Electoral Tactics and Autocratization

Paul D’Anieri, University of Florida

I. Introduction

The third wave of democracy stalled around 2005, and since then democracy has decreased in more states than it has increased.¹ Many states apparently on the path to democracy have reversed course, as leaders have entrenched themselves in power by limiting competition and rewriting the rules of the game. The phenomenon is increasingly noted, but we do not yet understand it well. Part of the problem is that the enormous body of research on “democratization” is focused, as the word implies, on variation in only one direction. “Autocratization” is as important as democratization, and we need to understand not only how democracy or autocracy increases, but crucially, how changes in direction take place. Elections contribute to the legitimacy of democrats and autocrats alike, and tactics to ensure the victory of incumbents are numerous and proliferating. This paper examines the tactical factors that allow elections to contribute to autocracy rather than democracy.

II. Democratization and Autocratization

The dependent variable in most analyses of regime type is “democracy.” In theory, democracy can range from the very high to very low. But the process addressed in the literature is


Incentives, Institutions, and the Challenges to Research on Authoritarian Politics

Milan Svolik, University of Illinois

The difference between dictatorship and democracy is a distinction central to many research questions in political science. Most of the continuing debates about regime types concern concepts and measurement: Is the difference between dictatorship and democracy one of kind or one of degree? How many political regime types are there? Should only procedural or also substantive indicators be considered?

The overthrow of a number of long-standing autocratic leaders in the Middle East and North Africa during the Arab Spring has sparked extensive speculation in the media and elsewhere about the consequences of their ousters. Will they democratize? Will the same elites who supported the dictator install a successor from within the former leader’s inner circle and continue to rule? Will a new autocratic group seize control instead? Autocratic leadership transitions demand so much attention because they can go in very different political directions.

In Myanmar in 1992, for example, when the military ousted General Saw Maung, another military officer and fellow member of the State Law and Order Restoration Council inner circle, General Than Shwe, quickly replaced him. The regime remained in power, controlled by the same group of elites. Compare this to Iran in 1979, where anti-regime protests led to the ouster of the Shah, and a radically different autocratic regime led by Muslim clerics took control. In contrast, in Romania, when security forces executed former dictator Nicolae Ceausescu after weeks of protests in 1989, military and civilian elites who had until a few weeks before supported his rule cooperated to move the country toward democracy. In the first example, the autocrat's ouster led to regime survival under a new leader; in the second, one autocracy replaced another; and in the third, democratic transition followed the ouster. Better understanding of the conditions that make any one of these outcomes more likely than the others remains at the forefront of both academic and policy agendas.

Despite the importance of this issue, analysts have until recently lacked the appropriate data to explore it. Existing data

Perhaps the first clear statement tying oil wealth to a regime’s fragility—and implicitly to regime survival—came in 1970 when Hossein Mahdavy suggested that the Shah’s autonomy from Iranian society was a function of the country’s oil-dominated political economy. That insight found its way into a revision of Theda Skocpol’s framework for studying revolutions (Skocpol 1982) among other places. The rationale for modifying her original argument was that oil had made the Iranian monarchy autonomous from its subjects and rendered it vulnerable to anti-regime mobilization. During the last two decades of the 20th century, the study of resources and regimes remained a small research program for Middle East specialists and one that failed to garner much attention in the mainstream of comparative politics. Two non-Middle East specialists—Terry Karl and Michael Ross—broke the question out of its then-marginal position with a book and an article, respectively, that made the political economy of the resource curse into a mainstream question (Karl 1997, Ross 2001). Since these two seminal works nearly one thousand subsequent articles have cited one or both, a simple but apt illustration of the degree to which the links between resource wealth and political regimes are now central topics in the subfield.

The findings concerning the link between resource wealth and both regime type and stability are increasingly varied. A vein of inquiry elaborating Ross’s original 2001 findings continues to contend that oil still hinders democracy. Another vein suggests either that oil has no effect or that its effects are actually positive (Haber and Menaldo 2011). At the very least the muddle of

It is worth noting here that in early 1998 I was warned by a senior comparativist not to write a dissertation about oil and autocracy because "no one cares about oil and no one cares about authoritarianism."
eclecticism, this issue’s symposium includes essays on: a call for more attention to specific tactics of authoritarian consolidation (Paul D’Anieri), new publicly available datasets (Svolik and Wright, Geddes and Frantz), and a stock-taking look at the resource-regimes link (Smith).

Together, the essays bring valuable analytic and operational light to bear on a subject that by definition is often opaque and difficult to study. D’Anieri asks us to think about some regime dynamics as “autocratization” processes rather than simply as off-the-path democratization. Svolik, and Wright, Geddes and Frantz, respectively, introduce their own new efforts to categorize the myriad dynamics of autocratic rule and the results of their own research. Smith synthesizes the current state of research on the link between resource wealth and regimes.

This issue also brings us as executive editors to the halfway point of our own “rule.” The early summer 2014 issue will be our final one and in the interim we continue to appreciate the support of our fellow editorial board members, our editorial assistant, and of course Melissa Aten, who cheerfully makes sure that our trains always run on time. We suspect that she looks forward to regime change on the editorial board next year but can’t hold that against her!

On behalf of the Editorial Committee,

Benjamin Smith and Staffan I. Lindberg

---

D’Anieri, continued

“democratization,” which implies that change only occurs in one direction. As a result, the existing literature on change in one direction vastly outweighs that on change in the other.

For example, McFaul’s widely cited study on the sources of “colored revolutions” derived a model of such revolutions from cases in which such revolutions were attempted and succeeded. There is variation on neither the dependent nor the independent variable. Bunce and Wolchik pointed out that the post-communist states are particularly susceptible to democratic diffusion, and that electoral revolutions had occurred in 40 percent of the post-communist cases where they were possible, but they did not try to explain the 60 percent of cases which did not experience revolutions, or the increase in autocracy in many states in the region.

In more recent work, Bunce, McFaul and Stoner-Weiss acknowledge that “the general rule has not been the rise of democracy, but, rather, the formation of regimes that are located in the middle of a continuum anchored by democracy at one pole and dictatorship at the other” and that “we are unlikely to understand democratization without understanding both mixed regimes and full-scale dictatorships.” Lucan Way and Vitali Silitsky explore the sources of autocratic resurgence. Way in particular asks about variation in outcomes: “Why did some (Armenia, Belarus, Moldova and Russia) survive the third wave in the early and mid-2000s whereas others (Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine) fell to opposition forces?”

Over time, Freedom House scores for individual countries move in both directions. Much of the increased autocracy we see in the world is not simply a bump on the road to democracy, but rather a lasting change. Russia moved gradually from scores of 6 and 5 in 1991-1992 to 3 and 3 in Freedom House’s two main categories in 1991-1992 to 6 and 5 in 2010 (exactly where it was in 1988-89, before the collapse of the Soviet Union). Venezuela was ranked “free” by Freedom House (with scores of 1 and 3) in the late 80s and early 90s, moved to “partly free” from 1992-1993 to 1995-1996, returned to “free” for three years and since has been classified “partly free” by Freedom House (with scores of 1 and 3)

6. Bunce et al., Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Post-Communist World, x.
free,” with its scores declining to 5 and 5 by 2011.\(^9\)

What are the sources of autocratization? While scholars have increasingly pointed to the phenomena of autocratization and the manipulation of elections, our understanding of how this process relates to democratization remains incomplete. In particular, we want to understand the inflection points: why and how does the direction of change reverse? We have immense empirical data and theory on how and why stable autocracies begin the process of democratization. We have a much poorer understanding of how that trend, once underway, is reversed, or equally important, how the quality of democracy in a stable democracy erodes.

**III. Tactics**

Rather than asking “what causes autocratization?” we might go back a step and ask “what tactics do rulers use to minimize the chance that they will be forced from office?” The discussion naturally gravitates toward elections, because elections are the main democratic means of removing leaders from office and are such a powerful means of legitimizing rule. In many cases, it may be easier to gain legitimacy by winning elections than by solving intractable problems (performance legitimacy). Moreover, keeping power through the legitimacy provided by elections may be easier and cheaper than doing so through outright coercion, especially in an era where coercion can carry high international costs.

The essential trick of “electoral authoritarianism”\(^10\) is for authoritarian leaders to gain the legitimizing effects of elections without enduring the danger of actually being ejected from power.

The idea of democracy has become so closely identified with elections that we are in danger of forgetting that the modern history of representative elections is a tale of authoritarian manipulations as much as it is a saga of democratic triumphs. Historically, in other words, elections have been an instrument of authoritarian control as well as a means of democratic governance.\(^11\)

To the extent that the gap between actual fairness and perceived fairness grows, a leader can gain the legitimizing effects of elections without paying the costs in terms of accountability to voters or compromise with other politicians. At one end of the spectrum, elections in the Soviet Union were so widely perceived as fixed that they contributed little legitimacy to the regime. At the other end, rulers in today’s advanced democracies use a variety of tactics to gain electoral leverage, such as gerrymandering and favorable administrative treatment for donors, without undermining the overall perception that elections are fair. This goal of using the power of the state to retain authority leads to a vast range of tactics and tricks, some of which are listed below.

The crucial point, from this perspective, is that elections do not only constrain leaders. They also empower them, by allowing them to claim a mandate from voters for their actions. This legitimacy is useful not only in retaining office. It is equally useful in claiming a democratic mandate to overcome resistance from opposition parties or even from within one’s own party. The adoption of such tactics need not be motivated by the desire to become an “autocrat” or to rule without check. The motivation might simply be the desire to overcome legislative or judicial gridlock blocking adoption of a program that the leader views as highly desirable for society. Thus, Franklin Roosevelt tried to pack the Supreme Court by expanding the number of justices when the court ruled unconstitutional many of the New Deal programs Roosevelt considered essential. In some cases, it seems, the goal is to defeat an opposition that is itself regarded as antidemocratic. Two examples illustrate this point.

In Russia in 1993, Boris Yeltsin confronted a legislature which staunchly opposed Yeltsin’s economic reforms. The legislature (like Yeltsin himself) had been elected under Soviet law and then remained in power when Russia succeeded the USSR in late 1991. Yeltsin went outside the constitutional order to demand the dissolution of the parliament. The parliament resisted, and the ensuing standoff was resolved only when military forces loyal to Yeltsin shelled the parliament building. Yeltsin then drafted a new constitution outside of existing processes for amendment and put it to a nationwide referendum. That constitution, adopted unconstitutionally through a mixture of force and fraud, has empowered the Russian president ever since.

In Ukraine in 1996, Leonid Kuchma confronted a legislature that was badly fragmented but generally hostile to reform. In contrast to the Russian case, the Ukrainian parliament had been elected in free post-soviet elections in 1994. Ukraine had not yet adopted a post-Soviet constitution, and was

---


working under a patchily modified version of its 1977 Soviet constitution. Kuchma proposed a strongly presidential constitution, similar to that adopted in Russia, while the leaders of the Ukrainian parliament advocated a parliamentary model. In order to bend the parliament to his will, Kuchma threatened that if it did not endorse a presidential model, he would put an even more strongly presidential model to a nation-wide referendum. Such a referendum would be unconstitutional, but it would have the power of legitimacy that such referendums bring. Faced with that threat, the parliament adopted the presidential model that facilitated Kuchma’s subsequent authoritarianism.¹²

Tellingly, neither Yeltsin nor Kuchma was seen as an “authoritarian” at the time. Yeltsin’s violent dissolution of the Russian Duma and subsequent constitutional referendum were widely endorsed by western supporters of democracy. In Ukraine, Kuchma also had western support in his battle with the leftist parliament. Why? Essentially, most in the west shared Yeltsin’s and Kuchma’s view that the leftists needed to be defeated, and that power needed to be concentrated in the hands of the executive if economic reform were to proceed.

In both of these cases, moves to concentrate power in the hands of the president at the expense of parliament were legitimated through ostensibly democratic means—a referendum in Russia and a parliamentary vote in Ukraine. In both cases, the steps taken appeared necessary to empower the cause of reform over those who were hostile to it. And in both cases, the measures taken concentrated so much power in the executive branch that further unbalancing of the system became much easier.

What tactics allow one to create a gap between the perceived levels of freedom, fairness and competitiveness of elections with their actual levels? Tactics range from those which directly alter voting results to more diffuse efforts to build general political support and hamper opposition. They include patronage, selective law enforcement, control of the media, and voting fraud. At one end of the continuum is reporting the vote falsely after it has been counted. At the other end are efforts to spend government money in a way that gains the support of key constituencies. As Robert Dahl points out, “In a rough sense, the essence of all competitive politics is bribery of the electorate by politicians.”¹³ Well-executed, such tactics can tip an election while making it difficult even for international observers to identify clear violations.

