THE EVERYDAY LIFE *of the* STATE

A State-in-Society Approach

EDITED BY ADAM WHITE

Foreword by Joel S. Migdal

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Foreword

JOEL S. MIGDAL

Establishing authority is no easy business. The difficulty is not only the inclination by many people to resist being told what to do, not an insignificant problem in its own right as any parent or teacher can tell you. It is much more than that. For one, people live in a multivocal world; they hear many commands, often at odds with one another, barked out at them. Even if they are disposed to obey or play along or do the right thing, they still face the excruciating dilemma of whom to obey or play along with. As they hear the multiple rules for behavior from parents, bosses, saints, and political officials, it is not always so evident who the ultimate authority is or if there is an ultimate authority at all. And, even when that is crystal clear, there is almost always a price to be paid for ignoring the other voices. There is no free ride in social action.

Beyond the difficulties in establishing authority in an environment where there is the noise of others who are trying to constitute their own authority is the capriciousness of the bureaucrats, henchmen, hall monitors, disciples, and minions designated to execute authority. They, alas, are almost never totally faithful to their instructions. In fact, transmission of directives can turn out to be like a children's game of telephone, where the command becomes progressively muddled. Robert Cover framed this sort of problem in a bit more sophisticated manner. He commented on how the pristine, original commandments by the authority, what Cover calls *nomos*, devolve immediately into the multiple, diverse stories, or "narratives," constructed by those entrusted with making the authority real in people's lives. So, too, is it even with simple orders and rules, let alone constitutional edicts or foundational commandments.

has experienced this phenomenon because a large population of Bedouins from the northern Arabian Peninsula settled in Kuwait before 1920. These people moved to Kuwait after the current state boundaries were established. These *bidoon* are similar to the children of Egyptian women and non-Egyptian men; they have resided mostly in Kuwait their entire lives but have been unable to receive citizenship rights (in the case of the *bidoon*, it is because either they or their ancestors moved to Kuwait after 1920). Kuwait has experienced a public struggle similar to the one in Egypt over its practice of granting citizenship rights. Despite many other limitations placed on *bidoon* applications for citizenship, the government did agree in 2001 to grant citizenship to children of Kuwaiti widows or divorcees who had been married to *bidoon* men (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2003).

A similar debate questioning the state's practice in granting citizenship rights to the children of native women married to foreign men occurred in Jordan. In fact, Jordan's Queen Ranya was an outspoken leader in the movement to change Jordan's citizenship laws. In 2002, the government announced that it would consider amending the citizenship law to grant women equal rights in passing on their Jordanian citizenship. However, a group of lawmakers, fearing Palestinian access to Jordanian citizenship, put an end to the possibility. Applying Migdal's state-in-society approach will help us better understand not only the three cases mentioned in this chapter but also others throughout the Middle East.

NOTE

Some of the material in this chapter is drawn from Pamela J. Stumpo (2012), "Citizenship Talk and the Challenge to Authoritarianism in Mubarak's Egypt," Ph.D. diss., University of Washington. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

Conclusion

BENJAMIN SMITH

The state-in-society approach has been a public good in political science for more than two decades. Between finishing his dissertation on peasant rebellion and publishing *State in Society*—a nearly thirty-year span—Joel S. Migdal's intellectual trajectory is clear in hindsight. On the one hand, one sees an individual fascinated with the ability of state leaders to compel their country's children to attend public school for more than ten years. On the other hand, one sees him marveling at just how limited state power often is and how relatively rarely states can convince or compel citizens to follow their rules and employ state-sanctioned survival strategies. The chapters in this book not only are a tribute to the immense impact that Migdal's work has had in shaping comparative research on the state but also represent the latest phase in the evolution of state-in-society scholarship.

