cooked up himself in order to justify the declaration of martial law.<sup>58</sup> There was substantial opposition to Marcos among the Philippines' traditional elite, and the Liberal Party would almost certainly have defeated Marcos's Nacionalista in the 1971 elections. However, these elites were far from unified, relied on sporadic alliances with and support from regional militias or rebels, and could never provide the kind of united front that might, as it did in Indonesia and Tanzania, have forced Marcos to think seriously about a robust ruling party to serve as the foundation of his regime. Once elections were canceled, elite disunity and the absence of an organized opposition party or organization ensured that other options were unfeasible. Finally, sporadic demonstrations and strikes by student and labor groups both failed to generate a radicalized opposition movement that maintained its reformist demands; the demonstrations shrank in frequency as September 1972 approached.<sup>59</sup> In short, Marcos declared martial law and seized power under conditions that were not particularly threatening to him; rather, it seems to have been a case of simple political ambition.

The Marcos regime also came to power with access to sizable rents and increased them dramatically during his first few years in office. By 1972 Marcos had a ready source of vast, highly discretionary revenues that made it possible to build networks of patronage rather than power on a scale not before seen in the Filipino presidency: control of the country's timber industry. During the years before martial law, he had replaced the head of the Department of Agricultural and Natural Resources (DANR) with his vice president. Shortly after declaring martial law, he personally took control of the DANR and of access to timber contracts and rents, thereby availing his regime of a powerful alternative to coalition building.<sup>60</sup> In the early 1970s timber revenues accounted for roughly one of every twenty dollars produced in the Philippines. Marcos, that is, completely controlled 5 percent of the national economy through the DANR alone: "[he] used his authoritarian powers to make his allocation rights more direct, more exclusive, and *more discretionary*."<sup>61</sup> The unsurprising result was that the structure of political power that grew up around Marcos was grounded in rent payoffs rather than negotiated access to the center of power.

<sup>58</sup>David Wurfel, "Martial Law in the Philippines: The Methods of Regime Survival," *Pacific Affairs* 50 (Spring 1977), 6.

<sup>59</sup>Thanks to Dan Slater for his discussion of anti-Marcos political activity during this period.

<sup>60</sup>Ross (fn. 37), 71–73.

<sup>61</sup>*Ibid.*, 76, emphasis added.

His rent sources expanded dramatically as he used his martial law powers to seize the business holdings of many of his opponents among the Philippines' traditional economic and political elite. Dozens of firms, radio and television stations and newspapers, and utility companies became his private patronage account almost overnight through expropriation and government-forced fire sales to his friends and relatives.<sup>62</sup> By 1975 his regime and the ligatures through which it exercised power came to be characterized almost exclusively by patronage networks and cronyism. Marcos's regime-building strategies reflected the weakness of the challenges he had faced in consolidating power. Rather than build the Nacionalista into a coalition-maintaining organization that could provide predictable access to the center of political power, he focused instead on forging individual ties to personal friends and select members of the military and bureaucracy, essentially a transition from clientelism to sultanism.<sup>63</sup> These ties never went beyond access to regime-granted monopolies in key economic sectors or to payoff-generating government positions that Rosshas termed "rent seizing"; as a result, they depended entirely on continued economic growth.<sup>64</sup> Given the rampant and increasingly unchecked corruption with which Marcos had chosen to consolidate his regime and the simultaneous focus on export-led liberal economic policies, the economy became increasingly vulnerable to economic shocks.<sup>65</sup>

In advance of the 1978 elections, Marcos announced the creation of the New Society Movement Party (KBL), which was to be the public face of his development policies and of his regime more broadly. In organizational terms, it never amounted to much more than a collection of Marcos's favored cronies, and the KBL accomplished little more in the late 1970s than to catalyze the beginnings of an opposition coalition. Local politicians who had not been lucky enough to be in the smallest circle of regime patronage by the early 1980s were "far more ambivalent toward Marcos than their predecessors were and some [went] out of their way to assert their loyalties to their constituencies, trying to distance themselves from Marcos while simultaneously manoeuvring for his favour."<sup>66</sup>

<sup>62</sup>Mark R. Thompson, "The Marcos Regime in the Philippines," in H.E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, *Sultanistic Regimes* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 218–21. See also Thompson (fn. 56), 52–54.

<sup>63</sup>Thompson (fn. 56), 49–63.

<sup>64</sup>See fn. 60.