A tentative typology of the main tactics we see around might include the following categories and practices:

1. Skewing the vote count after the election:
   1.1. Falsification of the vote count.
   1.2. Stacking electoral commissions to influence how votes are counted.
2. Skewing the voting itself:
   2.1.1. Tactics to prevent opposition voters from voting.
   2.1.2. Harassment of opposition voters.
   2.1.3. Limited voting hours.
   2.1.4. Limited polling stations.
   2.2. Vote fraud.
   2.2.1. Adding ineligible voters to one’s own lists.
   2.2.2. Casting multiple votes; stuffing the ballot box.
   2.2.3. Bribing voters.

3. Limiting who can compete:
   3.1. Prosecution of opposition candidates, coupled with laws banning convicted from running.
   3.2. Party/candidate registration rules that can only be met by those with state support.
   3.3. Changing registration laws with too little time for opposition parties to re-register.
   3.4. Economic threats against the business interests of possible challengers.

4. Controlling the rules of competition:
   4.1. Manipulating rules about how votes are translated into seats.¹⁴
   4.1.1. Threshold limits, electoral rules.
   4.1.2. Gerrymandering.

5. Impeding competition:
   5.1. Splitting the opposition through bribery.¹⁵
   5.2. Banning or disrupting opposition rallies.
   5.3. Strict NGO registration or funding laws.
   5.4. Economic threats against the business interests of possible challengers.

6. “Virtual politics”¹⁶
   6.1. Creation of “virtual” interest groups and NGOs, which appear to be societally based but are actually supported by the state or ruling party.
   6.2. Running candidates or parties intended to confuse the electorate and split opposition votes (e.g. candidates and parties with names very similar to major opposition).
   6.3. Disinformation campaigns.
   7. Constitutional/legal tactics:
   7.1. Using executive-led referendums even when not allowed by law.
   7.2. Using an unfairly elected legislature to change the constitution.
   8. Use of “administrative resources:”
   8.1. Use of state economic resources.
   8.1.1. Patronage.
   8.1.2. Diverting campaign funds from the business interests of possible challengers.

---

state enterprises.
8.1.3. Paying campaign staff with public funds.
8.1.4. Requiring public employees to campaign.
8.1.5. Using state firms or bureaucracies to provide economic benefits to supporters.
8.2. Use of regulation and law enforcement.
8.2.1. Selective law enforcement that prosecutes those who support the opposition and provides impunity to supporters of the ruling party.
8.2.2. Corruption, which facilitates selective law enforcement.
8.2.3. Closing down businesses of the opposition.
8.2.4. Privatizing lucrative assets to supporters.
8.2.5. Providing lucrative concessions, contracts, or monopolies to supporters.
8.2.6. Politicization of the judiciary.
9. Control of the media.
9.1. State ownership.
9.2. State regulation through oversight commissions controlled by government/ruling party.
9.3. Use of selective law/codes enforcement to control apparently independent media.

Four things should be noted about this list. First, and most important, the vast majority of these measures are based in practices that, in different contexts, are legal and perfectly consistent with democracy. Second, the list is incomplete. The range of tactics is extensive, and each tactic has variations around the world. Moreover, innovation is continuous. Third, the categories here are not analytically exclusive. Various “administrative resources” also fall under “control of the media,” while “patronage” is both a use of administrative resources and a means of tipping an election. Fourth, the tactics are often most powerful when used in combination. Pressure on the press, for example, makes it less likely that other transgressions will be publicized.

The general strategy of solidifying political power is to construct a reinforcing connection between formal institutional authority and informal practical power. If law enforcement (formal authority) can be applied selectively (informal power), then business owners can be provided with strong incentives to contribute money or votes to a leader’s campaign. A successful campaign, perhaps for a referendum, can then lead to a further increase in formal authority, and so on. When this process becomes strongly self-reinforcing, autocracy can result. In contrast to sudden seizures of power such as coups, revolutions, or implementation of martial law, this gradual accretion of reinforcing formal and informal power has been the main mode of autocratization since 1989.

IV. Conclusions:
Electoral authoritarianism” and “competitive authoritarianism” are intrinsically connected to democratization. Leaders have found a wide variety of ways to subvert the democratic process, not only reducing the constraints of elections, but actually using elections to build the legitimacy of what are essentially autocratic regimes. This is a significant contrast from the previous era, in which autocratic elections in places like the Soviet Union were so obviously fixed but actually using elections to build legitimacy. As long as elections can be confidently won, they are something for the autocrat to welcome, not fear. A spreading repertoire of tactics is helping incumbents skew results enough to be decisive, but not enough to completely discredit the elections and remove their legitimizing effect. The sheer variety of techniques is one factor that helps leaders achieve the results they want without creating obvious evidence of cheating. Some techniques of electoral authoritarianism, such as referendums to increase executive authority, are emerging in multiple polities around the world, raising the question of the transnational diffusion of the tactics of autocratization. Just as the international environment can work to the advantage of democracy, it can work to the advantage of autocracy.

One advantage of focusing on tactics, rather than regime types, is that it allows us to see similarities in tactics across regime types. Gerrymandering, widespread in the US, and not considered fatal to democracy, is being applied elsewhere. Referendums to remove term limits on leaders are held in Venezuela and in the former Soviet Union, but also in New York City. The widespread use of elections to empower incumbents, and the tactics that facilitate this, are an issue for nearly every polity in the world.

Paul D’Anieri is the dean of the college of arts and sciences at the University of Florida. Portions of this paper were presented at the conference in honor of Peter J. Katzenstein, Cornell University, October 14-15, 2011. The author is grateful to John Ruggie and to the conference participants for their suggestions. Seung Lee contributed research assistance.

In this essay, I approach the contrast between dictatorship and democracy from a different vantage point. I discuss how differences between authoritarian and democratic politics shape and limit our efforts to map and explain the world authoritarian politics. I suggest that authoritarian politics is distinctive in two key ways: first, in dictatorships, no independent authority has the power to enforce agreements among key actors; and second, in authoritarian politics, violence is the ultimate arbiter of political conflicts. These features result in a number of challenges to theory building, inference, and measurement in the study of authoritarianism.

Consider the first of the two differences between authoritarian and democratic politics that I just previewed: Unlike democracies, dictatorships lack an independent authority with the power to compel key actors to comply with their commitments. Authoritarian high courts, for instance, although de jure supreme, are de facto subservient to the incumbent, rarely ruling against the rulers. This is because the presence of a formal authority with the power to bind key players in dictatorships would imply a check on the very powers that most of them aim to acquire. In turn, commitment problems abound. Whether it is the regime’s promise to play fair in elections, the dictator’s promise to share power with his allies, or the repressive agents’ promise to remain loyal in the face of mass opposition, in authoritarian regimes, neither can be realistically expected to be enforced by a third party.

This concern is compounded by the prominent role that violence plays in resolving political conflicts in authoritarian politics. By my count, about two-thirds of all leadership changes in dictatorships between 1946 and 2008 were non-constitutional – they departed from official rules or established conventions. Furthermore, almost one-half of all leadership changes involved the military, and about one-third of them were accompanied by overt violence. Thus when formal rules and institution appear to govern authoritarian politics, it may not be because of their binding power but because the alternative of resolving political conflicts by brute force looms in the background.

These differences between authoritarian and democratic politics imply a number of distinct challenges in the study of authoritarianism. In theory building, the lack of an authority with the power to enforce commitments and the pervasive use of violence place a high bar on what reasonably counts as an “explanation.” When it comes to inference, these features of authoritarian politics exacerbate concerns about the endogeneity of presumed causes to their effects. And in measurement, the tentative binding power of institutions in authoritarian politics raises questions about which institutions and decision makers actually matter -- doubts that we rarely encounter in the study of democratic politics.

Consider theory building. When I say that dictatorships lack an authority with the power to enforce agreements among key actors and that violence is the ultimate arbiter of conflict in authoritarian politics, I am not suggesting that--because of these two features -- all dictatorships resolve conflict violently, no promises will ever be kept, and formal institutions are irrelevant. Neither am I suggesting that the exact opposite holds under democracy. Rather, I propose that the lack of an authority with the power to enforce agreements and the pervasive use of violence imply a major difference in the assumptions that we can reasonably make when we build explanations of authoritarian politics.

In the study of democratic politics, institutions and rules that presumably allocate power can be realistically expected to do so. When Cox studies the coordination dilemmas that electoral systems create for voters and parties, he can safely assume that the rules that govern electoral competition indeed do so. Such a “partial equilibrium” analysis is warranted because the relevance of electoral rules for allocating power in democracies is rarely in question. By definition, any government that would circumvent a major constitutional provision would no longer be considered democratic.

In the study of authoritarian politics, compliance with institutions is as much of a puzzle as are the consequences those institutions. When it comes to theory building, explanations of authoritarian politics must therefore examine the “full” rather than the “partial” political equilibrium: we must explain not only the political consequences of rules and institutions but also why, given their consequences, key actors have an incentive to comply with them. Put in the jargon of contemporary political science, both behavior and the institutions that presumably govern it must be self-enforcing.


3. This data can be accessed at http://publish.illinois.edu/msvolik/the-politics-of-authoritarian-rule/.


Take term limits. This institution is frequently studied in democracies but rarely in dictatorships. This is in spite of the fact that term limits – and more often their circumvention – have played a prominent role in the rise many autocrats. When the Chilean junta came to power in 1973, for instance, it aspired to a system of collective rule bound by term limits on the chief executive. The junta was initially supposed to govern by unanimous consent and its presidency was to rotate among its four members. Soon, however, Pinochet came to dominate: In 1974, he compelled other members of the junta to appoint him president, replaced unanimous decision making by a majority rule, and foreclosed any further considerations of rotation of the presidency. In 1978, Pinochet expelled from the junta Gustavo Leigh, the air-force representative and his most vocal opponent. From that moment on, according to Arriagada, Pinochet began to act as “the de facto, if not the de jure, Generalissimo of the Armed Forces.” Compare Pinochet’s Chile to contemporary China: Term limits have been a central feature the political machinery that has governed Chinese leadership politics since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the 1980s. Under Deng’s leadership, the newly revised Constitution of the People’s Republic of China prohibited certain officials from serving concurrently in more than one leadership post, adopted mandatory retirement ages at various levels of the government hierarchy, and limited tenure at top government posts to two consecutive five-year terms. At the same time, norms developed according to which analogous term limits and retirement-age provisions applied to members of key Communist Party bodies. Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, at first politically exploited mandatory retirement-age provisions when he invoked them to retire opponents within the leadership in 1997. Yet the same term and age provisions eventually came to limit Jiang Zemin’s and his successor Hu Jintao’s time in office when both were compelled to step down at the end of their second term. Likewise, Xi Jinping, the current “paramount” leader of China, is expected to relinquish all of his posts after two five-year terms in office.

At first sight, the implications of term limits appear obvious: a term limit on a leader’s tenure amounts to a line in the sand. Its violation is easily observable and thus reveals a leader’s true ambitions to both those within and outside the regime. Yet the most important political consequences of term limits, in my view, are more subtle and indicative of the reason why only a few dictatorships establish effectively constraining term limits.

A term limit does not merely place a sharp limit on a leader’s time in office. The political retirement of an authoritarian leader typically implies the departure of an entire generation of officials. Thus once in place, term limits coordinate the political horizons of multiple generations of authoritarian elites: They encourage ambitious political clients to invest their careers in their own generation of leaders rather than the current but only temporary cohort of elites. In turn, a dictator who is intent on overstaying an established term limit must anticipate opposition from not only his heir apparent but also from the multitude of clients who have invested their careers in patrons belonging to the next generation of leadership. This is why PRI-era Mexicans were able to retire their dictators every six years, as Brandenburg eloquently put it.

Hence the primary reason why dictators do not like term limits is not because they fear breaking rules. Rather, the political bite of term limits is in their ability to coordinate over time the political investments of a large number of clients. The resulting incentives help us understand why binding term limits emerge only when power is distributed evenly among authoritarian elites: only then can the first generation of leadership facing term limits be realistically expected to step down and thus initiate the expectation of future alternations in power among the army of clients at lower ranks of the political hierarchy. In the case of China, the

6. for an exception, see Erica Frantz and Elizabeth A. Stein, “The Benefits of Institutionalized Leadership Succession for Dictators’ Tenure” Unpublished manuscript, Bridgewater State University and University of New Orleans, 2013.