THE ROOTS OF THE STATE-IN-SOCIETY APPROACH

At its core, the state-in-society framework is a lens through which to view the struggles that take place within every society over whose rules are the ones people decide to follow. To squeeze Migdal's 1988 book, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, unfairly into a couple of paragraphs, it focuses on the material aspects of building effective government in the postcolonial world. Many of his contemporaries in political science took for granted the power of governments around the world to act coherently and to impose Weberian order on their territories. This tendency (Evans, Rueschemeyer,

and Skocpol 1985), while it was a rightful corrective to stateless analyses of the Marxian and functionalist veins, often led to assuming rather than establishing state capacity and autonomy. Migdal instead urges us to focus on the variant conditions under which states have seized, or failed to seize, that power from other places in society. This accumulation of power in state rather than societal hands relies not just on force but also on obedience, drawing on Max Weber's (1978, 53) observation that obedience is as much legitimacy as it is domination. The question for Migdal becomes, who do people obey, and why?

This is a key insight of the book and the original framework. States as we know them usually arrived to the scene to find societies already populated with social organizations—churches and mosques; family, tribal, and ethnic groups; legal systems; and others. Those organizations provided the daily rules and survival strategies people used to get by, produce and trade goods, mediate their conflicts, educate their children, and so forth. And they were not eager to surrender that power. To survive, would-be state leaders had to displace, co-opt, or at least not be conquered by these other organizations. Through this lens, battles over direct versus indirect rule took place not just spatially—across territory—but at the level of authority too. How would rulers in new states accomplish the Weberian imperative of making *their* organization the only game in town?

Ideally, they sought to make people follow state rules rather than other ones. Both the theory and the narratives in *Strong Societies and Weak States* revolve around the "hard" aspects of state power. For Migdal, state power grew out of the ability to reconstruct social power so that it was in one's best interest to follow state rules and not others. In this sense, the framework focused on infrastructural power, to use Michael Mann's (1993, 59–61) term, but its focus on obedience was also influenced heavily by Weber. Moreover, one of the major contributions of Migdal's work on state-society relations was to focus our attention on the sites where the state actually encountered society. In his words in an e-mail to me ten years ago, the best place to uncover the realities of state power is "where the rubber hits the road." That is a central theme of nearly all the chapters in this book: everyday actors frequently accomplish major change both in their societies and in the shape of their states. Migdal's research has increasingly pushed us to study state-society relations at the level of practice: where people actually encounter the state, how they respond to it, how state actors respond to social ones, and how both are changed in the

process. This ground-level focus led Migdal to advocate "an anthropology of the state" (1994, 15).

On the one hand, Migdal strongly advocated a close look at the places where states actually engaged with societies. On the other hand, he worked hard in *Strong Societies and Weak States* to preserve the parsimony of the model of the state as one social organization among many. His account provides a simplified model of A state versus A society to cast sharply the argument that social power is frequently a zero-sum game, while at the same time recognizing that there were often times in which parts of states were in competition with one another or in which social actors captured parts of the state for their own ends rather than for state ones. That insight inspired many scholars to study battles for power within states and over which social groups would successfully use the state to their own ends.

However, the intellectual lineage that resulted from *Strong Societies and Weak States* was largely one of explanatory social science. To use a phrase of Migdal's own writing, he and his fellow state-society scholars generally worked within what he later termed the "narrowly constructed world of rigor" (2001a, chap. 1). It was during the fifteen years following the publication of *Strong Societies and Weak States* that the symbolic and processual elements of the state-in-society approach took shape. And while his first book-length exploration of state-society relations took careful note of the symbolic imagery of the state, in the years preceding the publication of *State in Society* in 2001 this element came to take equal pride of place in Migdal's scholarship.[1]

IMAGE AND PRACTICE

Between 1988 and 2001, when Migdal's *State in Society* appeared in print, there emerged an increasing focus on the nonmaterial character of the state. By 2001, the state-in-society framework had evolved into one focused on the tension between image and practice. In this evolved account of state-society relations, state leaders work very hard to present an *image* of a unified, effective state. The problem is that the things they actually do as state leaders become the state's *practices*, even when they depart from the image. The origins of the state-society or state-in-society framework emerged from material conceptions of state power. But over time Migdal has developed an understanding of the image of stateness as a core principle. His conception of image captured not just external presumptions

about what states are supposed to be able to do—in Migdal's (2001a, 14) words a Weberian state "firing on all cylinders"—but also the effects that those presumptions have on state leaders themselves. And it was not just political leaders and their subjects but also the international observers that expect much of those who hold the reins of state.