<sup>65</sup>Renato S. Velasco, "Philippine Democracy: Promise and Performance," in A. Laothamatas, ed., *Democratization in Southeast and East Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), 86–87.

<sup>66</sup>Richard Nations and Guy Sacerdoti, "Marcos Gives Ground on Some Points, but the Future Is Still Uncertain: The Aquino Legacy," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 125 (August 30, 1984), 22.

For a variety of reasons, of which the economic wreckage caused by rampant corruption was central, the Filipino economy began to deteriorate in the late 1970s. The 1979 oil shock exacerbated the crisis, and by the early 1980s local economic elites began to defect from a regime that could no longer deliver the one thing that held them to it: profit. Marcos responded by attempting to keep them in the fold with new cuts from a shrinking pie: "As his legitimacy eroded, Marcos responded with 'massive outlays to insure the loyalty of local elites.'"<sup>67</sup> By then Marcos faced an uphill battle to hold together his crony coalition. The lack of hierarchical control in the KBL ensured that Marcos had virtually no ability to demand or cajole loyalty from anyone who was not still getting rich.

As the economy continued to suffer and Marcos's emerging health problems became a prominent variable in national politics, it became clear that "the unity of the ruling party [was] directly proportional to the strength left in Marcos' body."<sup>68</sup> It is noteworthy here that the salience of the succession issue was directly tied (inversely) to the strength of the ruling party. Absent a coherent organization that could steer a possible transition from Marcos to a new leader, his few remaining supporters began to calculate the odds of their dyadic relationships with him surviving a political crisis. There was no party that could have smoothly managed a transition to post-Marcos authoritarianism such as was possible, for instance, at the end of Nyerere's rule in Tanzania.

The regime's collapse was more gradual than the PAIGC's in Guinea-Bissau but no less complete: by 1986 the opposition forced Marcos's New Society regime to hold snap elections. The regime claimed, of course, that the KBL had won, but the independent National Movement for Free Elections challenged this claim. As computer technicians from the Election Committee walked out in protest, a group of junior military officers led by the defense minister plotted a coup against the regime. The group allied with the Armed Forces vice chief of staff and then reached out to the Catholic church, which through a church-run radio station urged supporters of Corazon Aquino to support the coup plotters. They did, in what became the "People Power" uprising that resulted in the collapse of the Marcos-KBL regime and a transition back to democratic government under President Aquino.

<sup>67</sup> Peter Dauvergne, *Shadows in the Forest: Japan and the Politics of Timber in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 140.

<sup>68</sup> Nations and Sacerdoti (fn. 66).

## CONCLUSIONS AND SOME THOUGHTS ON FUTURE RESEARCH

The experiences of Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Tanzania suggest that it is the origins of, rather than the existence of, single-party rule that account for the long-term viability of some regimes and the surprising vulnerability of others. In Guinea-Bissau and the Philippines, the existence of a ruling party failed to produce a robust coalition. During the first serious economic crisis either faced, both regimes collapsed, as party elites and other rent-bought allies defected to the opposition. In Indonesia and Tanzania, by contrast, coalitions remained intact, for two reasons. First, social groups in the coalition were vested in regime continuity by more than rent payoffs; they had predictable access to policy-making and political power and stood more to gain than to lose by standing by the respective regimes; parties provided a credible commitment to these coalition partners. Second, previous ties to social groups allowed rulers to react assertively to crises and to prevent economic shocks from pulling their coalitions apart. In both cases, truly institutionalized ruling party apparatuses helped greatly to provide a predictable set of political incentives that signaled to coalition partners that their interests would continue to be looked after.

While in many ways ruling parties in these and other developing countries were modeled on Leninist parties in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, they offer useful reflexive insight into the survival of regimes in the communist "hard core." If it is the challenges faced at the party's inception, rather than ideology or level of development, that shapes long-term viability, it is unsurprising that every one of the East bloc party-regimes established by Soviet intervention collapsed within eighteen months of Gorbachev's announcement that he would not order his military to intervene again in East European domestic politics. In other words, the East bloc regimes became fatally fragile at almost the moment their superpower guarantee vanished.

By contrast, the fierce civil wars that confronted both the Chinese and the Vietnamese communist parties as they sought power shaped the organizations they built. In short, there may be little that is exceptional about communist parties as opposed to other ruling parties other than the contingent intensity of conflict within which they were often forged. Nor, given the similar dynamics of party building as a response to early challenges, does there appear to be an insurmountable analytic divide between authoritarian and democratic party formation. These insights may encourage the emergence of a research agenda for party formation studies that cuts across both regions and regime types and

urges a focus on the origins of political organizations as key determinants of later political outcomes.