11. Similar incentives may account for why most aging dictators avoid anointing a successor.

The effective adoption of term limits was made possible by the even balance of power that emerged within the Chinese political elite after the departure of Mao’s and Deng’s revolutionary generation. Mao and Deng commanded personal authority grounded in revolutionary achievements and charismatic personalities that eclipsed any of their contemporaries. By contrast, Jiang, Hu, and Xi have been regarded as “firsts among equals” within two evenly balanced political coalitions in the Chinese leadership.13

The requirement that our explanations account for both the consequences of institutions and the compliance with them also highlights the challenges to the empirical evaluation of propositions about authoritarian politics. The need to model institutions as self-enforcing equilibria significantly limits the number of factors that can be considered exogenous. In democracies, major constitutional provisions – like whether the executive is bound by a term limit – can be considered both binding and given, at least in the short run. My discussion of term limits in dictatorships, by contrast, suggested that compliance with them is endogenous to the balance of power among the authoritarian elite. An empirical study of term limits in dictatorships that would ignore this endogeneity might naively conclude that their adoption in any dictatorship would automatically prevent the emergence of personal autocracy. The distinctive features of authoritarian politics thus amplify concerns about the endogeneity of presumed causes that we frequently encounter in other subfields of political science.14

The two distinguishing features of authoritarian politics – the lack of an independent authority with the power to enforce agreements among key actors and the pivotal role of violence – also complicate the measurement of the institutional make-up of dictatorships. A major dilemma in authoritarian politics is not only whether institutions matter for the conduct of authoritarian politics but also which institutions and leaders should matter in the first place.

By now for instance, it has become apparent that the effective head of the Russian government is neither the President of the Russian Federation nor its Prime Minister. Rather it is Vladimir Putin -- regardless of the official post that he confers upon himself. Putin’s political transubstantiation has parallels across the world of authoritarian politics. The Great Benefactor Rafael Trujillo formally led the Dominican Republic during only 18 of the 31 years of his de facto rule. Fearing criticism by the United States and the Organization of American States, he interspersed his years in power with fours pliant substitutes, including his brother Héctor. Meanwhile Deng Xiaoping, who is universally regarded as the “paramount” leader of China between 1978 and 1992, avoided any titular confirmation of his powers in an attempt to distance himself from his domineering predecessor.15


Unfortunately, the nominal resemblance of many institutions in dictatorships -- especially legislatures, parties, and even some elections -- to institutions in democracies is poor guidance for their conceptualization in authoritarian politics. Consider again the case of term limits. When political scientists study term limits in the context of democratic politics, their focus is most often on how term limits affect electoral accountability and legislative representation.16 By contrast, my earlier discussion suggests that the primary role of term limits in dictatorships is to reproduce a balance of power among the authoritarian elite that will prevent the usurpation of power by any single leader or faction – a very different and uniquely authoritarian concern. Likewise, rather than coordinate the political activities of like-minded citizens,17 regime parties in dictatorships appear to instead co-opt the most capable and opportunistic among the masses in order to strengthen the regime. Thus while many institutions in dictatorships nominally mirror their democratic counterparts, their political ends may be distinctively authoritarian.

The questionable relevance and function of many political institutions in dictatorships is compounded by their diversity. By most definitions, the world of authoritarian politics ranges from cases like PRI-era Mexico, whose institutions posed as democratic in form, to traditional polities like the neofeudal Saudi Arabia, to idiosyncratic regimes


like Iran with its overlapping system of republican and religious authorities, to contemporary China with its Leninist institutional hardware. As Barbara Geddes concluded, “different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy.”

This institutional diversity obtains partly because dictatorship is a residual category that contains all countries that do not meet established criteria for democracy and partly because of dictatorship’s richer and longer pedigree. Whereas democracy has historically followed a few institutional blueprints, dictatorship’s richer and longer pedigree combines institutional models from multiple centuries and levels of development. Barbara Geddes’s classification of dictatorships into personalist, military, and single-party types is one of the first and most productive efforts to map and organize the institutional make-up of authoritarianism. The wave of both substantive research on authoritarian politics as well as competing data collection efforts that followed Geddes’s original work is evidence of the catalyzing effect that publicly shared data can have on comparative political research.

In spite of this progress, however, our large-N data on authoritarian politics are mostly confined to the post-World War II period. This temporal limitation may be significantly biasing our conclusions about the political organization of dictatorships, the process of regime change, and the consequences of authoritarian institutions.

Consider how the Cold War affected the political organization of dictatorships: In much of Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, the institutional infrastructure of authoritarianism followed the Leninist single-party blueprint. When it wasn’t directly dictated from Moscow, the Leninist blueprint was encouraged as a part of the Soviet package for prospective Third World clients and even managed to inspire a few Baathist copycats. Meanwhile, the emergence of the highly bureaucratic, conservative, and exclusionary military regimes among many U.S. clients was a parallel reaction to Lenin’s, Mao’s, and Castro’s improbable revolutions.

In turn, our conclusions about the distribution of regime types, their longevity, and the process of regime change may be unduly shaped by the limits of our data. The emergence and demise of single-party and military dictatorships may have as much to do with Cold War geopolitics as with the intrinsic features of these regimes’ political organization.


has the power to enforce commitments among key actors and violence is the ultimate arbiter of conflicts. While neither of these concerns is unique to authoritarian politics, their combination and severity amplifies many of the challenges to theory building, inference, and measurement that we encounter in other areas of political science.

I suggested that when we propose explanations of authoritarian politics, we must examine the “full” rather than the “partial” political equilibrium — we must explain why both behavior and the institutions that presumably govern it are self-enforcing. This is because for every institutional resolution of a political conflict under dictatorship, there is a crude alternative in which force plays a decisive role. In turn, when we evaluate our claims empirically, we cannot take authoritarian institutions as given and confront concerns about endogeneity in causal inference.

Meanwhile, the questionable relevance of formal political institutions in dictatorships results in distinct challenges to measurement and data collection. Because of the potential disconnect between formal institutions and de-facto power, which authoritarian institutions and leaders matter is frequently far from obvious. In many dictatorships, the man who gives orders may not reside in the presidential palace but rather across the street from it.\(^\text{23}\)

A final challenge arises out of the limited scope of our large-N data on authoritarian politics. Today's oligarchs of the United Russia Party and the anti-liberal populists of Latin America may be closer to the aristocratic republics of the 19th century and the imperfect democracies of the interwar years than the Leninist single-parties and reactionary juntas that we so often encounter in our existing data. The latter may be the byproducts of the Cold War and thus distorting our image of authoritarianism.

Milan Svolik is an associate professor of political science at the University of Illinois. Parts of this essay build on his recent book *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge University Press, 2012). The author would like to thank José Cheibub and Bonnie Weir for comments and discussions.

enabled analysts to estimate the likelihood of democratization versus continued autocracy, given the ouster of a dictator. But they did not allow analysts to disentangle survival of the same autocratic regime, as in Myanmar, from seizure of power by a new regime, as in Iran. Yet this distinction is an important one that can mean very different realities for a country’s citizens and, in turn, demand very different foreign policy responses. Think, for example, of Cambodia. The ouster of the ineffective autocrat Lon Nol in a 1975 coup resulted in a new autocratic regime led by Pol Pot and the death of nearly two million Cambodians. By contrast, when Heng Samrin lost power in 1985, the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (today’s Cambodian People’s Party) replaced him with fellow party member, Hun Sen. The regime persisted and life for the average Cambodian remained more or less the same.

The inability of pre-existing data to differentiate these two very different outcomes has been particularly troublesome because leadership changes in stable autocracies are common. Since World War II, less than half of leadership changes in autocracies have led to regime change. Further, fewer than half of regime changes have been transitions to democracy. In other words, the ousters of dictators resulted in democratization in less than a quarter of the cases of dictator ouster. Earlier data sets identify autocratic from democratic spans of years (spells), but they do not distinguish one autocratic regime from the next, even though autocratic regimes often succeed one another.

To address these problems, we have compiled new data, the Autocratic Regimes Data Set, which we describe in this essay. The data set uses hitherto uncollected information to identify all autocratic regime breakdowns between 1946 and 2010. We identify transitions from autocracy to new autocracy as well as transitions to and from democracy; and record the exact calendar dates of the political events that constitute both the start of new autocratic regimes and the collapse of incumbent regimes. We also provide information about how the outgoing regime collapsed (e.g., ousted by coup, popular uprising, election loss, foreign intervention) and the amount of violence during the transition.

The data set lays the empirical groundwork for better theorization and analysis of transitions from one autocracy to another and, in doing so, can help deepen our understanding of democratization. Beyond its applications for studying autocratic regime breakdown, the new data set also makes studies of a variety of previously difficult questions easier. Among them is the question discussed in the introduction and posed by the Arab Spring: when dictators are overthrown, what can we expect to happen next?

In this essay, we first define what we mean by autocratic regime and describe how the new data set compares to existing ones. We then discuss some research applications in progress that make use of the new data set to show how it can be used to answer interesting and policy-relevant questions. We close by discussing the data collection undertaken thus far for this project and our long-term goals with respect to additional data collection.

**Autocratic regimes**

Consistent with much of the qualitative literature, we define a regime as a set of basic formal and informal rules for choosing leaders and policies. We highlight informal rules because autocracies often hide the rules that shape and constrain political choices. Dictatorship routinely coexists with democratic formal institutions. The informal rule we judge most central to distinguishing autocracies that make decisions in one way from those that make decisions in another are the rules that identify the group from which leaders can be chosen and determine who influences leadership choice and policy. This “leadership group” resembles the Selectorate, as this term is used by Shirk1 and Roeder.2 To retain power, leaders must maintain the support of members of this group, but leaders also have substantial ability to influence the membership of the group, especially after initial leadership selection. Formal rules often do not determine membership in the group.

The history of Nicaragua illustrates our use of the concept regime. From 1936 to 1990, two successive autocratic regimes governed Nicaragua. The first, led by the Somoza family, lasted until 1979 when it was overthrown in an uprising spearheaded by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a left-wing political movement that ruled until 1990, when it lost power in competitive elections. Despite the continuity of autocratic governance, the two autocratic regimes bear little resemblance to each other and demanded quite different policy responses. The first regime was led initially by Anastasio Somoza Garcia and then by his sons, Luis Somoza Debayle and Anastasio Somoza Debayle. During this regime, the Somozas, either directly or through figureheads, controlled the allocation of political posts, the distribution of state resources, and the security forces.

---

In other words, the leadership group was limited to the Somoza family and a few close allies chosen by them. In 1979, the Somoza regime was violently overthrown by the FSLN, which had waged a guerrilla war against it since the 1960s. When the FSLN gained control, it established a new autocratic government, led by one of its leaders, Daniel Ortega. It seized the Somozas’ property and nationalized many industries. Most Somoza supporters fled into exile. FSLN supporters held the vast majority of decision-making positions and, for the next decade or so, dominated Nicaraguan foreign and domestic policy. In the Sandinista regime, top leaders of the FSLN composed the leadership group.

This brief summary of Nicaragua’s experience with dictatorship highlights two important points. The first is that autocratic regimes often last well beyond the tenure of any single ruler. Under the Somoza regime, Anastasio Somoza Garcia was succeeded by first one son and then another. Because intra-regime leadership transitions are common, leadership changes should not be used as proxies for regime breakdown.

Second, a single, continuous autocratic time period or “spell” often conceals multiple, consecutive autocratic regimes. During Nicaragua’s autocratic spell of nearly six decades, it was governed by two different autocratic regimes. Each of these regimes featured different rules for identifying elites and methods for choosing policies and leaders, and as a result, elites in each represented different interests and made very different policy choices. If autocratic regimes rarely followed one another, using democratic transition as a proxy for autocratic breakdown would cause minor empirical problems.

However, autocracies are succeeded by new autocracies (rather than democracies) more than half of the time. Figure 1 presents the frequency of autocracy-to-autocracy transitions since World War II, with democratic transitions included as a frame of reference. Autocratic breakdown leads to democracy more often now than in earlier decades, as shown in the right-hand columns of the figure, but transitions to subsequent autocracy remain common.

Efforts to explain whether and how foreign policy tools, such as economic sanctions and military intervention, influence autocratic survival have also sometimes assessed only their effect on the probability of democratization. Both academics and policy-makers, however, need to know not only whether interventions contribute to democratization, but also whether foreign-induced autocratic collapse might lead to a new dictatorship or a failed state.

To summarize the two points emphasized here: intra-regime autocratic leadership turnover is common, as are autocracy-to-autocracy regime transitions, meaning that both leadership data and spell data are ill-suited to capture autocratic regime duration or breakdown. Because our new data set measures the start and end dates of autocratic regimes, it paves the way for more accurate analyses of the causes of autocratic breakdown and better comparisons of how factors such as economic performance, corruption, and war influence regime duration in democracies relative to dictatorships.
Frantz, Geddes, Wright

In several working papers, we compare our measure of autocratic breakdown to the proxies most often used in quantitative research. We find that the data used to test theories can determine what answers one gets. Using autocratic leader ouster as a proxy for regime change underestimates autocratic stability by about 50 percent, while using Polity democratization thresholds overestimates the survival of dictatorships by 100 percent. These are large differences that might lead to under- or over-estimations of factors thought to influence authoritarian stability and breakdown.