The effect of the image is multifaceted. First, scholars have frequently assumed much more capacity for transformation than states could actually accomplish. The persistence of indirect rule, the durability of local strongmen and other nonstate everyday rule makers, the tenacity of substate political identities, all serve as reminders of just how tenuous has been the actual control that states impose on their societies and territories. Second, and this point is sometimes understated in state-in-society studies, the life of a state leader can be rather depressing given the inability to do what seems expected. Because the original statement of the state-society nexus cast political authority as a zero-sum game, we often assume that state leaders are almost rapacious in their first-order desire to seize existing loci of authority from other places, to cow them into submission by accumulating social power in the state. But is this accurate? Do state leaders in all times and places seek to maximize their power, as suggested by Margaret Levi's (1988) revenue-maximizing officials? Or does the iron cage of the image of stateness at times constrain the iron fist of rulers by subjecting them to unrealistic expectations about what they might hope to accomplish?[2]

Migdal's evolving work suggests that the answer to the latter question is yes. State builders and state rulers are also, to some degree, trapped by the image of the modern state. They are expected, and as a result themselves expect, to exercise a legitimate monopoly of violence across their territories. Despite this, most contemporary states *still* lack the technical capacity to impose direct rule. This is the Migdalian paradox: rulers inherit an administrative apparatus that is unable to keep up with the lofty expectations about state capacity. Migdal's material states can rarely sustain their idealistic expectations. His updated definition reflects this tension: "The state is a field of power marked by the threat and use of violence and shaped by (1) *the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory*, and (2) *the actual practices of its multiple parts*" (Migdal 2001a, 15-16).

Migdal's focus has been on the efforts by state builders and their successors to craft and recraft the image of coherence and control. This is

somewhat ironic because such an approach often looks at state leaders as agenda setters strategically laying out the state narrative for societal consumers. The irony, as many of the chapters in this book attest, is that Migdal has been relentlessly (and justifiably) skeptical of the theoretical and substantive appropriateness of attributing so much latitude to even the highest-ranking state elites. An important corrective, then, is that the image of the state that has developed in more recent iterations of the state-in-society framework is as often independent of, and therefore a constraint on, state elites as it is a product of them. Even in the world's advanced industrial democracies political leaders find themselves hemmed in by overblown expectations of what they can really accomplish. In short, it is not just societal actors that confront state actors but the image of the state itself, constantly demanding more than can be delivered even in the most powerful states.

It is here that the image-driven focus of Migdal's framework has had its greatest impact. In the same way that infrastructural constraints limited what state leaders could do in imposing power across territory, social hierarchy, and societal cleavages, "image constraints" sharply rein in the nation-building ambitions of those leaders. But where does the image come from? Or, to return to state leaders as principals for whom the image is an agent of varying loyalty, what share of that image is actually the product of, or within the control of, state leaders?

PROCESS: STATE AND SOCIETY AS MUTUALLY CONSTITUTIVE

In addition to an increasing focus on the symbolic rather than the material, Migdal's state-in-society framework has come to focus on process. What does it mean to focus on process? In significant part it implies looking at state-society relations through a historical lens, but that is not all. The framework implores a focus on how state and societal actors transform each other during the process of interaction and (often) contestation. Interaction, again, is most frequently over rules: whose rules are the ones people choose to obey. Furthermore, alongside and overlapping with processes of state-society interaction, Migdal's approach also encourages us to focus on the equally transformative relationship that exists between the image and practices of the state. For Migdal, the content of these key analytical categories does not remain constant but evolves over time in

response to the changing complexion of state-society encounters. In effect, then, it is this focus on process that brings together in one melting pot the different strands of the state-in-society approach. The interactions between state and society, image and practice, are clearly reflected in a variety of historical periods and geographic locales throughout the chapters in this volume.