Outside of the Soviet bloc, Vietnam, and China are many extremely long-lived party-regimes that provide strong suggestive support for the argument that it is party origins that explain much of later regime durability. A look back to Table 1, and in particular to the regimes still standing in Cuba, Egypt, Malaysia, and Syria, to take four “big” cases of notably durable single-party rule, reveals significant differences in the mode of ascent to power but powerful similarities in the challenges that party builders faced in each instance. Brownlee notes that powerful and coherent ruling parties emerged in Egypt and Malaysia as the result of conflicts faced at the time of their inception and that those parties facilitated the maintenance of elite cohesion through crises that could have threatened the ruling coalition.<sup>69</sup> In Cuba the road to power followed a path much like that taken by the Vietcong, in which long-term guerrilla warfare was combined with coalition building in the countryside but which, unlike in North Vietnam, had no ready source of external revenue from foreign supporters. Finally, Heydemann details the powerful conservative coalition of capitalists, landed elites, and militant Islamists that confronted the Syrian Baath Party’s elite in 1963 as it attempted to consolidate itself in the aftermath of secession from the United Arab Republic and two years of failed parliamentary politics.<sup>70</sup> The powerfully organized party that had emerged by 1970 presided over “nothing less than a revolutionary transformation of the state, society, and economy.”<sup>71</sup> Moreover, the Baath regime came into oil wealth more than a decade after this tumultuous road to consolidation, having faced serious rent scarcity during its early years.

While broader and deeper comparative inquiry is needed to confirm these findings, it seems to be the case that, where party elites faced serious organized opposition as they made crucial decisions about how broad and how deep to build party organizations and where they faced fiscal scarcity, they tended to be left with no alternative but to invest heavily in coalition and organization building. Moreover, this seems to cross numerous types of opposition—colonial, communist, ethno-regional, and even superpower—and to cross all regions of the developing world as well as the former Soviet bloc. In short, close analytical

<sup>69</sup>Brownlee (fn. 19).

<sup>70</sup>Steven Heydemann, *Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946–1970* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), 157–61.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*, 162.

focus on the early years of single-party regimes holds much promise in the study of both regime persistence and change.

The cases presented here also suggest a promising avenue for future cross-national research on the study of authoritarian durability: the incorporation of opposition and rent access variables, and more generally inception-specific variables, into data sets. It is possible to develop historically sensitive data sets, given prior theorization of and comparative historical testing of the importance of factors that help to shape authoritarian regimes of varying robustness. For example, Lust-Okar and Smith utilize similar coding criteria to test for the effects on authoritarian persistence of, respectively, past Islamist exclusion by regimes in the Middle East and opposition strength at the onset of state-led industrialization in oil-exporting countries.<sup>72</sup> There is no intrinsic reason to segregate quantitative studies of authoritarianism from qualitative-historical ones, and an integrative approach offers scholars great potential.<sup>73</sup>

Finally, if the theory developed here travels well, accounting for the origins of authoritarianism may well take us considerably further along the path to understanding why so many of these regimes have weathered the third wave of democratic transitions. As a research agenda focused on authoritarian longevity and distinct from transitology takes shape, it ought to do so judiciously, investigating not only the institutional appearances of regime types but also their social and political underpinnings. Such an approach mandates neither a return to nationally bounded theories, nor a return to the simple description of different authoritarian polities, nor a move to strictly formal and quantitative approaches to studying dictatorship. What it does is support the contention that, by carefully combining structured comparisons and large-N data analysis, it should be possible to “recover the macro-analytics” of authoritarianism and to wed them to broader collections of data, expanding both the breadth and depth of our analysis of authoritarian persistence.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>72</sup>Ellen Lust-Okar, “Institutions, Historical Legacies and the Failure of Liberalization in the Middle East and North Africa” (Manuscript, Yale University, 2004); Benjamin Smith, “Hard Times in the Land of Plenty: Oil, Opposition and Late Development” (forthcoming).

<sup>73</sup>See, for example, Evan Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,” *American Political Science Review* 99 (August 2005), 435–52.

<sup>74</sup>David Waldner, “From Intra-Type Variation to the Origins of Types: Recovering the Macro-Analytics of State Building” (Paper presented at the conference, “Asian Political Economy in an Era of Globalization,” Dartmouth College, May 10–11, 2002).