The Polity Durable variable, a frequently used measure of autocratic instability, is also poorly suited to capture this concept. This variable codes increases or decreases of three points or more (over three years) in a country’s combined Polity score as instances of “regime change.” Using this measure, however, Iran’s 1979 revolution, Mobutu’s 1992 legalization of opposition parties in the former Zaire, and Chile’s 1989 democratic transition are identified as identical “regime changes” because the combined Polity scores increased by more than three points in each case. As these examples illustrate, studies that use this variable treat instances of autocracy-to-democracy transition (Chile 1989), autocracy-to-autocracy transition (Iran 1979), and minor changes in formal institutions in stable autocratic regimes (Zaire 1992) as equivalent events. This would not matter if few questionable transitions were identified, but many are. Our autocratic regime data, in contrast, code autocracy-to-democracy transitions (Chile 1989) and autocracy-to-autocracy transitions (Iran 1979) as distinct types of regime collapse while treating periods of continuing rule by the same regime as non-transitions (Zaire 1992).

We also examine how our data set compares to the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) data on executive leadership survival, which has also been used as a proxy for autocratic regime change. This analysis indicates that governments are conceptually distinct from what we commonly think of as regimes in democracies as they are in democracies. Instances in which one autocratic leader replaces another via a routine institutionalized mechanism for rotating leadership are often coded as government changes. Such changes are of course not considered regime changes in democracies. In autocracies, government changes sometimes accompany regime change but can also be successful maneuvers by incumbent elites to prolong their rule and should not be interpreted as regime change.

In Mexico, for example, the long-dominant Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) ruled for more than 80 years. During the last seven decades of its rule, the PRI selected a new leader every six years. Government change in Mexico, according to the DPI, occurred in 1976, 1982, 1994, and 2000 when term-limited presidents stepped down. Though these leadership changes constitute government changes, they do not identify regime changes. Only the leadership change in 2000 coincides with a loss of power for the ruling regime. If anything, the regular selection of new leaders in Mexico under the PRI was a feature of the regime that enhanced its chances of survival. In short, the use of the DPI government change variable as a proxy for autocratic regime breakdown is similar to using leader tenure data, which as noted above, underestimates regime survival by roughly fifty percent.

This is not to say that the other data sets discussed here are not useful for other purposes, just that they may bias analyses of autocratic regime breakdown and comparisons between democratic and autocratic breakdown. Our new data set is better suited for this endeavor.

Current research applications

In this section, we describe several papers that use different features of the new data set as illustrations of its potential uses.

The new data set includes revised and updated versions of the Geddes’ regime-type classifications of dictatorships as personalist, dominant party, military, or hybrids of these. The categorical typology originates from a series of questions about the relationship between the regime leader, the support party, and the military. These questions were grouped for the purpose of distinguishing dictatorships in which a dominant party constrained the dictator from dictatorships in which high ranking officers constrained the dictator from dictatorships in which neither the ruling party nor the officer corps actually constrained the dictator, even though a ruling party might exist.

In this endeavor.


and the dictator might be an officer. The questions were answered for each regime. Regimes with a high number of positive answers for a particular category of questions were coded as being members of that group. Hybrid regimes were those that recorded high scores in two (or more) categories of questions. Beyond revising and updating these classifications, the new data set expands them to include monarchies and other regimes omitted from the original classification.

In a paper introducing the new data set, we show how the regime-type classifications can contribute to current debates in comparative politics and international relations. We first confirm what numerous scholars of democratization have pointed out in the past: democratization is more likely following military rule than other kinds of autocracy. We also show that transitions to new autocracies are more common than democratization following either dominant-party or personalist regime collapse. Further, regimes led by dictators with wide personal discretion over policy making (such as Muammar Qaddafi in Libya and Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen) are less likely than military dictatorships and party-based regimes to democratize after regime breakdown, as are dictatorships forced from power and dictatorships ended by violence. These findings add to our theoretical understanding of democratization.

Recent theories in comparative politics and international relations use dictators’ expectations about their post-ouster fates to explain their decisions about things as varied as holding elections, repressing citizens, and starting wars. This research indicates that the risk of post-exit punishment causes dictators to behave differently than they would otherwise. In the paper that introduces the data set, we find that departing leaders are more likely to suffer costly fates during transitions to subsequent autocracy than transitions to democracy. The greater likelihood of punishment after ouster by a new dictatorship also suggests that autocrats facing challenges from insurgencies or popular protests might be more likely to try to rally support by attacking another country than would dictators whose main fear is losing an election. Indeed, exploration of this relationship in a second working paper provides evidence to support this.

Our data set thus makes possible more nuanced investigation of this and other aspects of authoritarian decision-making that may be influenced by dictators’ expectations about their future.

A third paper revisits an old question about the political resource curse by asking how oil wealth influences regime survival, and uses the most basic feature of the new data: identifying when autocratic regimes collapse and whether what comes next is a democracy or another autocratic regime. While the conventional wisdom claims that oil wealth prolongs autocratic rule by hindering democratization, recent challenges to this claim suggest that no relationship between oil and democracy exists. To date, research on the oil curse has relied on various measures of democratiseness or democratic transition to assess the consequences of differences in oil wealth, ignoring transitions between different autocratic regimes. If autocrats can use oil revenues to buy regime support and suppress opposition as is often suggested, then such regimes should be more resistant to collapse than other autocracies regardless of whether they ultimately democratize. We use the new data to investigate the relationships between oil wealth and autocratic survival. Our analysis shows that, once we account for unobserved country-level characteristics, increases in oil wealth promote autocratic survival by lowering the risk of ouster by a rival autocrat, not by reducing the likelihood of democratization. This suggests to us that oil revenue may be used to keep militaries quiescent and thus reduce the risk of coups that lead to regime collapse. Consistent with this interpretation, we find additional evidence (once we account for unit effects) that oil wealth increases military spending in dictatorships.

The Future

A currently unfinished piece of the new data collection effort recodes a substantial number of the items originally used to classify regimes for each year in each regime. This approach adds information that varies year-to-year for the duration of the regime. This data will provide the building block for a new approach to measuring features of autocratic rule by assessing the latent

dimensions of authoritarianism. We expect to release the first set of time-varying items next year.

Our preliminary analysis of the time-varying data coded to date shows that two of the main dimensions of autocratic rule (dominant party rule and personalist rule) are orthogonal to continuous measures of democracy, such as the combined Polity score. In other words, these dimensions of autocratic rule cannot be measured using information from the Polity index. Further, we find that while indicators of dominant party rule group observations into roughly two distinct bins, indicators of personalist rule show much more (continuous) variation. This suggests that using a binary variable to measure dominant party rule captures most of the relevant information, but the same is not true for personalism. Instead, this concept may best be measured as a continuous variable in applied research.

These advances will address some of short-comings of the original Geddes typology. For example, some have argued that personalism characterizes most dictatorships, but to varying degrees, which cannot be captured with a binary variable. The new data will allow personalism to be treated as several characteristics rather than a regime type if the analyst wishes. The degree of personalism may also vary over the period during which a single regime retains power. With the new data, we will be able to identify changes over time in the characteristics of personalist rule within the duration of a specific regime.

Our long-term goal in this project is to propose a method for aggregating information from various measures of autocratic rule to more comprehensively assess the distinct dimensions of authoritarianism. For example, with latent dimension analysis we can examine and aggregate information from other autocratic typologies — such as Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, and Hadenius and Teorell — to assess what new information these measures provide that is not captured by the Geddes typology. This should make the data useful to scholars interested in topics that cannot now be easily investigated. The data aggregation approach in which we use information from various sources that measure a particular concept (e.g. military rule or party dominance) is similar to recent efforts to construct a universal measure of democracy. However, our project attempts to do so for multiple, distinct dimensions of autocracy which cannot be measured using standard data on the level of democracy.

Erica Frantz is an assistant professor of political science at Bridgewater State University. Barbara Geddes is a professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles. Joseph Wright is Jeffrey and Sharon Hyde Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University. The research described in this note is supported by NSF-BCS #0904463, NSF-BCS #0904478, and the Minerva Research Initiative (ONR #N00014111004). Emails: ericaemilyfrantz@yahoo.com, geddes@ucla.edu, and josephgwright@gmail.com.

measures and results deserves an effort at a detached treatment, which is what I endeavor to provide in this essay. My goal is not to nail down the empirics on any one side, but rather than illustrate some persistent areas where greater standardization in measurements and models could get us collectively closer to cumulative rather than mutually incompatible knowledge.

This essay takes stock of research to date on resource wealth and politics as it relates both to regime type and to regime longevity, and makes three main points. First, the early consensus on oil’s autocratic effects has eroded, leaving in its place a growing and increasingly sophisticated debate over the causal role oil plays in shaping the prospects for democracy. Second, the role of oil in shaping regime durability has similarly grown in size and sophistication, revealing a more nuanced role for rentierism in the longevity of governments. Finally, all of this scholarly attention has raised a number of still unresolved measurement issues related to how we a) conceptualize and b) operationalize “resource wealth.” I address these issues in turn, making a call in the concluding section for the standardization of measurements, if not in central models then at least in robustness tests.

**Oil and Autocracy: A Less Certain Link?**

Our original statements about the likelihood that oil wealth would tend to make democracies less prevalent and less democratic drew on traditional fiscal sociology. As Luciani (1987) pithily put it in framing the rentierism variant, “No taxation, no representation.” Even autocratic rulers would find less reason to behave predatorily with ample access to externally derived export revenue, leading to less pressure from below. As Luciani noted, though, the volatility of the world oil market meant that economic shocks (oil busts) could provide the crisis setting within which so many other countries began the Third Wave transitions to democracy. Two other mechanisms also provided theoretical rationale for linking oil to regime type. *Modernization* theory posited a progression from the social impact of industrialization and economic diversification to political efficacy: its lack, given the capacity of oil to provide an alternative to tough economic policy choices, stood in the way of subsequent political evolution. *Repression*, funded by ready access to externally derived oil income, made it possible to keep societies under control in ways that would be less feasible if rulers had to bargain the same revenues out of their citizens’ hands.

This set of propositions catalyzed the first systematic cross-national exploration of oil politics with Michael Ross’s seminal “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” (Ross 2001). It found broad support for then regionally isolated observations from the Middle East, and some support for the rentierism mechanism. The article and its findings became the baseline for future research, which among other things concluded that oil appears to lessen the risk of authoritarian breakdown (Smith 2006; Ulfelder 2007; Wantchekon and Jensen 2004; Wright et al 2013). Research in this vein prior to 2006 measured oil wealth by dividing oil export revenues by GDP (using two statistics readily available from the World Development Indicators). As I discuss below, this measure had the benefit of accounting for a country’s relative dependence on oil income, but captured neither per capita effects nor the income on oil consumed domestically.

Subsequent to these findings came some contradictory research. Thad Dunning’s 2008 *Crude Democracy* began by puzzling why it was that Latin America’s oil-rich countries were on average more democratic than either their oil exporting counterparts in other regions OR their neighbors. Drawing on the same basic contractarian notions of fiscal interactions and regime outcomes Ross had, Dunning suggested that oil might short-circuit the fear that economic elites have of democracy in highly unequal settings. Given enough oil income, the upper classes might see democracy, funded by that oil income, as a reasonable solution for both themselves and the lower classes.

Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo again challenged the consensus with new data reaching back to 1800 (2011). In addition, they employed a different approach to analyzing this longer time series, suggesting that past studies all studied from a fatal flaw: comparing dynamics only across countries in a counter-factual manner. As they characterize the literature, “had Saudi Arabia not become oil-reliant, it might have developed the same political institutions as Denmark, provided that it had achieved the same per capita income and had fewer Muslims” (2). For the record, this is to my mind an exaggeration: most such studies suggest simply that, ceteris paribus, the more oil-rich a country is the less democratic it is likely to be, or the less likely to become democratic in the first place (see for example Wright et al in this issue). Nonetheless, after correcting for the cross-country bias of extant studies Haber and Menaldo found not only that there appeared to be no authoritarian effect of oil, but in fact that its effects appeared to run systematically in the other direction in the long run, promoting democracy. In addition to running the time series back substantially further in time, Haber and Menaldo also employed a set of techniques to account for the most likely counter-factual path to have been followed by countries had they not
become oil exporters. They conclude, as a result, that Saudi Arabia would rather have come to look like Yemen prior to 1990, not Denmark.

Ross and Andersen (forthcoming 2014) clarified in a response that although Haber and Menaldo may be right for the period prior to 1970, subsequent to that the resource curse holds up well. The reason is nationalization, hence the title of the article: “The Big Oil Change.” Prior to the wave of nationalizations that swept the oil exporting countries of the developing world in the 1970s, oil wealth had a small net effect on the domestic politics of exporting countries, largely because they were able to capture relatively little of the rents which went instead to large oil companies in the West. As a result, with multinational companies largely driving the train of the world oil market, there was less domestic effect in producing countries. Once those countries seized control, the political effects began to accrue, with the result being the development of the resource curse. The central message here is that we have no reason to expect that oil “does” the same thing to regimes in all times and places. This finding echoes recent work on ownership structure’s differing effects (Jones Luong and Weinthal 2010, 2006) and on the variant effects that oil can have contingent on the circumstances surrounding its emergence as a primary sector (Smith 2007).