Pamela J. Stumpo's chapter, for instance, highlights a key aspect of the mutual constitutional dynamic: the transformation of social actors through their interactions with the state. She demonstrates that it is frequent for social actors to find themselves and their agendas transformed and sometimes partially co-opted by their engagements with the state. In her words, Egyptians who found themselves on the losing end of the state's "exclusionary citizenship laws based on certain bloodlines" also found themselves reinforcing the official state vision by challenging it. The dynamic here—that social actors challenging the state reinforced both its image and its concrete centrality precisely by challenging it—is a common theme in state-in-society scholarship. The dynamic of unintentional, mutual change is a key one, but it is not by any means the only one. Both state and societal actors also pursue intentional strategies that under varying circumstances can either strengthen or weaken the state. The most self-evident is the one that state leaders themselves try to present to the outside world: that of an all-powerful state apparatus operating just as efficiently as its Weberian ideal type would predict.

It is not only states that wish to cast themselves as all powerful, however. Social actors frequently have strong incentives to cast states in a similar way to frame a narrative of oppression to the outside world. As Nicole F. Watts explains in her chapter, Kurdish challengers to the Turkish state were just as happy to depict it in those terms: "Movement-linked actors tend to produce narratives of state-society relations peopled by unnuanced heroes and villains." The villain her Kurdish actors described, of course, was characterized as a Weberian bully, meting out undeserved punishment to Kurds in Turkey for challenging the ethnically Turkish image the state sought to market. In short, societal actors on the ground have incentives to engage in the same overblown state image-crafting as do state elites themselves.

Another major, but more implicit, avenue of inquiry has to do with the fragmentation that often afflicts social organizations as they prepare to engage or challenge the state. Patricia J. Woods's chapter illustrates the

tensions not within the state but within a single social organization—the Israeli women's movement—as it aimed to represent a unified narrative challenge to the Israeli state. The emergence of, first, a "standpoint theory" narrative casting women as unified in perspective vis-à-vis a male-dominated state *and* mainstream society and, second, a fragmentation driven by "specificity" points to an important phenomenon. That is, that social organizations can fragment, just as the state can, over access to power and resources. And it appears that the simple fact of engaging the state can foment fragmentation where it might not occur otherwise. Just as important, the simple fact that groups are engaging the state—rather than other groups—appears to generate substantially different intra-group dynamics.

Watts's chapter illustrates intricately the numerous organizations that have both claimed to represent Turkish Kurds *and* become vehicles through which Kurdish individuals channel their political preferences. Some of those organizations—and Watts includes among them avowedly "pro-Kurdish" parties—were "designed" to serve as conduits for Kurdish ethnic politics vis-à-vis the Turkish state. Others were not—nonethnic parties across the political spectrum—but this reflects the reality, as Watts notes that it is not ethnic groups but organizations that engage in ethnic politics. In just the same way, it is rarely central governments that engage in state-society relations, but rather smaller, lower parts of the state, in the hands of officials who inhabit both state and societal roles.

Senem Aslan's chapter in this volume elucidates a similar process in Morocco, where mobilization by the country's Amazigh minority accomplished substantial changes in the way the state officially viewed it, as well as unintentionally changing the way the group's members viewed both themselves and the nature of the Moroccan state. Indeed, the monarchy's efforts to co-opt Amazigh moderates, and the movement's efforts to skirt outright repression by the state, led to both transforming themselves. Iza Hussin's chapter, too, illustrates how iterated interaction between British colonial authorities and religious elites in India and Malaya changed both fundamentally in ways that belied the intentions of both parties. The push back by religious elites against colonial administrative efforts to overhaul the role of religious law in Indian and Malay society both introduced state power into the "repertoire of religion" and made religion a part of the state itself. In short, states occupy a pride of place in our political imaginations, as well as in the calculations of social activists seeking to change state policy. That aspiration to change how the state treats a set of social actors

implies a fairly lofty capacity for the state to accomplish all that is hoped for, and the high-reaching image far outstrips what they can usually do in practice.

NATIONS AND STATES

Perhaps no other research program in comparative politics is as ripe for state-in-society analysis as the study of how collective identities form, re-form, and are contested. Nationalism as the highest form of collective identity has garnered the most attention. A number of the chapters—especially those discussing state-society relations in Turkey and Israel—tackle questions of national and subnational identities from a state-in-society perspective, exploring not just the frequent tensions between state leaders' efforts to convince their citizens to take on a particular national identity and the myriad accidental outcomes that accrue from such nation-building strategies.