In short, debate over the right way to model oil’s effects, and whether to consider time homogenous, appear to define the lack of consensus. One thing to note here is that beginning with these studies scholars employ a different measure: fuel income per capita. There are two important lessons for future research emerging from this debate. One is that, increasingly, the effects of oil wealth are conditional. For Dunning, they are contingent on extant levels of economic inequality. For Ross, in a rejoinder to Haber and Menaldo (2012 and forthcoming), the qualifier is world-historical time. Prior to the 1970s, few developing countries had nationalized, and therefore taken ownership of, their oil sectors. In short, Ross suggests, that wave of nationalization generated the resource curse. For those of us disinclined to believe that oil has one singular effect in all times and places, this world-historical corrective rings right—the ownership structure, as Jones Luong and Weinthal (2006, 2010) point out rightly, shapes the context of oil’s effects in powerful ways.

**Oil and Stability: Not What Kind of Regime But for How Long**

Hossein Mahdavy (1971) and then Jacques Delacroix (1980) use the case of Iran under the Shah to suggest that oil engendered a particular kind of shallow autocracy, one that might be extremely vulnerable to the politics of oil bust-driven crisis. Less than a decade later, an early volume on rentier states (Beblawi and Luciani 1987) featured mostly chapters focused on the stability-inducing dynamics of resource rents. Karl (1997) elaborated both approaches by tracing the development of politics and state institutions in 20th century Venezuela. She showed how long-term trends in both stability and crisis were intrinsic parts of an oil-based political economy, and among other things illustrated nicely how ready-made were the instruments that Hugo Chavez took to hand in reshaping the Venezuelan polity during his tenure.

We were left after these case-driven theories, though, with a conundrum, and subsequent scholarship tried to resolve it econometrically. Results here tended more to illustrate stability, even though crises, than had the case-driven studies. On the one hand, I found oil to have a strong positive effect on the durability of political regimes, regardless of regime type, and to lessen other manifestations of instability such as anti-regime collective action and civil conflict as well (Smith 2004, 2007). More recent scholarship has suggested oil makes authoritarian regimes more durable (Ross n.d., Ulfelder 2007, Wright et al. n.d.). Conversely, it also appears (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004) to undermine the stability of democratic regimes. Subsequent research largely confirmed the stability-inducing effects of oil wealth (Morrison 2009), but at the same time has accumulated evidence that while oil enhances the tenure of rulers it also makes civil war more likely (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 2004; 2005; Dixon 2009; Fjelde 2009; Humphreys 2005; Ross 2004a; 2004b; 2006). Kevin Morrison (2012) has suggested that these are contradictory findings—it seems difficult to imagine how oil wealth could simultaneously enhance stability on one dimension while undercutting it in another. He suggests that oil’s effects are conditional on state capacity. Elsewhere I argue (Smith 2007) that he is right, and that by exploring the origins of different political economies of oil we can uncover variations in precisely that state capacity. However, I also found that oil was partly formative in determining state capacity, again contingent on the circumstances of its entry. Where the consensus on oil and regime type has eroded over the last 5 years, the one on oil and regime durability, at least, has stabilized and taken on some appropriate nuance.

**Oil and Stability: Concepts and Measures**

There are two main conceptual approaches to thinking about how oil wealth shapes politics. The first 2 This is different than simply stating that some oil producers are stable and some are not, which implies no necessary relationship between oil and stability. Morrison argues, and I concur, that oil in fact can shape both.
centers on the long-term impact of oil revenues on state institutions. This line of argument suggests that oil export dependence produces a variety of durable political-institutional effects that are partially or largely out of the hands of political leaders at any particular moment in time. The second is more agency-oriented, and has to do with what we hypothesize oil revenues allow rulers to do vis-à-vis their citizens: in other words what leverage those revenues provide to rulers that they would not have otherwise to shape their citizens' decisions and actions. These two conceptual tracks both stem from oil export dependence, but the time frames and measurement implications are different.

The structural-institutional hypothesis suggests a longer-term time horizon for the effects to manifest since the logic is that over time oil wealth erodes the quality of public institutions. This long-term theory suggests that it is the lack of need to extract revenues domestically from citizens that leads to a path of state development that effectively hollows out one of the most crucial foundations of state capacity. Over time, these trends become path-dependent: as Karl has suggested, these dynamics are not entirely deterministic but aside from game-changing crises that force change, leaders face something like everyday determinism. In other words, without a forced move to serious reform there is little incentive to do anything to alter a comfortable equilibrium.

The agency or leader hypothesis, on the other hand, is shorter; basically it leads us to expect nearly immediate effects. Moreover, these effects can run in both regime-stabilizing and destabilizing directions, since broadly equitable rent distribution (resembling public goods provision) might buy acquiescence while narrower exclusive distribution (private or club goods) might provoke revolt by those left out. This dynamic is intuitively and empirically plausible, especially when we look back at how the Gulf monarchies in 2011 made massive spending promises to short-circuit popular uprisings. They, of course, could bring to bear many times the rent leverage that their less rent-rich counterparts in countries such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia could muster.

These longer- and shorter-term theoretical bases carry implications for measurement as well. The longer run suggests absolute measures be used, and as Ross (2001, 2008, 2012) has done they ought to be lagged by five years or more. The shorter run, on the other hand, suggests we might consider using annual changes in our measures of choice: the logic here is that it is not just oil wealth per se but sudden changes in one direction or the other that might produce political impact. A set of analyses in a current paper of mine suggests a powerful short-term effect—year-on-year changes in oil wealth have strong and robust implications for both regime survival and for the onset of civil war. These relationships hold in the absence of any significant effect for oil wealth in absolute or proportional terms, which measurement issues I turn to next.

One advantage that the old conventional standard—oil export revenues as a share of GDP—had was that it told us something about the relative important of the oil sector in a country’s economic well-being. It missed the value of domestically consumed oil, of course, as well as the per capita implication of that oil. This was the reason for the adoption of a new measure, rolled out and made publicly available by Michael Ross (2012)—fuel income per capita. It is a marked improvement over its predecessor in giving us fine-grained micro-level wealth measurement for a country’s fuel sector. What it cannot account for, though, is the relative weight of that fuel income in a particular country. In the same way that fixed effects models allow us to account for a country’s particularities, allowing for purchasing power to vary across country settings also makes it possible for us to measure what a given level of fuel income can actually buy there. The analogy I use in the classroom is illustrative. In the late 1990s I arrived to conduct research in Indonesia for the first time with about $1500 per month on which to live. Needless to say, that $1500 went a lot further in central Java than it did back home in Seattle. The difference in purchasing power has a logic that applies for oil wealth as well. Two countries with fuel income per capita of US$250 but with GDP per capita figures of US$25,000 and US$1,000 respectively are going to evince markedly different dynamics for the same $250. Accounting for these differences enables us to capture the relative import of oil wealth.

This core theoretical logic in mind, I have constructed a new measure—what I term rent leverage—that takes fuel income per capita and divides it by a country’s GDP per capita corrected for purchasing power parity. Since both numerator and denominator have population in them, we effectively lose that. As a result, best practices would then be to include both fuel income per capita and rent leverage, allowing us to measure both abundance and dependence in ways that are theoretically close to the concepts we really want to operationalize. Basedau and Lay (2010) and Lederman and Maloney (2007), among others, employ this strategy and find that the two have significant but opposite effects. I found similar differences in the annual changes of each: positive changes in fuel abundance (fuel income per capita) were associated with instability, while positive changes in rent leverage (fuel income as a share of average income) were generally stabilizing. While there remain a relatively small number of
studies employing both conceptual parts of oil wealth this way, the results are promising and if nothing else modeling oil’s effects this way as a robustness check ought to help in the process of sorting out conflicting findings.

To tie together the three sections of this essay, the link between resource wealth and regime type is a less easy consensus today. In part this may be a function of scholarly disagreement over estimation and modeling choices, and in part a function of disagreement over whether we expect the same effects in all times and places. To the extent, however, that the discord reflects a still too-broad array of measurement choices, introducing some standardization could help. Measures of fuel income are publicly available and a measure of rent leverage soon will be, making it possible for scholars not only to replicate each other’s findings but for both PhD students and young faculty to avoid unnecessary time spent collecting and coding their own data.

The stabilizing effects of resource wealth as regards regime longevity appears to be both somewhat more solid and more conditional than the effect on regime type. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that it may stabilize precisely the kinds of status quo we normatively want to become less prevalent. Moreover, the conditions under which oil may stabilize democracy—high inequality pace Dunning (2008)—are nearly as normatively troublesome as autocracy itself.

Benjamin Smith is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. References used are available at http://www.benjaminsmith.net/research.html.
SECTION NEWS

Call for Papers: Workshop on “Citizens, Parties, and Electoral Contexts”:
Making Electoral Democracy Work, the Electoral Integrity Project, and IPSA’s Research Section on Elections, Citizens, and Parties are organizing a one-day, pre-IPS A workshop on Friday, July 18, 2014, in Montreal, Canada to examine the theme “Citizens, Parties, and Electoral Contexts.” The workshop welcomes paper proposals using multiple methods and approaches that seek to tackle several related questions: what impact do electoral rules and electoral integrity have on citizen’s participation, especially voting turnout and campaign activism; what impact do electoral rules and electoral integrity have on political representation, especially the accountability of elected officials to citizens; what impact do electoral rules and electoral integrity have on party choice and voting behavior; and what impact do electoral rules and electoral integrity have on the behavior of political parties? Paper proposals should include the name(s) and institutional affiliations of authors, the title, and a short (100 words) synopsis and can be submitted online at www.electoralintegrity.com. Email electoralintegrity@gmail.com with questions. Proposal deadline: September 1, 2013.

Call for Applications: Democracy Fellowships in Washington, D.C.:
The Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, D.C. invites applications for fellowships in 2014-2015. This federally-funded program enables democracy activists, practitioners, scholars, and journalists from around the world to deepen their understanding of democracy and enhance their ability to promote democratic change. Dedicated to international exchange, this five-month, residential program offers a collegial environment for fellows to reflect on their experiences and consider best practices; conduct independent research and writing; engage with colleagues and counterparts in the United States; and build ties with a global network of democracy advocates. The program is intended primarily to support practitioners and scholars from developing and aspiring democracies; distinguished scholars from established democracies are also eligible to apply. Projects may focus on the political, social, economic, legal, and cultural aspects of democratic development and may include a range of methodologies and approaches. Fellows devote full time to their projects and receive a monthly fellowship payment, health insurance, travel assistance at the beginning and end of the fellowship, and research support. More information about the program is available at www.ned.org/fellowships/reagan-fascell-democracy-fellows-program. To apply online, visit http://fellowships ned. org/applications/. Application deadline is October 1, 2014.

Call for Papers: Conference on “Whither Eastern Europe? Changing Political Science Perspectives on the Region”:
The University of Florida, the American Council of Learned Societies, and East European Politics and Societies and Cultures (EEPS) has issued a call for papers for a workshop titled, “Whither Eastern Europe? Changing Political Science Perspectives on the Region,” that will be held at the University of Florida, Gainesville from January 9-11, 2014. The field of East European area studies faces currently a crisis of dual nature. On the one hand, the very concept of Eastern Europe has become questionable, and many in academia and outside see this field as obsolete—a mere residuum of the Cold War. On the other, the financing of research on Eastern Europe and related training, which was substantial (if never abundant) in the past decades, is drying up. These two developments are, obviously, not unrelated to each other. Yet for a political scientist, the politics of Eastern Europe, be they new democracies, conventional dictatorships, or hybrid regimes, may and should remain objects of serious interest regardless of the ontological status of the region. They continue to be an excellent laboratory for the testing of existing theories and the development of new ones. The purpose of this conference/workshop is to provide a self-assessment of the field and to reflect on the past, present, and future place of empirical evidence gathered in Eastern Europe within the discipline.

The workshop’s participants will represent three generations of East Europeanists: (1) those who were trained as social scientists, either in the U.S. or in their native countries, in the times of the Cold War; (2) those who entered the field right before or right after the collapse of the communist system; (3) young scholars who have completed their training only recently, when many countries of the region had already become consolidated democracies. The call for papers is directed to the last category, scholars who are in the pre-tenure phase of their careers (or have just received tenure). The organizers can cover participation costs (airfare, room, and board) of up to three junior scholars. They are looking for short (5,000 words or so) papers reflecting on the ways in which data from Eastern Europe have informed the authors’ own research projects, past or present, and/or have contributed to the developments in particular substantive sub-fields of political science and related disciplines (political sociology, political anthropology, etc.). More information about the conference and paper requirements is available via email (Ms. Elisabeta Pop epop@acls.org). Paper proposals and resumes should also be sent to that address. The submission deadline is July 15, 2013.