While states came into their own in political science as independent actors in the 1970s and 1980s, the study of collective political identity during the same period bifurcated into the studies of nationalism and ethnicity. While periodically overlapping in explanatory framework, the two fields of study more often than not remained substantively distinct, cut off from each other by the state. Benedict Anderson's seminal *Imagined Communities* (1991) is a good example of this: only national narratives in the hands of people who wanted to create *a new state* qualified for discussion in his book. Indeed, Anderson (1992, 7) refers to ethnicity as the "much less respectable younger relation" of nationalism. Why? The answer is that groups seeking something less than a state occupied a second-class niche in the state-dominated worldview of collective identity. Like modernization theorists two decades before them, who viewed only national identities as properly modern ones, scholars of nationalism have often laid state ambition down as the baseline for inclusion in their universe of cases.[3] It raised the question: do groups demanding their own state differ fundamentally from those that do not? Experience with putatively separatist groups that settle for autonomy, cultural policy change, and the like suggests that maximalist demands—for their own state—are as often bargaining strategies as they are actual goals.

A state-in-society take on this question would caution us against assigning any sort of ranking or hierarchy on the basis of whether groups make

state claims, initially or at any point in time. The reason is that, like states, ethnic groups and their organizational spokespersons change during the process of interacting with the state. As Migdal (2001a, 23) remarks, the state-in-society approach "is not a prize-fighter model in which each combatant remains unchanged throughout the bout and holds unswervingly to the goal of knocking out the other . . [rather] . . . [t]he dynamic process changes the groupings themselves, their goals, and, ultimately, the rules they are promoting." So while at certain times the state might constitute a threat to the group's existence, at other times it might represent a space through which the group can advance its cause. And this shifting field of threats and opportunities may result from changes inside the group, changes within the state, or most likely changes coming from interactions between the state and group. The important point here is that this variability will serve to transform the way in which the group interprets the state's image and seeks to distort and manipulate its practices. In short, a state-in-society lens helps illuminate the problem of typecasting groups on the basis of their claims to a state at a particular point in time.

An example from Iraqi political history ties some of these concepts together. Kurdish separatists in Iraq have bedeviled central state authorities in that country since the end of the First World War and challenged the Ottomans before that. The British administration charged with pacifying Kurdish Iraq in the 1920s failed and handed off the responsibility to its handpicked monarch, King Faisal. He failed too, and so have all those who followed him. What Iraqi leaders have for decades called the Kurdish "problem" still exists today. In Iraq, the problem has been one of reconciling the space of the state with the multiple groups living in that space—what Anderson referred to as the problem of stretching the tight skin of the nation over the unwieldy structure of the nation-state.

In 1968, the Baath Party returned to power in Iraq, and the new leader, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, felt threatened enough internally by the military, by the Iraqi Communist Party, and externally by Iran to want to find a way to solve the Kurdish problem. He assigned his vice president, Saddam Hussein, to lead this diplomatic effort. The fact that it was a diplomatic effort is peculiar. Here was a vice president negotiating as an equal with a separatist leader from his own country, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who himself was far from a unanimous leader of Iraq's often fragmented Kurds. But he, more than any of his Kurdish rivals, could rightly claim an ability to pacify most of Iraq's Kurdish regions: to provide them with a modicum of secu-

rity and a set of more or less stable rules for everyday life. No Iraqi state, and not the British either, had been able to do this; they had long relied on agreements with individual tribal leaders, violating the image of state as chief enforcer. In short, Mullah Mustafa was as close to a personification of stateness as Iraqi Kurdistan had seen since independence. But that status came not from demands for independence but rather from his capacity as rule maker and rule enforcer.

The negotiations between Saddam and Mullah Mustafa led to the agreement of 1970, which called for more Kurdish representation in the central government and for substantial Kurdish control of local government. This episode was reflective of a central government violating most parts of its own public relations effort. First, the Sunni Arab–dominated regime acknowledged its lack of stateness in monopolizing the use of force within its boundaries, agreeing instead to negotiate with a rival social organization over rules. Second, the regime actually changed both itself and its rival rule maker. Mullah Mustafa's militia and supporters became *part of the state* at both the local and national levels, subsequently changing the state itself. Here the Iraqi state acknowledged the claims of a rival rule maker and actually incorporated those claims into its own rules and narrative about itself and the people it claimed to govern.