NEWS FROM MEMBERS:
Mayling Birney, lecturer, department of international development, London School of Economics and Political Science, published “Decentralization and
Veiled Corruption under China's 'Rule of Mandates' in a forthcoming issue of World Development. The article outlines the imperatives and incentives of China's local government officials and the implications of decentralized authoritarian rule for the efforts of anti-corruption watchdogs.

Mehrzad Boroujerdi, associate professor of political science and director of Middle Eastern Studies program, Syracuse University, published an edited volume entitled Mirror for the Muslim Prince: Islam and Theory of Statecraft (Syracuse University Press, 2013). The book contains essays from authors examining traditions of statecraft employed across the Middle East and South Asia, exploring the diverse viewpoints through which Islamic rulers have historically understood their roles in developing and governing political communities.

Archie Brown, Emeritus Professor of Politics, Oxford University, published “Did Gorbachev as General Secretary Become a Social Democrat?” in the March 2013 Europe-Asia Studies, in which he draws on analysis of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's program between 1990 and 1991 to conclude that Gorbachev preferred a course toward social democracy that was ultimately upended by his political opponents.

Maxwell A. Cameron, director of the Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, University of British Columbia, published Strong Constitutions: Social-Cognitive Origins of the Separation of Powers (Oxford University Press, 2013), in which he examines the evolution of the concept of “separation of powers.” Cameron argues that constitutional states are not weaker because their powers are divided. Instead they are “often stronger because they solve collective action problems rooted in speech and communication.” Cameron was also awarded the Killiam Teaching Prize, an honor that is given by the University of British Columbia to faculty for excellence in teaching.

Melani Cammett, associate professor of political science, Brown University, won a New Directions Fellowship for 2013-2014 from the Mellon Foundation, in support of her new research project, “Is There an Islamist Governance Advantage?” She will spend the upcoming year working on the project at the Harvard School of Public Health.

Paul J. Carnegie is now senior lecturer in political science, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, where he plans to conduct fieldwork in Kalimantan Timur, Sulawesi Selatan, and Nusa Tenggara Timur in order to update previous research on the uneven impact of political decentralisation during the run-up to the 2014 Indonesian elections. His forthcoming article, “Will the Indonesian model work in the Middle East?” will be published in the summer 2013 Middle East Quarterly.

Alfio Cerami, research associate, Center for European Studies of Sciences, published Permanent Emergency Welfare Regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Exclusive Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). The book analyzes the cultural, social, and economic trends of sub-Saharan Africa, highlighting their origins and the important role of welfare institutions on social conflict and the reduction of inequality.

In April, Javier Corrales, professor of political science, Amherst College, organized a one-day symposium with Ángelica Bernalwe on “Venezuela: Change or Continuity? The Legacy of Hugo Chávez & the Future of the Bolivarian Revolution.” The event included presentations by section member Jennifer McCoy, professor of political science, Georgia State University, as well as Alejandro Velasco, Martha Fuentes-Bautista, Leonardo Vivas, George Ciccariello-Maher, Francisco Monaldi, Carlos Romero, Mark Weisbrot, David Myers, David Smilde, Margarita López-Maya, and Miguel Tinker-Salas.

Aurel Croissant, professor of political science, Heidelberg University, and Stefan Wurster edited “Performance and Persistence of Autocracies” in the April 2013 Contemporary Politics, which includes seven articles in which authors examine social performance (James McGuire); property rights protection (Carl Henrik Knutsen and Hannah Fjelde) and ecological sustainability (Stefan Wurster) in different forms of authoritarian and democratic regimes; autocratic responses to economic downturns (Wolfgang Merkel et al.); issues in measuring types of autocratic regimes and performance (Edeltraud Roller, professor of political science, Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz); and present updated authoritarian regime data in comparative perspective (Michael Wahman, postdoctoral fellow, University of Texas at Austin, Jan Teorell, professor of political science, Lund University, and Axel Hadenius).

Zsuzsa Csergő, associate professor of political science, Queen's University, became the new President of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN). ASN is a leading international academic association in nationalism and ethnicity studies, and the only scholarly association focusing on the study of ethnicity and nationalism from Europe to Eurasia.

John P. Entelis, professor and chair of political science, Fordham University, and Laryssa Chomiak published “The Making of North Africa’s Intifada” in The Arab Revolts: Dispatches on Militant Democracy in the Middle East, edited by David McMurray and Amanda Utheil-Somers and published by Indiana University Press in 2013. The book is written for a broad audience, aiming to identify “key trends” that contributed to the Arab Spring over the past twenty years. Entelis also published “Algeria: Democracy
Denied, and Revived?” in North Africa’s Arab Spring (Routledge, 2013), edited by George Joffé.

Tulia G. Falleti, associate professor of political science and senior fellow, University of Pennsylvania, was awarded the “World Politics” residential fellowship at Princeton University for the 2013-2014 academic year.

Robert M. Fishman, professor of sociology and fellow at the Kellogg and Nanovic Institutes, the University of Notre Dame, and Omar Lizardo published “How Macro-Historical Change Shapes Cultural Taste: Legacies of Democratization in Spain and Portugal” in the April 2013 American Sociological Review. The article demonstrates the effect of large scale political change on individual cultural choice by contrasting the democratic development of Spain and Portugal.

Agustina Giraudy, assistant professor at the School of International Service, American University, recently published “Varieties of Subnational Undemocratic Regimes: Evidence from Argentina and Mexico” in the March 2013 Studies in Comparative International Development. Giraudy proposes a new classification system she believes will allow scholars to more clearly conceptualize subnational democratic regimes.

Ben Goldfrank, associate professor at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy, Seton Hall University, published “The World Bank and the Globalization of Participatory Budgeting,” in the December 2012 Journal of Public Deliberation, in which he analyzes the reasons for the World Bank’s promotion of participatory budgeting and argues that it is a positive development. He also received the Whitehead School of Diplomacy Researcher of the Year Award for 2011-2012 and the Salgo-Noren Teacher of the Year Award for 2012. On July 1st, he will become department chair of the department of diplomacy and international relations.

Elliott Green, lecturer in development studies, London School of Economics, and Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay published “Nation-Building and Conflict in Modern Africa” in the May 2013 World Development, in which they compile an original dataset to test the effect of nation-building policies on postcolonial civil war. Green also published “Explaining African Ethnic Diversity” in the June 2013 International Political Science Review, in which he examines the sources of African diversity through statistical tests.

Henry E. Hale, associate professor of Political Science and international affairs, The George Washington University, published “Regime Change Cascades: What We Have Learned from the 1848 Revolutions to the 2011 Arab Uprisings,” in the June 2013 Annual Review of Political Science. The article examines historical precedents for “regime change cascade,” proposing four preconditions which enable this phenomenon.


Calvert W. Jones, Ph.D. candidate, Yale University, has accepted an offer to become assistant professor of political science, City College of New York, in fall 2013. Jones will present his dissertation, “From Enlightenment to Entitlement: Intended and Unintended Outcomes of Social Engineering in the United Arab Emirates,” at the 2013 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago.

Yuta Kamahara became lecturer with tenure at the Institute of Urban Innovation at Yokohama National University on April 1, 2013.

Ekrem Karakoc started as an assistant professor of political science at Binghamton University, SUNY, in the fall of 2012. He recently published “Religion in Politics: How Does Inequality Affect Public Secularization?” with Birol Baskan in the December 2012 Comparative Political Studies, wherein he argues that societies with greater inequality have a more positive attitude toward religion’s role in politics. He also published “Economic Inequality and its Asymmetric Effect on Civil Society: Evidence from Postcommunist Countries” in the February 2013 European Political Science Review and “Ethnicity and Trust in National and International Institutions: Kurdish Attitudes toward Political Institutions in Turkey” in the February 2013 Turkish Studies.

Carl LeVan, assistant professor at the School of International Service, American University, and Joseph Oleyinka Fashagha have received a grant from the National Endowment for Democracy to co-organize a conference in Nigeria next year at Landmark University on “African State Legislatures: Subnational Politics and National Power.” For information about this new project, which they expect to lead to an edited volume, please email: levan@american.edu.

Staffan I. Lindberg, associate professor of political science, Universities of Florida and Gothenburg, and Keith Weghorst have an upcoming article, “What Drives the Swing Voter in Africa?” that will appear in the American Journal of Political Science. Their analysis demonstrates that voters in Africa are persuadable through simultaneous promises of collective developmental goods and clientelistic goods and suggests
that incumbents in highly clientelistic environments are more successful when offering collective goods.

Scott Mainwaring, Eugene P. and Helen Conley Professor of Political Science, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University, and Douglas Chalmers edited Problems Confronting Contemporary Democracies: Essays in Honor of Alfred Stepan (University of Notre Dame Press, 2012). The book includes essays that review the debates sparked by the work of Alfred Stepan and chapters by Juan Linz and Brazil’s former president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, among others.

James Melton, lecturer in comparative politics, University College London, Zachary Elkins, associate professor of government, University of Texas at Austin, Tom Ginsburg, and Kavek Leetaru published “On the Interpretability of Law: Lessons from the Decoding of National Constitutions” in the April 2013 British Journal of Political Science. The article explores which factors contribute to the “interpretability” of constitutions and concludes that textual factors are the greatest determinants.

Cas Mudde, assistant professor of international affairs, University of Georgia, is the new editor of the IPSA Committee on Concepts & Methods (C&M) working paper series. C&M publishes original work-in-progress papers in two series: Political Concepts and Political Methodology. If you are interested in discussing a potential paper, please contact Cas Mudde at mudde@uga.edu.

Ragnhild L. Muriaas is now associate professor in comparative politics, University of Bergen.

Monika A. Nalepa has been promoted to associate professor (with tenure) in political science, University of Notre Dame.

Olena Nikolayenko, assistant professor of political science, Fordham University, designed and taught an interdisciplinary course called “Youth and Politics,” through which a group of eleven Fordham students visited the Lviv-based Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU) to learn about Ukrainian politics and society through a wide array of academic and cultural activities.

Anastassia Obydenkova, senior researcher and professor of political and social science, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), and Luis Moreno published “Federalization in Russia and Spain: The Puzzle of Reversible and Irreversible Outcomes” in the January 2013 Regional and Federal Studies. She and Alexander Libman also published “Communism or Communists? Soviet Legacies and Corruption in Transition Economies” in the April 2013 Economic Letters; “International Trade as a Limiting Factor in Democratization: An Analysis of Sub-National Regions in Post-Communist Russia” in the March 2013 Studies in Comparative International Development; and “Informal Governance in International Organizations” in the June 2013 Review of International Organizations. Finally, Obydenkova and Wilfried Swenden published “Autocracy-Sustaining Versus Democratic Federalism: Explaining the Divergent Trajectories of Territorial Politics in Russia and Western Europe” in the March 2013 Territory, Politics, Governance.

Kateryna Pischikova, research fellow, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, coauthored The Democratic Disconnect: Citizenship and Accountability in the Transatlantic Community, an annual collaborative report, alongside other 2012-2013 Transatlantic Academy fellows, including Seyla Benhabib, David Cameron, Anna Dolidze, Gábor Halmai, Gunther Hellmann, and Richard Youngs. This year’s report focuses on the expression and promotion of liberal democratic values across the globe and the new challenges facing them.

Jennifer Pribble, assistant professor of political science, University of Richmond, published Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2013). The book examines the various ways in which social welfare provision is evolving in Latin America using case studies from Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

William M. Reisinger, professor of comparative politics, University of Iowa, edited Russia’s Regions and Comparative Subnational Politics (Routledge, 2013), featuring contributions from section members Donna Bahry, professor of political science, Pennsylvania State University, Vladimir Gelman, professor of political science and sociology, European University at St. Petersburg, Henry E. Hale, associate professor of political science and international affairs, The George Washington University, and Bryon J. Moraski, associate professor of political science, University of Florida. The book offers various perspectives on federalism in Russia—its characteristics and its consequences—in order to aid further research on subnational politics more generally.

Bo Rothstein, August Röhss Chair in Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Nicholas Charron, and Victor Lapuente published Quality of Government and Corruption from a European Perspective (Edward Elgar, 2013). The book addresses conceptual and empirical issues surrounding “quality of government” through analysis of regions within eighteen EU member states.

Jae Hyok Shin was recently appointed assistant professor of political science and international relations, Korea University. She also recently published “Electoral System Choice and Parties in New Democracies: Lessons from the Philippines and Indonesia” in Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Clientelism and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines (Routledge, 2013), edited by Dirk Tomsa.
and Andreas Ufen. The book examines the structures and strategies of political parties in Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, with a special emphasis on the role of clientelism.