Only a few years later, both sides abrogated the agreement. Because the central government dispensed with its external threats, it focused on and nearly wiped out Mullah Mustafa's Kurdish Democratic Party in 1975, sending him fleeing into Iran. This again points to an important insight that Migdal's state-in-society framework insists we address. The state and society change constantly. Each episode of conflict and contention is one between a state that is different, and a social group that is different, than it was at the last moment of encounter. Take the Iraqi army's 1988 attack on the Kurds, one of the acts for which Saddam was to go on trial for his life. Far from Saddam's own language in 1970 describing Kurds and Arabs as brothers in the Iraqi state, the man he handpicked to lead the offensive against the Kurds—Ali Hassan al-Majid, who we later came to know as Chemical Ali—referred to Kurds not as brothers but as "enemies of the state" at his trial. *Enemies of the state!* This is about as stark a change in the image of the state as it is possible to imagine. To the regime, the Iraqi state had ceased to be a site of interethnic fraternity recognizing Kurdish aspirations and had become one dedicated to crushing those aspirations.

Yet, only a few years after the 1988 attacks on the Kurdish regions, the

Iraqi state almost entirely ceased to be a central rule maker there. In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam again signed an agreement with Kurdish leaders giving them de facto regional control. Today, in post-occupation Iraq, the Kurdish signatories of those agreements—Jalal Talabani and Masud Barzani—are, respectively, the presidents of Iraq and of the Kurdish regional government. Talabani's primary job today is to maintain the unity of the Iraqi state against, among other things, Kurdish aspirations. The image and meaning of the Iraqi state for Kurds has again fundamentally changed, and so too has the Kurdish movement changed as a result of its ongoing interaction with the central government. And as the chapters in this book illustrate, the mutually recursive relationship between the Iraqi state and the Kurdish organizations that claim to represent Iraq's Kurdish minority is far from unique.

STATE-IN-SOCIETY SCHOLARSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

It is worth asking at this point how this framework holds together such a disparate body of scholarship. Between 1988 and today, Migdal's thinking—and the framework he presented—have changed dramatically. From a fairly simple, material, causal model of where to look and how, it has morphed into a much more complex process-focused one. But within that broad trend, as the chapters in this book illustrate, are many fruitful means of employing the state-in-society framework. Likewise, between those two variants of Migdal's framework lie many fruitful uses of his central insights. Some of the chapters hew closer to the material causal simplicity of the 1988 version, while others by contrast fall closer to its more recent, nonmaterial and process-focused form. In that sense one can conceptualize a continuum from positivist to symbolic state-in-society inquiry. Along that continuum, studying the state takes either a more hypothesis-testing tack or a more interpretive one that seeks to understand the image-laden elements of state power and its limits.

No matter where the chapters fall on that continuum, though, they all share a commitment to studying the everyday life of the state. That is, they are committed to studying states as less than natural and to studying them as if they are neither coherent nor actually separate from the societies they try to rule. That is the elegance of Migdal's framework. It also has led to a productive research program that skirts many of the cleavages that divide

contemporary political science. Scholars who draw inspiration from this framework frequently ignore debates over methods and ways of knowing that plague the rest of our profession and instead simply pursue answers to big questions.