Etel Solingen, Chancellor's Professor of Political Science, University of California at Irvine, published “Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional and Global Politics of International Diffusion” in the December 2012 *International Studies Quarterly*, in which she outlines the initial stimulus, medium, political agendas, and outcomes of a shared conceptualization of diffusion.

Jan Teorell, professor of political science, Lund University, Michael Wahman, postdoctoral fellow, University of Texas at Austin, and Axel Hadenius recently published “Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective” in the April 2013 *Contemporary Politics*, a special issue on “The Performance and Persistence of Autocracies.” The article introduces an updated and slightly modified version of the authoritarian regime dataset first introduced by Hadenius and Teorell in 2007 and compares it empirically and theoretically with two alternative regime typologies: those introduced by Cheibub et al. in 2010 and Geddes et al. in 2012. The data can be downloaded at www.svet.lu.se/ARD/.

Maya Tudor was recently appointed university lecturer in government and public policy, Oxford University. She also published *The Promise of Power* (Cambridge University Press, April 2013), which won the American Political Science Association’s Gabriel Almond Prize for the Best Dissertation in Comparative Politics. In addition, she published “Explaining Democracy’s Origins” in the April 2013 *Comparative Politics*. Both works build upon her research on democracy’s divergence in post-independence India and Pakistan.

Matthew S. Winters, assistant professor of political science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, was made affiliate faculty at the Beckman Institute for Advanced Science and Technology at the University of Illinois as part of the Social Dimensions of Environmental Policy program. In recent research related to the program, he spent February and March 2013 in Indonesia studying policy-making in the renewable energy sector. Winters also was awarded a fellowship at the Center for Advanced Study at the University of Illinois and will devote his fall 2013 semester at the Center to a project about the effects of branding foreign-funded development interventions on citizens’ attitudes toward the foreign donor and toward their own government.

**NEW RESEARCH**

*Journal of Democracy*

The April 2013 (Volume 24, no. 2) issue of the *Journal of Democracy* features a cluster of articles on “Lessons from Latin America,” as well individual case studies on Islamists and democracy, democratization theory and the Arab Spring, Greece’s economic and political failure, and restrictions on aid to NGOs. The full text of selected articles and the tables of contents of all issues are available on the Journal’s website.

“Islamists and Democracy: Cautions from Pakistan” by Husain Haqqani

*It is easy for Islamists to accept the democratic principle of majority rule when it results in their being elected to power. But the experience of Pakistan warns us that efforts to ‘Islamize’ laws and public life may be hard to reverse even if Islamists are voted out of office.*

“Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring’” by Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz

*In light of the ‘Arab Spring,’ how should students of democratic transition rethink the relation between religion and democracy; the nature of regimes that mix democratic and authoritarian features; and the impact of ‘sultanism’ on prospects for democracy?*

“Why Greece Failed” by Takis S. Pappas

*Greece was an early success story of the “third wave,” but since the 2008 financial crisis, it has become a poster child for the pains of austerity and unrest. Its troubles at one level are fiscal and economic, but there is a political dimension that may be even more critical.*

The Freedom House Survey for 2012

“Breakthroughs in the Balance” by Arch Puddington

*Although declines in freedom outnumbered gains yet again in 2012, the year was not without some significant progress, most notably in the case of Libya.*

“Armies and Revolutions” by Zoltan Barany

*A key factor in determining the success or failure of revolutions is how the national armed forces react. What are the keys to making accurate predictions about what the soldiers will do when the fate of a regime hangs in the balance?*

“Defunding Dissent: Restrictions on Aid to NGOs” by Darin Christensen and Jeremy M. Weinstein

*A number of countries including Russia and post-Mubarak Egypt are taking aggressive steps to limit or stop foreign funds from flowing to domestic NGOs that promote human rights and democracy. What is driving this trend, how far will it go, and what can be done to counter it?*

Lessons from Latin America

“Building Institutions on Weak Foundations” by Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo

*A particular pattern of institutional change—“serial replacement”—is dominant in Latin America and other developing countries with weak institutional contexts. This pattern is characterized by institutional change that is both frequent and radical.*
“The Rise of Rentier Populism” by Sebastián L. Mazzuca
Latin America’s much-discussed political “left turn” has taken two very different forms. Why has the region’s commodities boom led some left-turn states to move toward “plebiscitarian superpresidentialism,” while others have resisted this temptation?

“Democratic Breakdown and Survival” by Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Linán
Why do democracies survive or fail? An empirical study of Latin America finds that the fate of democracies depends largely on the regional political context, as well as the level of actors’ commitment to democracy and policy moderation.

“Defending Democracy Within the EU” by Jan-Werner Müller
Should Brussels intervene to protect democracy within EU member states? Does Europe have the tools it would need to do so effectively? Recent developments in Hungary and Romania show the importance of addressing these questions sooner rather than later.

“Southeast Asia: Sources of Regime Support” by Alex Chang, Yun-han Chu, and Bridget Welsh
Data from the latest wave of the Asian Barometer Survey show commonalities and variations in the sources of regime support in Southeast Asian countries. Most regimes—democracies and nondemocracies alike—draw political legitimacy from perceptions of effective and upright governance.

Democratization

The June 2013 (Vol. 20, no. 3) Democratization is a special issue on “Unpacking Autocracies: Explaining Similarity and Difference.”

“Comparing Autocracies: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Analyses” by Patrick Köllner and Steffen Kailitz

“The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes” by Johannes Gerschewski

“Classifying Political Regimes Revisited: Legitimation and Durability” by Steffen Kailitz

“Ideology after the End of Ideology: China and the Quest for Autocratic Legitimation” by Heike Holbig

“Autocracies, Democracies, and the Violation of Civil Liberties” by Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning

“Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in the Andes” by Steven Levitsky and James Loxton

“The Incentives for Pre-Electoral
New Research

Coalitions in Non-Democratic Elections” by Jennifer Gandhi and Ora John Reuter


SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES ON DEMOCRACY

This section features selected articles on democracy that appeared in journals received by the NED’s Democracy Resource Center, January 15–June 1, 2013.

African Affairs, Vol. 111, no. 447, April 2013
“Guns, Land, and Votes: Cattle Rustling and the Politics of Boundary (Re)making in Northern Kenya” by Clemens Greiner

“Remembering Nyerere: Political Rhetoric and Dissent in Contemporary Tanzania” by Felicitas Becker

“Africa’s New Big Man Rule? Pentecostalism and Patronage in Ghana” by John F. McCauley

“Africa’s New Big Man Rule? Pentecostalism and Patronage in Ghana” by John F. McCauley

“Pwani Kenya? Memory, Documents and Secessionist Politics in Coastal Kenya” by Justin Willis and George Gona

“The International Peacebuilding Paradox: Power Sharing and Post-Conflict Governance in Burundi” by Devon Curtis

American Political Science Review, Vol. 107, no. 2, May 2013
“Negotiating China: Reinserting African Agency into China–Africa Relations” by Giles Mohan and Ben Lampert

“Constitutional Provisions and Executive Succession: Malawi’s 2012 Transition in Comparative Perspective” by Kim Yi Dionne and Boniface Dulani

“Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa” by Jan H. Pierskalla and Florian M. Hollenbach

“Representation and Rights: The Impact of LGBT Legislators in Comparative Perspective” by Andrew Reynolds

“Politics in the Mind’s Eye: Imagination as a Link between Social and Political Cognition” by Michael Bang Petersen and Lene and Aarøe

“Africa’s New Big Man Rule? Pentecostalism and Patronage in Ghana” by John F. McCauley

“Africa’s New Big Man Rule? Pentecostalism and Patronage in Ghana” by John F. McCauley

“Crossing the Line: Local Ethnic Geography and Voting in Ghana” by Nahomi Ichino and Noah L. Nathan

American Political Science Review, Vol. 107, no. 1, February 2013
“Electoral Breakthroughs in Croatia and Serbia: Women’s Organizing and International Assistance” by Jill A. Irvine

“Problems of Corruption and Distrust in Political and Administrative Institutions in Slovenia” by Miro Hacek, Simona Kukovic, and Marjan Brezovsek


“The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in the Central and Eastern European Countries: The Importance of Institutions” by Cem Tintin

Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 46, no. 2, June 2013
“Political Instability and Economic Growth: Evidence from Two Decades of Transition in CEE” by Henryk Gurgul and Łukasz Lach

“The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in the Central and Eastern European Countries: The Importance of Institutions” by Cem Tintin

Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 46, no. 1, March 2013
“Problem of Early Elections and Dissolution Power in the Czech Republic” by Milos Brunclík

“Distributive Justice Attitudes in Ukraine: Need, Desert or Social Minimum?” by Kseniia Gatskova

“Electoral Breakthroughs in Croatia and Serbia: Women’s Organizing and International Assistance” by Jill A. Irvine

“Problems of Corruption and Distrust in Political and Administrative Institutions in Slovenia” by Miro Hacek, Simona Kukovic, and Marjan Brezovsek


“The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in the Central and Eastern European Countries: The Importance of Institutions” by Cem Tintin
“Monetary Regimes, Economic Stability, and EU Accession: Comparing Bulgaria and Romania” by Nikolay Nenovsky, Kiril Tochkov, and Camelia Turcu

“Social Structure, Social Coalitions and Party Choice in Hungary” by Oddbjørn Knutsen

“Ukraine Twenty Years after Independence: Concept Models of the Society” by Karina V. Korostelina

“Political Knowledge in Poland” by Robert M. Kunovich

“Voting as a Habit in New Democracies – Evidence from Poland” by Mikolaj Czesnik, Marta Zerkowska-Balas, and Michal Kotnarowski

“Is the USSR Dead? Experience from the Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008–2009” by Mikhail Golovnin, Alexander Libman, Daria Ushkalova, and Alexandra Yakusheva

“Corruption, the Power of State and Big Business in Soviet and post-Soviet Regimes” by Vladimir Shlapentokh

“Farewell to the Caucasus: Regional Ethnic Clan Politics and the Growing Instability of the Ruling Elite after the 2012 Presidential Elections in Russia” by Marat Grebennikov

“Explaining Prolonged Silences in Transitional Justice: The Disappeared in Cyprus and Spain” by Iosif Kovras

“Economics and Elections Revisited” by Richard Nadeau, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, and Éric Belanger

“The Ethnicity–Policy Preference Link in Sub-Saharan Africa” by Evan S. Lieberman and Gwyneth H. McClendon

“Welfare States and Social Trust” by Cheol-Sung Lee

“Congruence Between Regional and National Elections” by Arjan H. Schakel

“Economic Performance and Democratic Support in Asia’s Emergent Democracies” by Fiona Yap

“Credibility Versus Competition: The Impact of Party Size on Decisions to Enter Presidential Elections in South America and Europe” by Karleen Jones West and Jie-Jae Spoon

“Are All Presidents Created Equal? Presidential Powers and the Shadow of Presidential Elections” by Allen Hicken and Heather Stoll

“Elections and Ethnic Civil War” by Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Simon Hug

“Nationalism and the Cohesive Society: A Multilevel Analysis of the Interplay Among Diversity, National Identity, and Social Capital Across 27 European Societies” by Tim Reeskes and Matthew Wright


“Explaining Democracy’s Origins: Lessons from South Asia” by Maya Tudor

“The Sharia Controversy in Northern Nigeria and the Politics of Islamic Law in New and Uncertain Democracies” by Brandon Kendhammer

“Fighting for the Right to Exist: Institutions, Identity, and Conflict in Jos, Nigeria” by Maren Milligan

“State as Chimera: Aid, Parallel Institutions, and State Power” by Anne Mariel Zimmerman

“Gestalt Switch in Russian Federalism? The Decline in Regional Power under Putin” by Gulnaz Sharafutdinova

“Parties, Ethnicity, and Voting in African Elections” by Barak D. Hoffman and James D. Long

“Protesting and Policing in a Multiethnic Authoritarian State: Evidence from Ethiopia” by Leonardo Arriola

“Economic Voting in an Era of Non-
New Research

Crisis: The Changing Electoral Agenda in Latin America, 1982-2010" by Matthew M. Singer

"Regime Transition and Attitude toward Regime: The Latin American Gender Gap in Support for Democracy” by Lee Demetrius Walker and Genevieve Kehoe

Current History, Vol. 112, no. 754, May 2013

“France in Africa: A New Chapter?” by Stephen W. Smith

“The Jobs Crisis Behind Nigeria’s Unrest” by Kate Meagher

“Why Protests Are Growing in South Africa” by Elke Zuern

“Will Rwanda End Its Meddling in Congo?” by Thomas Turner

“Perspective: Millennium Goals Miss Africa’s Progress” by Charles Kenny

Current History, Vol. 112, no. 753, April 2013

“Pakistan on the Brink of a Democratic Transition?” by C. Christine Fair

“Nepal’s Constitutional Crisis” by Aditya Adhikari

Current History, Vol. 112, no. 752, March 2013

“Why 2013 Is Not 1933: The Radical Right in Europe” by David Art

“Diverging Paths in the Western Balkans” by Jelena Subotic

Current History, Vol. 112, no. 751, February 2013

“Colombia: Another 100 Years of Solitude?” by James A. Robinson

“Shifting Fortunes: Brazil and Mexico in a Transformed Region” by Michael Shifter and Cameron Combs