There is in the Migdal circle a legacy of ecumenical thinking about theory and method, even about discipline. But it is worth asking, where is that legacy likely to lead scholars of the state in the future? What direction(s) in state-in-society scholarship appear most fruitful? Are there areas in which the approach comes up short? One such area, it strikes me, is the collapse of the Soviet Union as a "case" of the sudden emergence of a large number of nation-states. By most accounts the Soviet state was an incredibly intrusive one that found its way into nearly all areas of personal life, yet it also collapsed in the almost total absence of any predictions. How did this state come apart at the seams so quickly? What made it possible, as Mark Beissinger, Henry Hale, Philip Roeder, and others have noted, for so many new nation-states to emerge from the ashes of the Soviet empire in just a few years? Although it is certainly appropriate to continue asking, as Migdal has, "why do so many states stay intact?" it seems equally important to ask, "why do some seemingly unassailable ones collapse so completely, so quickly?" Both topically and regionally, only one scholar has engaged this topic from a state-in-society perspective (see Bakke and Wibbels 2006; and Bakke 2007). The former Yugoslavia is no less fascinating: since 1994, more independent states have emerged from this already small Balkan state than have seceded in the rest of the world. What kind of state-society dynamic made it possible for the USSR and its ethno-federal counterpart Yugoslavia to disintegrate like this? Understanding why the grip that the Yugoslav and Soviet states had on their citizens' collective identity was so tenuous is still far from complete, and a state-in-society lens might provide illumination.

Migdal himself (2009) has called for studies of the state to wed historical and cultural institutional insights—to understand both the trajectories along which states move in time and the symbolic efforts their leaders make to cast the state in one light or another. He also has called for a "tri-level focus" on the image of the state, structured comparison as a most fruitful method of analyzing states, and dynamics within states themselves—highlighting again that accumulating knowledge about the state requires us to look where the rubber hits the road. Given the heavily explanatory bent of the examples Migdal uses in making this pitch for future research, there may be some tension between the historical-causal

and the image-focused affections of Migdal's most recent iteration of the state-in-society approach. But that is likely to be a creative and productive tension, as it compels both dialogue and ecumenical thinking.

ANOTHER LEGACY: MIGDAL AS MENTOR

Although Joel Migdal has established the state-in-society framework as a major approach to studying political development, his legacy will be greater than this. In addition to his scholarly footprint upon contemporary political science, there is a personal one: his role as mentor. Within a broad set of shared concerns over the construction of authority in the modern world, the contributors to this volume and Migdal's other former students have branched out into many areas of social science inquiry. This book, filled with insightful research by scholars studying states all over the world, is testament to that generosity of mentorship that characterizes Joel Migdal. One future implication, not of the state-in-society approach but of its author's success at modeling selflessness, is an epistemic community of scholars motivated to be generous and to encourage their own students to think in an equally broad way. Stephen Van Evera (1997, 110) encourages graduate students to aspire to be "menschlike" when they become academics; he could just as easily have encouraged them to be "Migdal-like." Such an approach to career planning would model Migdal's own career trajectory: to eschew the unnecessary method and theory debates in political science and simply to chase down questions provoked by the observation that, despite their weaknesses, states continue to command center stage in modern politics. But it would also hold an imperative to be as intellectually and personally bighearted as Joel Migdal has been to so many young scholars. The conference out of which this volume grew featured research not just by students and former students of Joel Migdal but also by scholars who as graduate students contacted him from departments across the country to ask for advice or a close read of a chapter or paper. When confronted with multiple options on an issue related to mentoring or professional generosity, one place to start is to ask, "What would Joel do?"

As mentioned above, Migdal's framework has changed substantially over the years. It has changed this way in significant part because Joel has had a remarkable capacity to be influenced by the students he works with even as they are influenced by him. The changes in the state-in-society framework reflect in part the work that his Ph.D. students have done on

the role of ideas and images and how those ideas are propagated in interactions between social actors and the state, often causing dramatic changes to both. This is another legacy of Migdal as mentor: a luminary scholar who nonetheless engages young scholars and students as equals and learns as much as he teaches. As one of those former students, I am glad to have the opportunity to express my gratitude in a permanent venue.

NOTES

1 See, e.g., Migdal 1999; also reprinted as chapter 5 in Migdal 2001a.
2 First, this point borrows from and inverts the title of an article by Dan Slater (2003): "Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia." Second, readers will perhaps see the threads of similarity between more recent iterations of the state-in-society framework and one proposed by James C. Scott in *Seeing like a State* (1998). That Scott's work appears by reference in many of this volume's chapters is no accident.
3 Michael Hechter (2000, 7), for example, defines *nationalism* as ethnic identity paired with the demand for a state.

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