“Venezuela’s Succession Crisis” by Javier Corrales

“Argentinia’s Democratic Decay” by Hector E. Schamis

Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 21, no. 2, Spring 2013

“If Tomorrow Comes: Power Balance and Time Horizons in Ukraine’s Constitutional Politics” by Serhiy Kudelia

“Youth as an Agent for Change: The Next Generation in Ukraine” by Nadia Diuk

“Public Procurement Reform in Ukraine: The Implications of Neopatrimonialism for External Actors” by Susan Stewart

“Yushchenko versus Tymoshenko: Why Ukraine’s National Democrats Are Divided” by Taras Kuzio

“Why We Speak Like That: Ambiguous Discourses of an Ambivalent Transformation” by Mykola Riabchuk

Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 21, no. 1, Winter 2013

“Nests of Democracy: The Institutional Interdependence of People’s Rule in Europe & Eurasia” by Alexander Sokolowski

“Oil and Regime Stability in Azerbaijan” by Farid Guliyev

“Institutional Persuasion to Support Minority Rights in Russia” by Debra Javeline

East European Politics, Vol. 29, no. 1, February 2013

“The Representation of Political and Economic Elites in the Russian Federation Council” by Cameron Ross and Rostislav Turovsky


“Manipulated Commitments: The International Criminal Court in Uganda” by Kenneth A. Rodman and Petie Booth

“Protecting the Right to Life of Journalists: The Need for a Higher Level of Engagement” by Christof Heyns and Sharath Srinivasan

Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 35, no. 1, February 2013

“Misperceptions of Freedom of Religion or Belief” by Heiner Bielefeldt

“Muslim Women’s Equality in India: Applying a Human Rights Framework” by Vrinda Narain
Comparative Democratization

New Research

“Representation of the Kurds by the Turkish Judiciary” by Derya Bayır

International Political Science Review, Vol. 34, no. 3, June 2013

“From the Arab Spring to the Chinese Winter: The Institutional Sources of Authoritarian Vulnerability and Resilience in Egypt, Tunisia, and China” by Steve Hess

“Is Party Type Relevant to an Explanation of Policy Congruence? Catchall versus Ideological Parties in the Portuguese Case” by Ana Maria Belchior and André Freire

“Explaining the Strength of Civil Society: Evidence from Cross-Sectional Data” by Stefanie Baier, Thilo Bodenstein, and V. Finn Heinrich

“Fragile and Failed States: Critical Perspectives on Conceptual Hybrids” by Olivier Nay

International Political Science Review, Vol. 34, no. 2, March 2013

“Gender and Consociational Power-Sharing in Northern Ireland” by Bernadette C. Hayes and Ian McAllister

“Origins of the Movement’s Strategy: The Case of the Serbian Youth Movement Otpor” by Olena Nikolayenko


International Political Science Review, Vol. 34, no. 1, January 2013

“Dialogue or Compliance? Measuring Legislatures’ Policy Responses to Court Rulings on Rights” by Emmett Macfarlane

“Bribes and Ballots: The Impact of Corruption on Voter Turnout in Democracies” by Daniel Stockemer, Bernadette LaMontagne, and Lyle Scruggs


“Non-State Actors and Universal Services in Tanzania and Lesotho: State-Building by Alliance” by Michelle D’arcy

“NGOs, Elite Capture and Community-Driven Development: Perspectives in Rural Mozambique” by Alex Arnall, David S.G. Thomas, Chasca Twyman, and Diana Liverman


“Some More Reliable than Others: Image Management, Donor Perceptions and the Global War on Terror in East African Diplomacy” by Jonathan Fisher

Middle East Journal, Vol. 67, no 2, Spring 2013

“Democratic Paradoxes: Women’s Rights and Democratization in Kuwait” by Emily Regan Wills

“Khomeini’s Concept of Governance of the Jurisconsult (Wilayat al-Faqih) Revisited: The Aftermath of Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election” by Hamid Mavani

Middle East Journal, Vol. 67, no 1, Winter 2013

“Investigating Lebanon’s Political Murders: International Idealism in the Realist Middle East?” by William Harris

“The Middle East Quartet and (In)effective Multilateralism” by Nathalie Tocci


Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, no. 1, Spring 2013

“Transition in the Middle East: New Arab Realities and Iran” by Mahmood Sariolghalam

Orbis, Vol. 57, no. 2, Spring 2013

“Can the Post-Communist Democracies Survive a Continuation of the Euro-Crisis?” by Adrian A. Basora

“Georgia’s 2012 Elections and Lessons for Democracy Promotion” by Michael Cecire

“Dancing for Democracy: Understanding Malawi’s First Female President” by Marilyn Moss Rockefeller and Joan Johnson-Freese

Party Politics, Vol. 19, no. 3, May 2013

“Policy Agendas and Births and Deaths of Political Parties” by David Lowery, Arjen van Witteloostuijn, Gábor Péli, Holly Brasher, Simon Otjes, and Sergiu Gherghina

“Islamists and the Regime: Applying a New Framework for Analysis to the Case of Family Code Reforms in Morocco” by Serida Lucrezia Catalano


“Online Social Networks and Micro-Blogging in Political Campaigning: The Exploration of a New Campaign Tool and a New Campaign Style” by Maurice Vergeer, Liesbeth Hermans, and Steven Sams

Party Politics, Vol. 19, no. 2, March 2013

“Inclusion and its Moderating Effects on Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Mexico’s Partido Acción Nacional” by Steven T. Wuhs

“Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized
New Research

Institutions: The Behavior of Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party in National and Local Politics” by Michael Buehler

“Economic Liberalization and Political Moderation: The Case of Anti-System Parties” by Sarah Wilson Sokhey and A. Kadir Yildirim

“Dynastic Parties: Organization, Finance, and Impact” by Pradeep Chhibber

“Politicization of Ethnicity in Party Manifesitos” by Oleh Protsyk and Stela Garaz


Representation, Vol. 49, no. 1, April 2013
“The Representation of Younger Age Cohorts in Asian Parliaments: Do Electoral Systems Make a Difference?” by Devin K. Joshi

“The Electoral Incentives for Legislator Perceptions in Mixed Systems: Integrating Evidence from East Asia” by Timothy S. Rich

“Proportional Representation and Authoritarianism: Evidence from Russia’s Regional Election Law Reform” by Grigorii V. Golosov

World Politics, Vol. 65, no. 2, April 2013
“King Makers: Local Leaders and Ethnic Politics in Africa” by Dominika Koter

“Capital and Opposition in Africa: Coalition Building in Multiethnic Societies” by Leonardo R. Arriola

“Separatist Conflict in the Former Soviet Union and Beyond: How Different Was Communism?” by Benjamin Smith

World Politics, Vol. 65, no. 1, April 2013
“Path Shifting of the Welfare State: Electoral Competition and the Expansion of Work-Family Policies in Western Europe” by Kimberly J. Morgan

SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON DEMOCRACY

ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES


Occupy the Future. Edited by David B. Grutsky et al. MIT Press, 2013. 280 pp

AFRICA


ASIA


EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION


**New Research**

**LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN**


**MIDDLE EAST**


**COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL, GENERAL**


*In Mistrust We Trust: Can Democracy Survive When We Don’t Trust Our Leaders?* By Ivan Krastev. TED Conferences, 2013. 71 pp.


**APSA-CD** is the official newsletter of the American Political Science Association's Comparative Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published three times a year (October, January, and May) by the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and expanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the field. The newsletter is now jointly produced and edited by faculty members of the University of Florida’s Department of Political Science and the International Forum.

The current issue of APSA-CD is available here. A complete archive of past issues is also available.

To inquire about submitting an article to APSA-CD, please contact Staffan I. Lindberg, Benjamin Smith or Melissa Aten.

### Executive Editors

**Staffan I. Lindberg** is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. He is also PI (with John Gerring and Michael Coppedge) the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project; a research fellow at the Quality of Government Institute, and an associate professor of political science at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. His research focuses on state building, political clientelism, political parties, legislative-executive relations, women’s representation, voting behavior, elections, and democracy in Africa. He is the author of *Democracy and Elections in Africa* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) and the editor of *Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition?* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

**Benjamin Smith** is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research focuses on ethnic conflict, regime change, and the politics of resource wealth. His first book, *Hard Times in the Land of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia*, was published in 2007 by Cornell University Press, and his articles have appeared in *World Politics*, the *American Journal of Political Science*, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, the *Journal of International Affairs*, and other journals and edited volumes. Dr. Smith is currently working on a book exploring the long-term factors that shape the success of separatist movements.

### Members

**Kate Baldwin** is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida. She studies state-building, clientelism, and the political economy of development with a regional focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Her current research projects seek to understand the political consequences of involving non-state actors, such as traditional chiefs and non-governmental organizations, in the provision of goods and services.

**Michael H. Bernhard** is the inaugural holder of the Raymond and Miriam Ehrlich Eminent Scholar Chair in Political Science at the University of Florida. His work centers on questions of democratization and development both globally and in the context of Europe. Among the issues that have figured prominently in his research agenda are the role of civil society in democratization, institutional choice in new democracies, the political economy of democratic survival, and the legacy of extreme forms of dictatorship.

**Petia Kostadinova** is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Illinois Chicago (UIC). Dr. Kostadinova’s main area of research involves the role of citizens’ preferences, and media’s transmission of these preferences, in shaping social and economic policies in the post-communist countries. A second stream of research focuses on the social and economic policies of the European Union. Prof. Kostadinova’s research has been published in *Europe and National Economic Transformation: The EU After the Lisbon Decade*, Mitchell Smith, ed, the *European Journal of Communication*, the *Central European Journal of Communication*, and is forthcoming in *East European Politics and Journal Media Communication*.

**Bryon Moraski** is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research considers the politics of institutional choice, institutional development, and the influence of short-term electoral incentives on long-term political trajectories. His first book, *Elections by Design: Parties and Patronage in Russia’s Regions* (Northern Illinois University Press, 2006) explores the origins of Russia’s sub-national legislative electoral systems. He has published numerous book chapters and articles, including works in *The American Journal of Political Science, Government and Opposition*, and the *Journal of Politics*. He is currently completing a co-authored book manuscript with William Reisinger (University of Iowa) that examines the links between federal elections and gubernatorial (s)election in Russia and their influence on the country’s post-Soviet trajectory.
Conor O’Dwyer is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His book *Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic Development* examines the relationship between party-building and state-building in new democracies, looking specifically at the relationship between party competition and patronage politics in postcommunist Eastern Europe. His latest research examines the European Union’s use of conditionality to promote more liberal minorities policies in postcommunist states. Specifically, it examines the EU’s role in the contentious politics of homosexuality in postcommunist societies. Looking beyond just policy adoption, it examines the impact of EU-sponsored minority-rights policies: do they lead to shifts in attitudes regarding religious difference, national belonging, and minority rights?

Philip Williams is the director of the Center for Latin American Studies and a professor of political science and Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. He also co-directs the Latin American Immigrants in the New South project. His research interests include religion and politics, transnational migration, democratization, social movements, and civil-military relations. His latest book, *A Place to Be: Brazilian, Guatemalan, and Mexican Immigrants in Florida’s New Destinations*, was published by Rutgers University Press in 2009 and his articles have appeared in numerous academic journals, including *Comparative Politics*, *Latin American Perspectives*, *Latin Studies*, and the *Journal of Latin American Studies*.

Leonardo A. Villalón is an associate professor of political science at the University of Florida. His research has focused on Islam and politics and on democratization in West Africa, particularly Senegal, Mali, and Niger. He is the author of *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal* (Cambridge University Press, 1995) and co-editor of *The African State at a Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration* (Lynne Rienner, 1998) and *The Fate of Africa’s Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions* (Indiana University Press, 2005), as well as of numerous articles and book chapters on politics and religion in West Africa.

Managing Editor
Melissa Aten-Becnel is the senior research and conferences officer at the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies and associate director of the Network of Democracy Research Institutes. She earned an M.A. from The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, where she focused on foreign policy and Central Europe.

Editorial Assistant
Adam Bilinski received a B.A. in International Relations at the University of Warsaw (Poland) and M.A. in Social Sciences from the University of Chicago. Currently he is a PhD student in Political Science at the University of Florida with specialization in comparative politics. His research interests include the problems of survival of democracy, electoral revolutions and democracy promotion. He is currently working on his dissertation, which evaluates how pre-democratization historical legacies (in the form of pre-democratization regime discontinuities and regime type both in independent states and colonies) conditioned the probability of survival of once-established democracies.